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Introduction 
 
Of the female Titanes they say that Mnemosyne discovered the uses of the power of reason, and that she 
gave a designation to every object about us by means of the names which we use to express whatever we would and 
to hold conversation one with another...And to this goddess is also attributed the power to call things to memory and 
to remembrance (mneme) which men possess, and it is this power which gave her the name she received.  
 
Diodorus Siculus1 
 
We cannot know for sure why the Greeks believed that one mythical creature – the Goddess of Memory - 
should be the source of "power of reason", of authoritative speech (Hesiod's Theogony2) and of the ability to call 
things to mind, but elements of this mythic cosmology impinge on the nature of cultural processes that are at the 
heart of this study.  
 
On a chilly afternoon of December 2010 a group of ten Georgian intellectuals took a 
special trip from Tbilisi (Georgia’s capital) to Lake Bazaleti,3 where the Free University's off 
campus training center is located. They gathered around the table in a small classroom and 
remained there for about five hours deliberating on the history textbook they were venturing to 
write. Their discussion concerned historical events spanning the last two hundred years and their 
goal was to think of a better way in which to tell a story of 200 years of Russian occupation. 
What this "better" implied has to do with a particular memory discourse and the political 
reasoning from which this memory discourse emanates; but it also has to do with how this group 
envisions Georgian identity, how it critically reflects upon "Georgian mentality" and how it 
foresees the "recovery" of the nation.  
The discussion was sporadic, imbued with humorous tales about mothers and wives of 
Georgian kings, anecdotes of Georgia's daily political life, or sarcastic tales about Georgian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Diodorus	  Siculus.	  Library	  of	  History	  (Books	  III	  -­‐	  VIII).	  Translated	  by	  Oldfather,	  C.	  H.	  Loeb	  Classical	  Library	  Volumes	  303	  and	  340.	  Cambridge,	  MA,	  Harvard	  University	  Press;	  London,	  William	  Heinemann	  Ltd.	  1935.	  2	  Hesiod,	   Homeric	   Hymns,	   Epic	   Cycle,	   Homerica.	   Translated	   by	   Evelyn-­‐White,	   H	   G.	   Loeb	   Classical	   Library	  Volume	  57.	  London:	  William	  Heinemann,	  1914.	  3	  Lake	  Bazaleti	  is	  located	  some	  60	  kilometers	  northwest	  of	  Tbilisi,	  with	  a	  surrounding	  recreation	  area	  and	  a	  village	  (with	  the	  same	  name).	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historians who like to write "myths" about "how we [Georgians] survived because every single 
Georgian fought till the last drop of blood". For the members of this group these myths 
represented notions of “exaggerated Georgianness4”.     
“We have to finish this textbook as soon as possible “ said Kakha Bendukidze, the founder and 
owner of the university, a right-wing neoliberal, a venture-capitalist who made his fortune in 
Russia and came back to Georgia to serve as a Minister of Economy (for more on Bendukidze 
and the Free University see chapter 1).  He urged the group to finish  “because there is another 
group working on the same thing. Their version is how Georgians fought relentlessly, shedding 
blood and all that”, he noted with a glimmer of humor everyone enjoyed. “We have to distance 
ourselves significantly from the stereotype that exists which involves a confrontation of refined, 
God-loving, brave and educated Georgians with the savage and uneducated...” 
“...rest of the world” Leri,5 a professor of philosophy in his 70s teaching at Free 
University, helped him finish the sentence. 
“Yes, the rest of the world” agreed Bendukidze. 
“So we are not writing a ‘mother-history’ [Georgian deda-istoria]”, queried Giorgi, a 27-
year-old poet, founder of a renowned website for literature and poetry and someone who a few 
years later was appointed Director of Georgian National Library.  
“Just like Argo mounting a siege of Colchis,6” said Gaga, a psychologist in his 50s 
teaching at Free University as he took an even more humorous tone toward "mother-history.”7 
Everyone laughed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “Georgianness”	  (Georgian	  kartveloba)	  is	  a	  term	  of	  common	  use	  that	  simply	  would	  be	  translated	  as	  Georgian	  identity,	   but	   while	   identity	   is	   a	   neutral	   term,	   Georgianness	   is	   a	   value	   charged	   word	   that	   functions	   as	   a	  condensed	  symbol	  representing	  some	  essentialist	  notions	  on	  the	  character	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people.	  	  5	  While	   I	   refer	   to	   Kakha	   Bendukidze	   and	   few	   other	   individuals	  who	   appear	   in	   this	   study	   by	   a	   full	   name,	   I	  prefer	   to	  use	  only	   first	  names	   (or	  pseudonyms	  where	   stated)	  with	   respect	   to	  others	  even	   in	   cases	  where	   I	  have	  been	  granted	  permission	  to	  use	  their	  real	  and/or	  full	  names.	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“Treacherously, the ship of Argo treacherously sieging the Colchis,” added Bendukidze, 
enjoying such caricaturization of the “stereotype” he brought up himself. A few minutes after 
entertaining the version of the ancient Greek myth on the Argonauts twisted in the spirit of 
“mother-history” Bendukidze continued: “The thing is if we don't employ some other angle, any 
one of troublesome events from the 20
th century will turn out just as Temur said to me once.  He 
was the head of the committee and gave me a small green book on history of Abkhazia8 and told 
me that this book is not only historically right,” and here Bendukidze paused briefly to 
accentuate the end of his sentence, “but politically right as well.”  
 A giggle and amusement went around the room, and he concluded: “...so we will end up 
with something like this.” 
“You can't trust any of the books published by that government”, pointed out Lali, a 
professor of linguistics in her 40s, teaching a course titled “Georgian Language and the 
Georgians” at the Free University. 
“So, how do we write a bestseller...”, said Dimitri, a historian in his 60s who had no 
affiliation with Free University and who seemed less in synch with the spirit of jesting “mother-
history”, as he summarized somewhat doubtfully the conversation. 
“No, not a bestseller” responded Bendukidze. “How do we write truth or what is the 
truth, that is our challenge... and also how do we write truth so that it does not provoke bloody 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Colchis	  is	  the	  first	  proto-­‐Georgian	  state	  on	  the	  eastern	  coast	  of	  the	  Black	  Sea	  established	  in	  Middle	  Bronze	  Age	  (see	  Suny	  1988,	  Rayfield	  2012)	  7	  “Mother-­‐History”	  (Georgian	  deda-­‐istoria)	  is	  a	  title	  of	  a	  historical	  novel	  by	  Levan	  Sanikidze	  that	  portrays	  the	  history	  of	  Georgia	  from	  ancient	  times	  till	  the	  20th	  century,	  through	  the	  adventures	  of	  Georgians’	  heroism	  and	  self-­‐sacrifice,	  first	  published	  in	  late	  1986.	  But	  “mother-­‐history”	  is	  a	  term	  of	  common	  use	  that	  on	  the	  one-­‐hand,	  signifies	  a	  particular	  vision	  of	  Georgia’s	  past,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  expresses	   the	  notion	  that	  Georgia’s	  past	  (as	  portrayed	  in	  Sanikidze’s	  novel)	  is	  a	  birth-­‐giver	  (hence	  a	  mother)	  of	  the	  Georgian	  nation.	  However,	  this	  group	  deploys	   the	   term	   as	   a	   way	   to	   satirize	   this	   particular	   vision	   of	   the	   past	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   “exaggerated	  Georgianness”	  (see	  more	  on	  this	  in	  chapter	  5).	  	  	  8	  Abkhazia	  is	  a	  seccesionist	  republic	  on	  the	  eastern	  coast	  of	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  recognized	  first	  by	  Russia	  and	  few	  other	   states	   as	   an	   autonomous	   republic.	   The	   conflict	   between	  Abkhazia	   and	  Georgia	   errupted	   in	   the	   early	  1990s,	  and	  to	  this	  day	  it	  remains	  a	  disputed	  territory.	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mass turmoil and attacks by bishops and by Marika all at the same time...” Marika was a 
renowned historian of Soviet intelligentsia generation, who was viewed by this group as an 
archetypical representative of the historians upholding the nationalist "myths," the historical 
"stereotype" as Bendukidze coined it – of the "confrontation of refined, God-loving, brave and 
educated Georgians with the savage and uneducated rest of the world." 
Their semi-humorous, sporadic discussion went on for hours, but this fragment of 
conversation provides an entry point into a set of issues that is the concern of this study. To make 
some sense of this almost inarticulate dialogue, one should have answers to at least the following 
questions: What does Bendukidze refer to when he mentions "another group working on the 
same thing?" What is the "stereotype" they have in mind? What do the Argonauts have to do 
with “mother-history?” Why would "writing truth" provoke bloody mass turmoil and attacks 
from bishops and prestigious historians? And last but not least, why is this group writing a 
history textbook on 200 years of Georgia's occupation? What kind of true but "untold story" 
(Mink, 1978) do they think is waiting to be told?  
These questions are specific, but answers to them speak to much broader issues on 
culture of memory and of memory debates, a socio-cultural web of meanings that are woven into 
the fabric of these debates, as well as political conditions that underpin endeavors such as the one 
in question. Answering these questions, then, requires not only peeling off several layers of 
socio-political landscape, but gaining deeper understanding of cultural semantics that is at the 
heart of this form of intra-cultural interaction.  
This study examines two distinct but mutually constitutive discursive genres on Georgian 
identity: one based in the voice of self-idealization and the other in self-condemnation. These 
two genres are embedded in historical conceptions and enact public debate on the country's 
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geopolitical challenges. The vignette introduced above provides an entry into the politically 
strained discursive terrain that unfolds as a “game of memory” between two visions of Georgian 
history, Georgian identity and Georgian geopolitics. The Free University textbook project on 200 
Years of Georgia’s Occupation enacts a hidden polemic (Bakhtin 1984) between two voices on 
Georgianness. It dialogically engages the self-idealizing and self-condemning voices to defy the 
former and re-emphasize the latter.  
 Throughout this study I examine how these two voices unfold through debates on 
historical memory and how they shape forms of political reasoning. On the basis of diverse 
textual and ethnographic material I suggest that in Georgian public discourse individuals employ 
“history” as a culturally meaningful, rhetorical resource to reflect upon “who we are” because 
memory functions as a fundamental symbolic form that speaks to the core of national 
consciousness. Georgians conceive of their past in a way that presupposes the co-existence of 
two contradictory registers of “Georgianness”, and framing the past in historical narratives 
reflects what I shall refer to as the bivocal nature of both Georgians’ memory and their way of 
thinking about themselves.  This is a bivocality involving mythically idealized terms, on the one 
hand, and critical self-condemning terms, on the other.   I argue that two contradictory voices 
that articulate Georgia’s past and Georgian identity belong not so much to distinct speakers as to 
discursive domains that exist within, as well as between speakers. Whether it is a casual 
communicative exchange or critical debate in which Georgian memory enters the discursive 
realm, it can sustain two distinct, but mutually interdefining discursive modes on Georgia’s past 
and Georgian identity.  
This bivocality of discourse is something that I have come to appreciate through my personal 
experience. Namely, I came to realize that every Georgian I knew could talk two different 
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“talks” while hardly ever reflecting on the contradiction between the “truths” that each “talk” 
embodies: in one moment Georgians can admire how “We” have always been able to unite to 
stand heroically in the face of all difficulties, but then in a split second exclaim how cursed this 
“self-betraying” and constantly “divided” nation was. My study shows how the voice of self-
idealization is resisted on some occasions and how in others it is reinforced for certain political 
goals.  
In chapter 1, I begin by mapping out Georgia’s socio-political landscape since the early 
1990s to outline major discursive trends that have been shaping the public sphere for the last 
decades. These trends have direct relevance for the ethnographies presented in this study. In this 
chapter I also situate my study within scholarly literature and summarize my approach to 
memory in general terms. Subsequent chapters provide more detailed and case-specific 
theoretical frameworks.  
Chapter 2 examines historical textbooks published in three different periods: a) in the 1970s 
during the Soviet era, b) in the 1990s, immediately after Georgia gained independence, and c) in 
the 2000s when Georgia was an economically impoverished country with an inept state 
apparatus. My analysis of these texts is oriented toward exposing a set of paradigmatic 
categories, what I refer to as memory maxims that shape historical conceptions and sustain 
discursive modes on Georgia’s past and Georgian identity. It is here that I arrive at a conclusion 
that memory maxims can enter the Georgian discursive realm on national identity with two 
distinct voices: one that focuses on self-idealization and one that can potentially sustain a critical 
discourse of self-condemnation. 
Chapter 3, builds on the analysis of the previous chapter and looks into how “historical 
memory” as a culturally meaningful category shapes contests over a nation’s present and future. 
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At the same time, by a combined analysis of ethnographic and textual material, I seek to 
demonstrate that a discursive tradition in which two voices on Georgianness are employed for 
reflecting on the past and present and a particular memory image that is posed to define 
nationhood has its antecedents in 19th century emergence of nationalism and the founding texts 
of that period.  
In chapter 4, I examine over 200 essays written by Georgian students on the topic of 
tradition and modernity for a writing competition (more on this chapter 1 and 4) organized by the 
Free University. While this analysis serves to substantiate my claims on the discursive function 
of memory maxims and on the rhetorical value of the past, it also demonstrates how these 
symbolic forms can anchor contesting ideologies that shape Georgia’s socio-political landscape.  
Furthermore, the students’ essays present a case in which only one of two contradictory memory 
voices is employed, revealing a particularly one-sided form of discourse sometimes found in the 
public sphere. Namely, for the purpose of their argument the students engaged the voice of self-
idealization as a structuring element of their texts.  
In chapters 5 and 6 I focus on the two history textbook projects on Russian-Georgian 
relations and situate them in the wider sociocultural and geopolitical processes that have shaped 
Georgia’s discursive landscape and triggered production of the textbook on Russian-Georgian 
relations. I show how the struggle over Georgia’s geopolitical belonging and the resulting 
disputes on national identity and national politics are reflected in the public sphere where liberal 
intellectuals vie with the members of the Soviet generation intelligentsia to re-chart the history of 
the last 200 years.  This involves looking into ways in which the hidden memory polemic 
between intellectuals and intelligentsia historians enacts the dialogism between the two voices 
built in Georgia’s memory paradigm.  
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CHAPTER 1: SITUATING THE STUDY: IN SEARCH OF A GEORGIAN 
MNEMONIC LANDSCAPE 
 
1.1. GEORGIA: TIME AND PLACE MAP 
 
In the wake of post-Soviet (or even Soviet) nationalism, making or re-making "national 
histories" became one of the most important instruments for sustaining claims of political 
legitimacy (Hirsch, 2005; Yurchak, 2006; Ušakin, 2009) and strengthening, if not altogether 
"inventing traditions" of peoplehood (Hobsbawm 1983). The mobilization of historical memories 
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served states to consolidate populations around nationalist goals, to draw or redraw national 
boundaries, while at the same time sustaining the discourse of resistance and dissent within and 
between states. Specifically in Georgia, a nationalist ideology "was built on the idea of defying 
imperial domination" (Khalvashi & Batiashvili, 2010) and empowering categories of national 
identity such as the Georgian language and Orthodox Christianity. Such markers of collective 
identity sustained a discourse of resistance and claims of independence.   
While in Georgia, a discourse on the "common past" as a symbolic marker of the nation 
has its precursors in the 19th century intellectual landscape, in the 1990s (after the disintegration 
of the USSR) a revived historical consciousness became integral to a nationalism of a certain 
type. Nationalist discourse of the 1990s was employed not so much for marking Georgia off 
from Russian space, but for shaping cultural and political conceptions of what a Georgian state 
should represent in terms of its historical mission and cultural belonging. Collective images of 
nationhood that under the Russian domination had gained cultural legitimacy for enabling 
individuals to transgress and subvert the Soviet state's official rhetoric, were mobilized by the 
political leadership of independent Georgia and inscribed into the hegemonic discourses on the 
Georgian state and "Georgianness" (Batiashvili, forthcoming). Ronald Grigor Suny has written 
extensively on the role of memory in Armenia’s as well as Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s 
primordialist discourse that essentializes notions of nationhood and reifies national identity 
(Suny, 1993; also see Garagazov 2008) 
Nationalism, as Bruce Kapferer has put it "makes the political religious and places the 
nation above politics" (1988, p 1). In Georgia this came to be realized in a most literal sense, as 
the Georgian Orthodox Church institutionalized the ethno-nationalist doctrine into its orthodox 
practice, thus making religion political. In Viktor Shnirelman’s (1998) words since late 1980s 
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Georgian nationalism emphasized the role of Georgia as a “stronghold of Christianity” in a 
hostile Muslim environment (p. 58). Not only did nationalism became a hegemonic ideology, but 
in subsequent years religious essentialization of such elements of collective identity as ethnicity 
and faith fed into social and political frictions, struggles for power, and eventually resulted in a 
civil war and multiple ethnic conflicts (see Pelkmans, 2006). Because ethno-nationalism has no 
basis without claims on the past, memory debates were integral to most political contests, and 
became even more so to the ones about disputed territories.  Historical myths played a crucial 
role in substantiating political claims, while historiography became both an instrument and a site 
for contesting legitimacy on the territorial claims (Shnirelman, 1995) and stiffened the friction 
between the parties (Shnirelman, 1998).     
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in an attempt to reverse seventy years of 
isolationism many post-Soviet states resorted to the idea of the “West” as a terrain of renewed 
belonging. As Katherine Verdery (1999) has pointed out, post-socialist transformation involved 
“a reordering of people’s entire meaningful worlds” and this open-ended process entailed 
rewriting history, forming new political arenas, redefining morality and basic values” (p. 35). In 
Georgia such realignment came to be most radically experienced after the young reformists led 
by Mikheil Saakashvili ousted President Eduard Shevardnadze, a former foreign affairs minister 
of USSR, who returned from Moscow to lead Georgian government in 1991 (see Way, 2008). 
The government that came to power as a result of 2003 "Rose Revolution" adopted a new 
transformative politics geared toward Georgia’s modernization and Euro-integration (see 
Wheatley 2005, Jones 2010, Mitchell 2012). Throughout 2004-2012 discussions of “the West” 
and “modernity” gained centrality in the public discourse as both espoused and contested ideas.  
 Most of the scholarly literature has approached modernity as a condition inseparable from 
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western colonialism, defining it as “a marker of Europe’s right to rule” (Brubaker, 2005, p. 115) 
that produces concepts and categories entrenched in Europe’s intellectual and theological 
traditions (Chakrabarty, 2002). Others have asserted the role of capitalism along with Western 
imperialism in bringing about modernity (Giddens, 1991; Rofel, 1999). Georgia’s experience is 
external to the historical conditions that these scholars define as crucial for understanding how 
modernization is occurring in different places. Although communism, as a negation of tradition, 
can be regarded as a version of modernity, Saakashvili’s administration and the Georgian elite 
appropriated the notion of “modernization” as a principal instrument for ideological detachment 
from the Soviet past and projected this goal not in terms of western “universalizing forms”, but 
in terms of the national interests that were entrenched in Georgia’s historic path of development 
that was disrupted by Russia.  
 The revolutionary government's rhetoric consolidated a new narrative of Georgia's future 
with a re-projection of its past, reinventing the country as a European state and culture. Such a 
re-alignment of Georgia's place in the world was in no way detached from memory politics. 
Rather, the state vision of the nation’s future embodied a conception of the past that situates 
Georgia within European civilization, as one of its legitimate members.  
On the one hand, the principal rationale behind inscribing national interests into the 
landscape of European civilization was essentially entrenched in the desire to dissociate Georgia 
from the Soviet sphere and to divorce itself from Russia's political orbit. This political 
orientation was not articulated as an uprooting of the country from its origins; instead it was 
presented as Georgia’s historically determined mission to “regain its place in Europe” (Wheatly 
2005, p. 37). President Saakashvili continuously asserted to his local and global audiences that 
"When we speak about the European future of Georgia, we must understand that this is not only 
	   12	  
today's choice; our ancestors chose Europe from ancient times and defined it as our compass. 
European and Georgian civilizations are so intertwined that it is difficult to determine whether 
Europe is our roots or on the contrary." (quoted in De Waal, 2011 p. 31)  
Most state performances of the time were defined by triangulation of its three distinct 
publics, in that almost any political and speech act was addressed to: a) its immediate audience—
the Georgian people, b) to its desired ally—the West, and c) to its enemy—Russia. The 
relationship with the West and its globalizing power played a crucial role in both how the state 
orchestrated its priorities and how Georgians "imagined" their national community (Anderson, 
1991). But the imagining had to do both with how some individuals employed the language of 
"modernity" and "Europeanization" to re-articulate Georgianness, while others contested and 
defied the new symbolism of globalized nationhood imposed by the official rhetoric (see more 
on this in chapter 4). In fact, this globalizing rhetoric posited a new imperative upon Georgian 
political consciousness and a new cultural paradigm.  
Regardless of Saakashvili's attempt to inscribe "Europeanization" into the nation's 
memory and define Europe as Georgia's natural historical landscape, predetermined by the 
nation's ancestral "compass", for many Georgians the “West” was (and is) an unfamiliar cultural 
terrain (see chapters 4 and 6). The idea of cultural relatedness to some “other” went against a 
nationalist cosmology that emphasized Georgia's cultural unbelonging, its immutably sharp 
boundedness.  Many Georgians had been in the habit of acknowledging a singular form of 
relationship to the rest of the world, and it was not one of "belonging" to somebody else's 
civilization, not of being similar, a borrower.  Instead, it is one of dissent and difference, 
maintaining cultural singularity through resistance and dissension.  
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Crucial to heightening the ideological tensions between Saakashvili’s modernizing 
project and nationalist agenda was the rhetoric of the Georgian Orthodox Church, possibly the 
most influential institution in the country. The church led a campaign that fused religion, nation 
and Georgian statehood in a single indissoluble whole, expressed in statements like: “Orthodox 
faith is the spine of our national body” by Patriarch Ilia II (Easter Message, 1992)9. By usurping 
and consecrating secular spaces and discourses, the church asserted its ownership over 
"Georgianness" as a category of its authority and inscribed it into Georgian Orthodoxy. Georgia's 
Patriarch has promoted ideas on the “purity of Georgian culture” with a veiled anti-Western 
sentiment, from as early as the 1990’s. The following excerpts from his speeches are illustrative:  
High culture and developed technology are not sufficient for people's happiness. There 
are values which are formed in a nation's life over the centuries, and losing them is a 
crime. For us such is Orthodox Christianity: bestowed by disciples, music that astonishes 
everyone [he has Georgian folk music in mind], our language and script filled with 
mystery and majesty, spectacular art, iconography, architecture, our beautiful customs. 
Which traditions of East and West can be compared to this? Unfortunately, we have not 
yet fully comprehended the treasure we own (Patriarch Ilia II, Christmas Message, 1994-
1995).  
 
Today the times have changes and with that the methods of evil, too. Today nobody uses 
force to disgrace national pride and impinge upon religious beliefs. Degrading our 
traditions and ways of life is accomplished through different methods…So today every 
one of us is facing a choice: abandon the normal path of the homeland or internalize 
imposed false culture? Resist informational pressure (he implies the internet) or preserve 
the heritage of our ancestors and enduring values? (2008) 
 
As Kapferer points out, when "made into a religious object, culture becomes the focus of 
devotion. It can have the character of a religious fetish, an idol, a thing which has self-contained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Patriarch	  Ilia	  II,	  “Epistles,	  Speeches,	  Preachings”	  Volume	  1,	  Tbilisi	  1997	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magical properties capable of recreating and transforming the realities of experience in its 
image" (1988, p 2). In the practice of religious nationalism, culture becomes an accessory to 
power when a "threat to culture" is invented and some “other” is construed in terms of the threat.  
In the Patriarch’s words trading the "national treasure", which includes Orthodoxy as its defining 
element but is not its singular denominator, for the West with its "high culture and technological 
development" is "a crime". This statement sets up a conflict in which the Georgian language, 
folk music, traditional culture, and art are endangered by the “other’s culture” which cannot even 
"be compared" to the Georgian one. His dictum is clear: Georgians need no model to which to 
aspire, what it needs is to preserve the "treasure" it owns, the cornerstone of which is Orthodox 
Christianity. As the Patriarch related on a different occasion "In our ancestors' consciousness, 
love for religious belief and love for the homeland were as undivided as was the divine and 
human nature of Christ"10. Such statements inscribe both Georgian identity and patriotic duty in 
the domain of Orthodox Christianity; Georgianness becomes indissolubly attached to Orthodoxy 
while the church acquires unquestionable authority in both secular and sacred dimensions of 
nationhood. With such sacralisation of the secular and secularization of religious, the church has 
attained two-fold power and become a major rival (if not superior and hegemonic) vis-à-vis the 
state. The photograph below taken at one of the Tbilisi’s private schools provides an example of 
the social ramifications of this rhetorical fusion of sacred and secular. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  www.orthodoxy.ge	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The discourse on Orthodoxy is significant not only as part of cultural identity, but in 
terms of its capacity to have geopolitical implications. Namely, the issue with the Orthodox 
imperative is that it implicitly entails favoring the Orthodox “familiar-neighbor” Russia over the 
non-Orthodox “stranger” West. Such a breach between state rhetoric and the country's most 
authoritative institution's ideology has hardly ever played out in the open, but it did create a 
subterranean tension and a sense among many that Russia, after all, may not be "that much of an 
enemy".  Conversely, Saakashvili’s elite, especially the liberal intellectuals labeled the Georgian 
church Russia’s “Trojan horse” that has served its imperialist agenda since the Tsarist regime11.     
In August 2008 a five-day war broke out between Russia and Georgia (see Asmus, 2010; 
Toal, 2012). The conflict over a small secessionist territory of South Ossetia  (Russians refer to it 
as South Ossetia while Georgians call it Samachablo as a land of Machabelis aristocratic clan) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  I	  have	  encountered	  reference	  to	  the	  Georgian	  Church	  as	  a	  “Trojan	  horse”	  	  in	  several	  forums:	  during	  informal	  conversations,	  but	  mostly	  in	  my	  discussions	  with	  liberal	  intellectuals	  as	  well	  as	  old	  generation	  historians.	  The	  right	  wing	  liberal	  magazine	  “Tabula”	  featured	  a	  column	  The	  Law	  of	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  Eternity	  (qartul	  rusuli	  maradisobis	  kanoni)	  outlined	  the	  long	  history	  of	  relations	  between	  Russian	  and	  Georgian	  churches	  in	  a	  section	  “Trojan	  Horse”,	  which	  included	  the	  	  	  following	  quote:	  “...in	  reality,	  this	  naive	  hope	  in	  a	  common	  faith	  (ertmortsmuneoba	  in	  Georgian	  literally	  is	  commonfaith-­‐ness)	  played	  the	  role	  of	  a	  real	  trojan	  horse	  in	  the	  preparation	  for	  [Georgia’s]	  occupation	  and	  annexation”	  (February	  22,	  2013).	  	  	  	  
Figure	  1.1.	  A	  small	  shrine	  in	  the	  hallway	  in	  one	  of	  Tbilisi’s	  small	  private	  (non-­‐religious)	  middle	  schools.	  	  	  (photo	  taken	  by	  author	  with	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  school’s	  headmaster)	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led Russian troops to invade these territories and come as close as twenty kilometers to the 
capital of Georgia (see Figure 1.2.). The question "Who started the war?" remained at the center 
of international media discussions and political debates for months if not years after the event. 
The Georgian side maintained that Russia invaded Georgia to interfere with its aspirations of 
European integration and to prevent the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
the region of South Caucasus. In contrast, Russia asserted that the Georgian state initiated 
military actions and that they, in turn, had only acted as a protector of South Ossetia's autonomy 
and defended the security of Russian citizens in the territory. 
The history of this territory is complex. The ethnic conflict that first erupted in the 1990s 
has its roots in the strategies of Soviet regimes and Russian Imperial rule as well as in the earlier 
history of Georgia's political landscape (see Grant, 2007; Horowitz, 2005). However, it is beyond 
the scope of this study to explore either the historical conditions of this complicated conflict or 
its political precursors. Rather my concern is to treat this war as a pretext for a discursive tension 
that reached a tipping point in the aftermath of the war (see chapter 5).  
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It may have seemed inconceivable that shortly after the war, references to Russia as an 
Orthodox friend-neighbor could still surface in public discourse. Yet they did. This was made 
possible, in part, by the view that "the West won't be there for us anyway". A taxi driver pointed 
out to me once, "America is not going to engage in a war with Russia for a small country like 
Georgia. What other choice do we have left other than negotiating with Russians?!"  
The “big bang” caused by the five day war seemed to have consolidated the Georgian 
nation in ways that a common enemy unites people almost anywhere, but in the aftermath of the 
war public opinion has evolved into a multivocal national debate with contested interpretations 
of what had happened and who was to blame. Shortly after these dramatic events, a series of 
public projects was initiated by the state. "The Museum of Soviet Occupation", established in 
2006, once again gained centrality in the state's rhetoric against Russia. One year after the war, 
an open air exhibition was held in the city center of Georgia's capital where over two dozen large 
posters displayed archival sources, (official documents, photos, biographical notes, etc) 
documenting the last two hundred years of Georgia's history with the sharp emphasis on the 
adversities of the "Russian occupation". On August 5, 2010 by official decree of President 
Saakashvili the “State Commission for the Assessment of Historical Truth” (Georgian: istoriuli 
simartlis damdgeni komisia) was formed. Its sole purpose was to produce an official document 
unveiling the “truth” about 200 years of Russian Georgian relations.  It was officially stated that 
the aim of this project was to study “19th-20th century historical memory, 200 years of Russian 
imperialist policy and its consequences” and to prepare a report “based on academic research 
Figure	  1.2.	  Map	  of	  Georgia	  showing	  two	  disputed	  territories	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia.	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which fully describes the acts of violence inflicted upon Georgia by Tsarist and Soviet Russia.”12 
The same year the Ministry of Education declared that the new subject "200 Years of Russian 
Occupation" will be integrated in public school curriculum (high school). 
From an outsider's perspective it may seem that in all these instances the Georgian state 
was making a clear statement addressed to Russia and/or possibly to an international community 
on behalf of the entire Georgian nation; that it sought to assure the rest of the world that the war 
in 2008 was just another instantiation of Russia’s attempt to realize its historically shaped 
imperial goals of expansion. But state initiatives were not conceived as the word of the entire 
nation intended for distant communities, they were not statements made on behalf of the 
Georgian nation. On the contrary their designated audience was the Georgian community itself. 
The word was to have an impact within the intimate landscape of national boundaries. It 
addressed its own internal alterity, like that found in the taxi driver mentioned above.  
But a question one might ask is: Why should one engage the remote history of the last 
200 years in an attempt to redefine interpretations of the events that are immediate both in time 
and in space? This is one of the questions that my study seeks to address, and the answer speaks 
to the cultural significance, function, and use of memory as a symbolic resource. In answering 
this question, I show how the memory debate becomes an active and culturally intimate 
battleground for subverting and/or reinforcing categories of cultural and political belonging as 
well as forms of national self-identification. The people I studied understood contests over 
memory-making as exercises of agency and autonomy despite wider geopolitical constraints. I 
show the instances where the idiom of memory is valorized when political thinking is 
problematized. As such, these ethnographies of memory-making are significant for 
understanding the forms of social poiesis that are rooted in the culturally predefined meanings, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Information	  obtained	  from	  Georgian	  Ministry	  of	  Culture	  in	  2011	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even while being shaped by the political processes that are globalized and globalizing both in 
their conditions of existence and their collective anxieties and desires.  
On September 25, 2013 President Saakashvili delivered one of his final speeches at the 
United Nations.  In it he spoke of Russia's aggressive politics and the threat to freedom in the 
face of the Eurasian Union. An excerpt quoted below demonstrates that individuals employ 
memory as a symbolic language to imbue an utterance with words that have emotional impact 
within the intimate space (Herzfeld, 1997) of a “mnemonic community” (Zerubavel, 2003). 
During his speech, Saakashvili spoke to his immediate audience, leaders of the Western World. 
But in the middle of his address, he said:  
Strangely, in recent years and even more in recent months, we hear in Tbilisi, Kiev, or 
Chisinau the same ugly music that was first orchestrated in Moscow.  We hear that our 
traditions are collapsing under the influence of the West, that Christian holidays will be 
replaced by gay pride events, and Churches by multicultural Disneylands; we hear that 
our Orthodox identity is under threat. 
 And after all—here we come—we hear that we share with our former masters a 
common respect for decency and traditions. 
Are we so naive to believe these lies of Putin and the others, as other generations 
did, allowing our sovereignty to be kidnapped? 
Are we so unfair to our ancestors to think that their memory would be honored by 
attacks on mosques or some pogroms? Are we so unaware of our own history that we 
allow it to repeat itself endlessly? 
When we hear the fake music of the Orthodox brotherhood sung by Russian 
imperialists, can't we hear the true voice of the Patriarch Kirion, who was assassinated, or 
the eternal voice of the Patriarch Ambrosi Khelaia, who was tortured during days and 
weeks only because he appealed to the Geneva Conference against the invasion of his 
country? And he told his Russian interrogators: 'You can have my body, my flesh, but 
you will never have my soul.' Are we so deaf as not to hear the voices of the killed 
bishops and priests, tortured by Russian imperialists and Russian communists? Are we so 
uneducated that we do not recall who has repainted our churches and erased our sacred 
frescos? 
Are we so blind today not to see the destruction of our churches by the same 
people, who erased our churches in [inaudible] now in the occupied territories? 
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We need to know our history. And our history teaches us that tolerance is the 
basis for sovereignty in our region. It is not only a moral duty: it is an issue of national 
security. 
We need to know our history to understand that the same old imperialistic 
principle of divide to rule is applied today as it was two centuries ago.13   
 
It seemed as if Saakashvili suddenly code-switched while continuing to speak in English. 
For a Western audience, neither Patriarch Kirion, nor Ambrosi Khelaia rings any bells, let alone 
has any weight for the kind of moral argument Saakashvili was making.  In making his point he 
deviated from what the imminent, immediate issue was, to speak of what was temporally distant 
and conceptually remote from his immediate audience, yet what he spoke of was at the heart of 
his nation's "webs of meanings" (Geertz, 1973). The language of memory was a way to 
demarcate his words when he spoke of his people from his words to his people. For Georgians, 
ancestors’ memory, repainted churches, erased frescos, the principle of divide and rule, and 
knowing history index what is at the core of their nation's self-defining symbolics.  Saakashvili's 
speech is just another instance of how memory as mythical language is devised for an utterance 
that is intended to produce an affective imprint and a conceptual shift in perceiving the self and 
reality.  
 
1.2. MEMORY: THE LANGUAGE OF ARGUMENT 
 
 At least since the time of Ernest Renan's classic 1882 lecture “What Is a Nation?” scholars 
have discussed the role of a "daily plebiscite" (1990 p. 19) in creating a nation and the 
importance of remembering and forgetting that this plebiscite entails (Connerton, 1989; Stoller, 
1997; Werbner, 1998). As distinct from “formal” or “analytic history” (Halbwachs, 1980; Nora, 
1989; Wertsch, 2002, Wineburg 2001, Ginzburg, 1980) collective memory is closely linked to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Full	  transcription	  (in	  English)	  on	  www.civil.ge	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the group’s identity project (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008) and plays an important role in fostering 
a group’s “we-image” (Assmann, 1995). Wertsch and Roediger (2008) have noted that at least on 
a conceptual level the distinction between “memory” and “history” needs to be maintained. 
Memory, unlike history a) involves an identity project (usually based on a narrative of heroism, a 
golden age, victimhood, etc.) b) is impatient with ambiguity, c) ignores counter-evidence in 
order to preserve established narratives, d) relies on implicit theories, schemas, and scripts that 
simplify the past and ignore substantiated findings that do not fit the narrative, and e) is 
conservative and resistant to change (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). By virtue of these tendencies, 
collective memory creates what Italian historian Carlo Ginzburg (1980) calls the “sense of 
proximity to people of the past”, whereas “the historian’s task is just the opposite of [that] …he 
must destroy our false sense of proximity to people of the past because they come from societies 
very different from our own” (quoted in Wineburg, 2001, p.10). Hence, while this distinction is 
important on a conceptual level, we will see throughout subsequent chapters that individuals 
(including the historians I discuss) employ the terms “past”, “memory,” and “history,” 
interchangeably and engage in “history” writing as a socio-culturally and politically situated 
agents rather than as unprejudiced scholars.   
Scholars in memory studies have emphasized the role of material culture such as memorials 
(Brüggermann & Kasekamp, 2008) and museum exhibits in which public memory is encoded 
(Connerton, 1989; Taussig, 1993), and they have shown ways in which people actively respond 
to such “mnemonic devices” (Rasmussen, 2002) in some cases resisting or modifying them 
(Rowe, Wertsch, & Kosyaeva, 2002). By employing Bodnar’s (1992) distinction between 
“vernacular” and “official” culture some have argued for a two level analysis of collective 
memory (Wertsch, 2002) especially (but not exclusively) when looking at strong authoritarian 
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regimes where unofficial versions of the past operate as “hidden transcripts” (Scott, 1985) 
against official narratives imposed from the state (Wertsch, 2007). My study builds on this 
scholarly tradition, but my analysis provides a different vantage point on the interplay between 
alternative modes for representing the national past and national self.  
Most of the ethnographic material presented in this study serves to demonstrate that memory 
is a cultural resource. There is a certain truism to this claim, but my argument has several 
provisions. First, I argue that more than anything else memory is a rhetorical resource that is 
made use of as a powerful speech genre. The origin of the English word resource is from 17th 
century French ressourse, meaning “to rise again, recover” based in Latin word surgere – “to 
rise.” The Oxford dictionary defines resource (among several versions) as “a stock or supply of 
money, materials, staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or organization in 
order to function effectively”.  
In comparison with individual memory, collective memory is a cultural phenomenon that 
requires constant effort to maintain and reproduce. As any effort toward accumulation of 
resources has its purpose so does the effort to sustain cultural memory. This is not to invest 
cultural processes of memory-preservation/formation with some teleologism, but to point out that 
memory can be drawn on by members of a community to function effectively from a culturally 
bounded perspective. My focus thus is on the cultural practices by which individuals or groups of 
individuals resort to their memory tool-kit to recover from their socio-political entanglements or 
to function effectively toward certain goals.  
Because they speak to “who we are,” memory narratives sustain certain registers of political 
and social morality. When these registers of morality put social order at risk or are in breach of 
designated political ideals, memory narratives become targets of critical reflection. When this 
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happens, it is not the past that some fear to be at stake, but the future they have decided to aspire 
to. Memory to Georgians, is not merely an aspect of their experience, not only a medium for 
conveying reality, but an organ of self-conception, self-realization and self-reflection. At times, it 
may seem that for Georgians memory is like a magical widget, because the way they engage this 
metaphor bears resemblance to the belief in a witchcraft: one can alter the subject by remolding 
the metaphor that stands for it. This is why memory discourse is valorized whenever “identity is 
problematized” (Kansteiner, 2002 p 184).  
To draw an analogy, the past to Georgians, is almost what the Declaration of Independence is 
to Americans. However polarized they are, few Americans dispute the authority and legitimacy 
of the text itself.  When they debate issues, when Republicans and Democrats battle over 
political decisions, both parties may try to frame the correctness of their arguments in terms of 
this authoritative text, and it is within the confines of this text that divergent interpretations 
mediate their unresolvable world views. As a common cultural ground, memory binds nation 
together, but not because of some homogeneous, standardized version of the “historical past,” 
but exactly because of and through the multiple voices that can emerge out of the shared 
“memoryscape” (Cole, 2001). Georgians imagine their national community in terms of the 
dialectics between sub-cultural alterities in which what differentiates “us” from another version 
of “us” - our internal other, is a particular reading of the past and hence particular belief in who 
we are. As Edmund Leach has noted “myth and ritual … is a language of argument, not a chorus 
of harmony” (1954, p. 278) 
Second, I argue that while memory is a “language of argument”, the memory debates of 
Georgia are governed by culturally predetermined rules. This claim is in line with Arjun 
Appadurai’s point that “past as a scarce resource” has its “rules of debatibility” (1981). Hence, 
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while memory-making, especially for political goals, involves attempts to adjust the “past” to 
meet the present needs (Middleton 2002; Rowe, Wertsch & Kosyaeva 2002; Rasmussen 2002), I 
argue that such remaking has its limits. To be more specific, I approach memory debates as 
rhetorical “games” in which men and women employ the “past” as a rhetorical strategy because 
of its culturally assumed power. The term “game” echoes Wittgenstein’s notion of the “language 
game” (1958), the communicative process that reflects upon given social relations and is shaped 
by the rules that mark the boundaries of the game and make “moves” meaningful within and only 
within those boundaries. Unlike just any language game, the memory game is intended to 
produce social shifts, to transform the “mentality” of its addressees. In that, its ability to infringe 
upon social consciousness, to move and emotionally excite addressees is predicated on: a) a 
shared symbolic value of the past, b) an underlying framework—a code text or a codex—on 
which semiotic action that I am calling a memory game depends, and more importantly c) on the 
existence of a “mnemonic community” (Zerubavel, 2003) in which a “collective framework of 
memory” (Halbwachs, 1980) is a pervasive symbolic construct and memory narratives are 
widely shared cultural texts (Assmann 1995).   
So why is the memory game rhetorical? And why is it a game? It is rhetorical because 
memory serves as a communicative resource of most culturally inter-subjective nature. People 
resort to this resource as to a language of special rhetorical faculty that can infringe on social 
consciousness from its core. When they think plain speech may go in one ear and out the other 
and evade reason, speech based on memory will go to the core of a nation’s self-consciousness.  
This is so because memory as a mythic form of ideation “is not something superadded to certain 
elements of empirical existence,” as Ernest Cassirer noted, “instead, the primary ‘experience’ 
itself is steeped in the imagery of myth and saturated with its atmosphere.” (1953, p.10)  
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    The term “game” is not meant to deprive memory debates of gravity and a serious nature. 
Rather I want to point to the rule-bound form of interaction that memory debates represent. Any 
game is a goal-oriented, structured form of interaction in which two or more parties challenge 
each other. The activities or “moves” they can make toward designated goals is bounded by a set 
of rules. As in a chess game players make moves with a set of pre-given pieces and each piece 
can make limited set of moves. Likewise in memory debates what is played is a set of pre-given 
“memory maxims” and the game enacts the dialogue of two counteracting voices on Georgian 
identity.  
 
 At its most basic level, this study addresses two issues. First, I examine certain modes of 
discourse that the idiom of memory sustains as a culturally meaningful symbolic vocabulary. In 
other words the focus is on the semantics of memory; it is on the discursive tradition in which 
memory is both an object and a medium for producing meanings shaped by a given context but 
rooted in the pre-given symbolic vocabulary. Second, this study is about a specific memory 
polemic in which the past is re-charted and made use of as a rhetorical resource to produce a 
mental shift in the Georgian public. This particular memory debate on the history of Russian-
Georgian relations is unleashed in the context of a political crisis and seeks to resolve both the 
political crisis and a “problematic” identity.  
 
 
1.3. FIELD-SITE: SEARCHING FOR GEORGIAN MEMORY 
 
 
 Memory is omnipresent in Georgia. It can surface in almost any conversation, regardless of 
whether the topic of discussion is politics, culture, religion, language, landscape, or urban 
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planning. Even complaining about the traffic in Tbilisi can lead to remembering King David the 
Builder of 12th century Georgia. This makes researching memory in Georgia easy and difficult at 
the same time. It is easy because one can come across these discussion anytime, but 
methodological hardships arise when you begin asking questions about the past and try to 
forcefully evoke something that in its organic setting functions by default. For me, a Georgian 
researcher, this task at first presented even greater obstacles, because I had to impersonate non-
Georgianness. This usually confused my respondents, because no one can act as if you are 
coming from no perspective when the topic of discussion is Georgia’s past and when someone 
asking a question is a Georgian herself. At the same time, I constantly sensed my awkward 
positioning and at times it felt like Reza Aslan during his interview with the Fox News: in 
continuous struggle to establish your status and reassure your respondents that the source of your 
question is not certain sub-cultural bias but extra-cultural scholarly practice.  
 After some time I gave up. I conceded that no Georgian will ever talk to me as if I am not 
Georgian myself, as if I have no embedded social status, and as if they do not preconceive my 
conceptual horizon. I understood that I could never re-direct addressivity in these acts of 
communication. Most of the interviews I conducted, thus, rested on a certain base of cultural 
intersubjectivity. My respondents did not so much tell me things, but rather positioned 
themselves with respect to the topics (this is evident in the interview excerpts in chapters 5 and 
6). In some cases, my respondents and I assumed we understood each other’s positioning and 
there was almost no information to be exchanged.  Instead, there was only a game, a rhetorical, 
discursive one, to be played. My conversations most of the time were half way between my 
wanting to gain some insight into another’s perspective and my engaging in a socially driven, 
pleasant, self-entertaining dialogue. Some days it felt as if I had to juggle two distinct “I”s, at 
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times none of which felt truthful.   
In time I learned that I had to employ what Kusenbach calls the “go along” method  
(Kusenbach, 2003) in order to access memory as it occurs in situ, and this in Georgia meant I had 
to enter a debate. Memory as noted earlier is a language of argument and it enters the discursive 
realm when a point needs to be proved, when someone needs to be persuaded of something. This 
is why I chose to focus on the history textbook project that was predicated on a mission to 
“persuade” the Georgian public on a politically and ideologically critical matter.  
This approach also helped me engage in countless informal conversations with different 
individuals, including complete strangers. Most of these conversations were not audio-taped.  
This was first of all because audio-recording confused my respondents (although, each time I 
asked for approval to use their comments in my research). And second, many of the 
conversations occurred spontaneously, sometimes in the most unlikely of contexts.  
 Throughout my three years of fieldwork I generally observed: a) how collective memory 
plays out in everyday discourse, b) how political events act upon memory narratives and how in 
turn these narratives play into unfolding political debates, c) how state mandated changes in 
history curriculum fit into wider political landscape and spur conflicts/debates/discussions in the 
society.  However, apart from observing these general trends, my main focus was fixed on the 
bounded discursive domain concerned with the production of history textbook on Russian-
Georgian relations.  
The project I observed originated at the Free University of Tbilisi, Georgia’s top ranked 
private institution that was founded in 2007 by a venture capitalist, a millionaire who had served 
as a minister of economy during the term of Saakashvili’s government. He was pronounced 
simultaneously a “Judas” and a “guru of the Georgian economy”. He acquired most of his capital 
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as a businessman in Russia (where he started his career as a biologist). In 2005 he was asked to 
join the government of Georgia to serve as a minister of economy in an economically degraded 
and impoverished country14.  
Upon his arrival in Tbilisi from Moscow, one of the first things Bendukidze declared to the 
press when asked about his vision of economic policy was, “You cannot sell conscience, 
everything else that is made of rock and brick can be sold” (personal communication with the 
journalist who asked him the question). This was a dramatic statement in a country with laws 
regulating “units of special importance and strategic significance”. Georgian law defines these as 
“units (building constructions) that in functional and strategic terms influence the country’s 
defense and security, territoriality, cultural heritage, economy, environment and natural 
resources” (e.g., hydroelectric stations, pipelines, or medieval cathedrals)15.    
But in the eyes of Bendukidze, a right wing neoliberal venture capitalist, investments from 
any source were more than welcome. It came as no surprise that a man who had been living in 
Russia and made statements of this sort, and who went so far as to express cynicism toward 
nationalist sentiments, became mythologized as a Goliath who would clandestinely sell Georgian 
rivers and mountains (in fact one of the respected talk show host actually asked him this 
question: “Did you sell rivers and mountains?”). He was called Judas in some circles and in fact 
had permanent protestors, rallying and shouting “Judas” outside of his office windows for 
months.   
Today that nickname simultaneously embodies remnants of distrust toward him but also a 
humorous take on that sentiment, something that reflects a major shift in his public activity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  “Bendukidze’s	   reforms”	   as	   Georgians	   refer	   to	   it,	   resulted	   in	   an	   increase	   in	   Georgian	   state	   budget	   from	  approximately	  400	  million	  US	  dollars	  to	  4.5.	  billion	  US	  dollars.	  	  15	  The	   legislation	   was	   amended	   in	   2010	   and	   has	   been	   since	   inactive	   as	   per	   Georgian	   Legal	   act	   N2911	  (information	  obtained	  from	  the	  official	  webpage	  of	  Georgian	  codex	  www.codexserver.com)	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public perception. In 2007 Bendukidze quit politics and by acquiring and merging two 
institutions—the European School of Management and the Institute of Asia and Africa—founded 
a new private university: Free University of Tbilisi. Eventually he established four additional 
undergraduate programs (in physics, social sciences, law, and math & computer sciences), all of 
which ranked at the top of the list each year among 600 undergraduate programs in Georgia.16 
That the Free University is top ranked is probably one of the very few undisputed things in 
Georgia. As a result, the perception of Bendukidze’s image as a Judas fell short of his charitable 
and socially beneficial investments as he placed his private funds into a university foundation 
and spent millions of dollars on students’ scholarships.  
In 2010 at the time of my field research, the university was housed in an old, but remodeled 
school building on top of the Nutsubidze Plateu, some 5 miles from Tbilisi city center. I came to 
know about the university through a TV commercial17 that advertised the university’s student 
loan program, called “learn today, teach tomorrow.”18 One of the promises, the university made 
was that after graduation a job was almost guaranteed.19 The university made special effort to 
recruit students from all regions across Georgia. In fact, some sense of anti-elitism guided its set 
of policies and practices, including: a) extensive information and PR campaigns in all of the 
provincial regions;20 b) no emphasis on English language requirement21 and c) funding and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	   ranking	   is	   calculated	   on	   the	   basis	   of:	   a)	   students’	   top	   choice	   of	   a	   university	   to	   attend,	   b)	   scores	   on	  national	  exams	  of	  the	  students	  who	  are	  accepted,	  and	  c)	  the	  number	  of	  students	  applying.	  17	  As	   I	   looked	   up	   their	   webpage	   one	   of	   the	   first	   things	   I	   came	   across	   was	   a	   video	   of	   a	   professor	   from	  Washington	  University	  in	  St.	  Louis	  giving	  a	  guest	  lecture	  for	  the	  students.	  18	  The	  university	  gave	  opportunities	  to	  every	  student	  to	  complete	  the	  undergraduate	  program	  without	  paying	  any	  tuition	  and	  then	  pay	  back,	  or	  as	  they	  termed	  it,	   fund	  another	  student	  after	  graduation.	  The	  commercial	  made	  the	  point	  that	  every	  student	  at	  Free	  University	  gets	  a	  job	  and	  their	  average	  salary	  exceeds	  the	  amount	  they	  have	  to	  pay	  toward	  a	  student	  loan.	  In	  2011	  every	  other	  student	  signed	  up	  for	  this	  financing	  opportunity.	  19	  In	   many	   instances	   this	   promise	   would	   be	   followed	   by	   a	   partially	   humorous	   provision:	   “It’s	   guaranteed	  unless	  the	  country	  collapses	  or	  war	  breaks	  out”.	  Expectations	  of	  destabilization	  are	  always	  present	  but	  held	  at	  an	  arm’s	  length	  in	  Georgians’	  imagination.	  	  It	  is	  a	  country,	  after	  all,	  that	  has	  gone	  through	  several	  civil	  wars,	  revolutions,	  public	  upheavals,	  and	  war	  with	  Russia	  over	  the	  course	  of	  little	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  20	  Each	  year	  the	  entire	  university	  staff	  is	  immersed	  in	  the	  extremely	  resourceful	  and	  intensive	  campaign.	  It	  was	   not	   just	   the	   group	   of	   administrative	   staff	   or	   PR	  managers	  who	   travel	   to	   around	  500	   schools	   across	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scholarship programs.  
The recruiting process was tough. In most of the schools in regions, the promise “you can 
study at Free Univesrity even if you are poor and you will get a job with major in physics or 
math after graduation” went against established imaginaries of the social order. For generations, 
Georgians have learned that you could get into any decent university only if your parents have an 
acquaintance or two somewhere “up” there.22  
Among the university’s wide-ranging initiatives were “olympiads” - five different writing 
competitions for prospective students (math, physics, short writing, independent reasoning, law). 
Olympiads would draw students from the entire country, and the university would conduct the 
first rounds of competition in Tbilisi as well as in Kutaisi (the second largest city of western 
Georgia) to make sure that students in western regions had the opportunity to participate. The 
winners of the competition would receive a full year scholarship provided that they applied and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Georgia,	  but	  the	  entire	  faculty.	  They	  made	  a	  point	  of	  this.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  administrative	  managers	  told	  me	  once:	  “It’s	  one	  thing	  if	  I	  tell	  them	  about	  school	  of	  physics	  and	  its	  curriculum	  and	  explain	  that	  in	  fact	  they	  can	  have	  a	  career	  with	  the	  degree	  in	  physics,	  or	  math	  and	  computer	  sciences…most	  probably	  they	  won’t	  believe	  me,	  but	  if	  a	  dean	  with	  a	  successful	  career	  in	  the	  US	  or	  in	  Europe	  tells	  them	  that,	  it’s	  a	  different	  matter.”	  	  21	  While	   knowing	   English	   is	   crucial	   to	   getting	   a	   degree	   in	   any	   of	   the	   specialties	   taught	   at	   Free	   U	   (it’s	  virtually	   impossible	   to	   learn	   anything	   up	   to	   date	   otherwise,	   not	   to	   mention	   that	   knowing	   English	   is	   an	  absolute	   requirement	   to	  get	  a	   job	   in	  Georgia,	   as	   in	  many	  other	  countries),	  Free	  University	  accepts	  national	  exam	  scores	   in	  any	   foreign	   language.	  As	  Bendukidze	  once	  explained:	   “there	  might	  be	  a	  potential	  genius	  up	  there	  in	  mountains,	   living	  in	  a	  small	  village	  with	  20	  families.	  Where	  would	  she/he	  learn	  English?	  His	  or	  her	  family	  most	  probably	  does	  not	  make	  enough	  money	  to	  hire	  an	  English	  instructor.	  With	  English	  requirement	  this	  genius	  will	  slip	  through	  our	  hands	  and	  s/he	  will	  never	  make	  it	  to	  any	  proper	  educational	  institution…we	  have	   to	   look	   for	   such	   kids”.	   	   So	   the	   university	   designed	   a	   curriculum	   with	   intensive	   English	   language	  instruction	   for	   the	   first	   two	  years.	   This	   also	  meant,	   that	   in	   some	   cases	  when	   a	   student	  would	  be	   admitted	  from	  some	  provincial	  region	  from	  a	  poor	  family,	  a	  student	  who	  could	  study	  “for	  free”	  but	  could	  never	  afford	  to	   live	   in	   the	   capital,	   the	   university	  would	   offer	   him/her	   part	   time	   jobs	   in	   administration	   and	   pay	   almost	  enough	  money	  to	  support	  their	  living	  expenses.	  	  	  	  22	  Olympiads	   were	   not	   connected	   to	   entrance	   examinations.	   Education	   reform	   that	   unified	   the	   entrance	  examination	  system	  was	  aimed	  at	  uprooting	  corruption	  by	  centralizing	   the	  system	  and	   leaving	  universities	  out	  of	   examination	  procedures.	  Yet	  persuading	  prospective	   students	   that	   they	   could	  get	   a	   free	   loan	   from	  a	  university	  owned	  by	  a	  millionaire,	  was	  tough	  (“Why	  would	  Judas	  give	  away	  money	  for	  nothing?’”).	  	  It	  made	  no	  sense	  to	  many	  of	  the	  young	  Georgians,	  let	  alone	  their	  parents.	  But	  students	  were	  excited	  by	  the	  opportunity	  and	  their	  passion	  in	  many	  cases	  outweighed	  their	  skepticism.	  I	  participated	  in	  these	  campaigns,	  and	  this	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  thrilling	  and	  rewarding	  experiences	  of	  my	  life.	  I	  would	  come	  across	  brilliant	  and	  talented	  high	  school	   students	   who	   would	   realize	   in	   front	   of	   me	   for	   the	   first	   time	   that	   their	   future	   could	   be	   drastically	  different	  from	  what	  they	  had	  imagined	  living	  in	  a	  rural	  area	  of	  the	  country.	  It	  was	  striking	  to	  me	  that	  students	  from	  Tbilisi	  schools,	  although	  much	  more	  informed,	  were	  less	  motivated	  and	  more	  skeptical.	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were accepted to the Free University23.  The Olympiads had a two-fold purpose.  On the one 
hand they provided a productive and very targeted method of campaigning, through which the 
university accumulated extensive data on prospective students and could trace their 
accomplishments, as well as choices they made for application, once the national exams were 
passed. The olympiads also gave the university a way to give scholarships to talented students 
without necessarily basing scholarship programs on GPA results24. 
It was during my work at this university in January of 2010 that I found out that Bendukidze 
had organized a group to write the history textbook on 200 Years of Georgia’s Occupation. 
Given his peculiar stance toward nationalist endeavors (and history projects in Georgia generally 
fall under this category), I was surprised to learn that he would concern himself with a matter of 
this sort. The group he initially put together mostly included university faculty. But from time to 
time as complexities of textbook writing were encountered, Bendukidze would invite some well-
known intellectuals, people of different background, with affiliations beyond Free University to 
participate in the discussion and contribute to the writing process. As a result the composition of 
the group changed on several occasions and in some instances these changes were preceded by 
dramatic debates and heated disagreements over the content and essence of the textbook. As a 
participant-observer I attended and recorded all meetings from December 2010 till October 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  National	  Exams	  take	  place	  in	  June.	  	  Hence	  at	  the	  time	  that	  Free	  University	  held	  its	  first	  round	  of	  competitions	  students	  would	  have	  filled	  out	  their	  registration	  preferences	  but	  would	  not	  have	  gone	  through	  the	  examination	  process.	  	  24	  As	   Bendukidze	   once	   commented:	   “giving	   scholarship	   to	   students	   who	   show	   excellent	   academic	  performance	  has	  its	  repercussions.	  These	  kids	  become	  obsessed	  with	  their	  grades	  and	  all	  that	  matters	  is	  how	  they	  pass	  exams…it	   incentivizes	  them	  to	  trick	  the	  system	  and	  we	  don’t	  want	  that	  to	  happen…so	  I	  abolished	  this	  system	  that	  ESM	  (European	  School	  of	  Management)	   initially	  had	   in	  place.”	   	  The	  olympiads	  at	   the	  same	  time	   incentivized	   students	   to	   take	   a	   chance	   and	   to	   see	   for	   themselves	  what	   Free	  U	   environment	  was	   like.	  Chapter	  4	  is	  based	  on	  the	  essays	  written	  for	  one	  of	  the	  contests	  in	  “Independent	  Reasoning”	  that	  took	  place	  in	  March	  of	  2011.	  I	  examine	  approximately	  two	  hundred	  essays	  written	  by	  students	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  “tradition	  on	  modernity”.	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201225. In 2013 I recorded interviews with all members of the group.  
Apart from that, my ethnographic material is based on the interviews with the historians who 
wrote another textbook on Russian-Georgian relations and with those who worked with the 
Georgian government as part of “The State Commission for Assessing Historical Truth.” The 
official document that this commission had to publish was never released to the public and 
neither the Ministry of Education nor the Ministry of Culture was able to inform me on its 
whereabouts. Nonetheless, it was noted to me by several historians that the commission was 
unable to accomplish its task due to disagreements on historical issues among individuals 
working on the project.  
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Their	  meetings	  were	  conducted	   in	  a	   form	  of	   “brainstorming”	  workshops.	  Their	  mode	  of	  work	  resembled	  the	   process	   of	   assembling	   a	   jigsaw	   puzzle,	   but	   the	   kind	  where	   one	   is	   provided	  with	   an	   initial	   skeleton	   in	  which	  gaps	  and	  blank	  spots	  need	  to	  be	  filled	  in	  with	  all	  the	  small	  images	  to	  form	  a	  big	  picture.	  In	  this	  process	  they	  were	   assembling	   the	   bricolage	   of	   told	   and	   untold	   stories	   against	   the	   background	   of	   existing	  memory	  maxims	   that	   shape	   conceptual	   landscape	  of	  Georgians’	  memory.	   Their	  way	  of	   imagining	  past	  was	  not	   self-­‐contained	  or	  sealed	  off	  but	  dialogic	  and	   intertextual	   in	   that	  every	  single	  story	   they	  re-­‐cast	  or	   retold	   in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  responded	  or	  was	  counterposed	  to	  a	  specific	  imaginary	  that	  was	  already	  out	  there.	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CHAPTER 2: STABLE TEXTS AND THE UNSTABLE ORDER OF THE 
PAST 
  
  
Things just happen, one after another… But history . . . ah, history is different. History has to be observed. 
Otherwise it’s not history. It’s just . . . well, things happening one after another. And of course, it has to be 
controlled. Otherwise it might turn into anything. Because history, contrary to popular theories, is kings and dates 
and battles. And these things have to happen at the right time. This is difficult in a chaotic universe there are too 
many things to go wrong.  
(T. Pratchett The Small Gods) 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter sheds light on that common ground of “memoryscape” (Cole 2001) that is 
implicated when Georgians mention “our history” or “historical memory”. Through examining 
textual material I suggest that a set of recurrent motifs underlie existing forms of historical 
conception. While recurrent motifs function as structural elements on a textual level for 
developing the storyline of historical narratives, they also engender set of memory maxims that 
are operative on a discursive level. Memory maxims are paradigmatic categories that, on the one 
hand, evolve out of historical conception and, on the other hand, sustain discursive modes of 
national self-conception and construal of reality.  The term “memory maxims” builds on the 
concept of “authoritative maxim” discussed in John Bowen’s work on Sumatran poetics. He 
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defines the term as a “short, often epigrammatic formulation of cultural and historical truth” that 
“locates the source of knowledge, authority, and social order in the distant past, thus connecting 
a particular temporal orientation to a distinct poetic form” (1991, pp. 141-142).  A special faculty 
of such maxims is that they “provide a discursive window” into a specific cultural logic and 
“invoke a general authority that transcends current sociopolitical alignment”. In turn, the notion 
of “authoritative maxims” can be viewed as a version of Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1986) concept of 
“authoritative utterance” that I further elaborate in the subsequent chapters.  Chapters 3 and 4 
build on the claims made here to show the ways in which “memory maxims” shape the 
discursive realm on Georgia’s past, present and future.  
Ultimately, I arrive at a conclusion that memory maxims can enter the Georgian 
discursive realm on national identity with two distinct voices: one that harnesses self-idealization 
and one that can potentially sustain a critical discourse of self-condemnation. Thus memory in 
this case sustains two discursive genres that remain at the center of my discussion throughout the 
rest of my study.   
 
2.2. STABLE TEXTS  
 
There is no single source for exploring historical imaginaries that are at the crux of 
memory debates in Georgia. They are sustained by cultural discourses, transmitted through 
family stories, represented in public spaces, literary works, poetry, and so forth; but based on my 
extensive conversations with students I would claim that formal history instruction plays the 
most significant role in crystalizing historical images into memory maxims (material in chapter 4 
further supports this claim). As such, the analysis of history textbooks is possibly the best way to 
approach the issue. Furthermore, the individuals I studied repeatedly referred to textbooks as a 
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source of a distorted, idealized past. In what follows then I examine history textbooks from three 
different periods and published under three different sets of political conditions.  
These textbooks were published in 1974, 1992, and 2001 and were written and edited by 
different individuals. Separated by decades each was produced under drastically different socio-
political conditions. Within these three decades Georgia went from being a Soviet republic to a 
troubled independent state tormented by coups, civil and ethnic wars, the rise of ethnic and 
religious nationalism, economic stagnation and a shift from isolationist to Western oriented 
international policy.  
The 1974 “History of Georgia” (for 7-10 grade students) was published in Georgian in 
the Soviet period and authored by two Georgian historians.  It covers Georgian history from the 
Paleolithic era to the “flourishing of communism.” The textbook was approved by the Soviet 
ministry of education, but published in Tbilisi by the publishing house “Ganatleba.” Its first 
edition came out in 1968, under the censorship of Leonid Brezhnev’s rule. This period was 
characterized by development programs for acculturating Soviet peoples into the common 
culture of industrialized, urban society. This new communist agenda undermined previous policy 
of Nativization (korenizatsiia) which contributed to the consolidation of nationalism in the early 
Soviet era by promoting national languages and national education of non-Russian titular 
nationalities. However, even after it was undercut by Stalin and after Brezhnev reinforced the 
policy of bringing Soviet people together, as Ronald Suny argues, “the processes set in motion 
by korenizatsiia continued until, by the 1960s, most of the republics had become more national 
in character, not only demographically, but politically and culturally as well” (1993, p. 109).  
The 1974 textbook with its exclusive focus on Georgian history is an evident outcome of these 
developments.  
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Shortly after Soviet disintegration Georgia’s political and social landscape was awash 
with nationalist ideology. During the rule of Georgia’s first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia myths 
of an ethnocentric, exceptionalist, and narcissistic nature became the reigning political rhetoric. 
But the early 1990s witnessed the torment and fracturing of the newly independent Georgian 
state by civil wars and ethnic conflicts. The discourse about both past and about present 
misfortunes in this context was saturated with anti-Russian sentiments. The 1992 History of 
Georgia (for 10th grade students) reflects an overtly anti-Russian agenda. This textbook provides 
an expanded focus on the period from Russian imperial annexation to the “Reinstatement of 
Georgian independence and national statehood” in 1918. Such an alternative focus naturally 
lends itself to the centrality of fixing memories of “annexation”. 
The 2001 textbook came out in the milieu of Georgia’s economic and political hardship.  
In the early 2000s a steady stream of the politics of economic impoverishment overtook the 
country.  While the state withdrew its rhetoric of ethnocentric nationalism from the official 
discourse, religious nationalism gained strength in another authoritative public domain. At the 
time, the Georgian Orthodox church gained power and ideological legitimacy and in the eyes of 
much of the Georgian public became a trustworthy substitute for the inept state apparatus. The 
cover of the 2001 History of Georgia (for 10th graders) is an image of the monument of 
Georgia’s great king - David the Builder - whose rule in the twelfth century defines Georgia’s 
Golden Age (for the golden age narrative see Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012). Perhaps the image of 
this iconic ruler embodied the desire and hope of the decaying state to regain the strength and 
power of the golden age.  
While textbooks are an essential part of the history curriculum almost anywhere, the degree 
of significance that is ascribed to this specific textual form can vary from one country to another.  
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Different societies have varying expectations on what a textbook can do, but in Georgia, the 
scope and intensity of public attention toward history textbooks suggests that they are treated 
rather as monuments of historical memory and as the ultimate (rather than just another) 
mechanism for inscribing historical consciousness in future generations (see discussion in the 
following chapter).  In that regard, I agree with Claudia Schneider’s claim that “textbooks are 
inherently political” because “they represent temporary outcomes of negotiations between 
various social actors over what counts as legitimate knowledge” (2008, p 113). But unlike 
Schneider I do not think that this is so because the state is inevitably involved in textbook 
production through “various restraining and control mechanisms” (p 113). Textbooks are 
political even when social actors negotiating “legitimate knowledge” act independently of the 
state, and textbooks are political even before the state starts to regulate their content. The case I 
present later speaks to this point, because it shows how the production of history textbooks is 
taken up as a form of critical engagement with the polity and bears on the image of the Georgian 
public with its assumed political consciousness. “Political” is the historically shaped quality or 
function of this specific textual form, and this is particularly so because of how history textbooks 
have been deployed as weapons of political regimes and ideologies in most totalitarian states.   
In the Soviet Union, and in many other authoritarian states as well, textbooks had a special 
place in upholding regimes of power knowledge (Foucault, 1972). In her work on education and 
social mobility in Soviet Union, Sheila Fitzpatrick (1979) wrote of how textbooks were tied to 
the machinery of the communist social order. In the eyes of the Soviet state textbooks were 
instrumental in stabilizing education and securing the indoctrination of party ideology (Heer, 
1971).  One of the 1934 Politburo transcripts of a dialogue between Stalin and L. M. Kaganovich 
– Stalin’s close associate, once proclaimed as the Soviet Union’s “architect of fear” (Kahan, 
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1987) – demonstrates the sheer absurdity of the regime’s concern with textbooks: 
Kaganovich: The Central Committee found out that the children did not have textbooks. 
Comrade Stalin came and asked: 'How are things with the textbooks? Find out what is 
happening.' Then the Politburo established that we did not have any permanent textbooks. 
Stalin: They changed every year. 
Kaganovich: Right, the textbooks were changing every year.. .The 'leftist theorists of the 
withering away of the school argued that if we kept the same textbooks for a few years we 
would be dragged backwards, not noticing that for want of textbooks the children were half 
illiterate. Just let a student try to get any firm systematic knowledge on the basis of 'loose-
leaf textbooks26. Each year Narkompros27 issued an enormous number of textbooks. Money 
was spent and mountains of paper wasted on the 'loose-leaf textbooks, yet each year we still 
had no stable textbooks... 
Stalin: Now the textbooks are stable. 
(Quoted in Fitzpatrick, p. 234)  
Stalin was himself intimately involved in designing history textbooks. It was due to his 
criticism of conveying the past through “abstract sociological schemas” that history textbooks 
followed a chronological order – narrating sequence of events, historical figures and dates 
(Fitzpatrick 1979).  This allowed for a Soviet republic like Georgia certain fluidity with the 
content so that history textbooks could transmit stories of enemies, resistance, heroic struggles, 
and so forth even while framed in terms of Marxist dialectics.  
Hence while Georgian textbooks can be viewed as artifacts of ideological and knowledge 
regimes transmitted to each generation, they in fact demonstrate continuity and persistence in 
conveying the past through immutable patterns.  There is a line of continuity not only between 
historical representations from the Soviet to post-Soviet period but linkage in form and content to 
a memory framework from the 19th century founding texts by Ilia Chavchavadze (see following 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Loose-­‐leaf	  textbook	  refers	  to	  a	  binder	  type	  journal	  -­‐	  a	  collection	  of	  material	  on	  different	  themes,	  disciplines	  or	  sciences	  for	  reading	  and	  working	  assignments.	  	  	  27	  People’s	  Commissariat	  for	  Education	  was	  an	  administrative	  unit	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  that	  overlooked	  and	  regulated	  all	  matters	  concerning	  education	  and	  culture.	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chapter).  This linkage was made possible not necessarily because of some sub-altern form of 
resistance aimed at defending history from the ideological pressure of the communist state, 
although many Georgians like to think that, but primarily because the memory framework in the 
19th century texts was so general and powerful as to have imposed limitations on the Soviet 
doctrine. It posited three basic memory maxims, none of which inherently contradicts the 
Marxist framework or infringes on the power of communist rule: a) Georgia has always been 
under attack by various invaders, b) Georgians are heroic and have always resisted attackers to 
defend their culture and nation, c) history reveals both strengths and weaknesses of the Georgian 
people.  In what follows I demonstrate the ways in which these maxims are sustained by 
recurrent motifs in historical narratives.    
  
2.3. RECURRENT MOTIFS  
 
Georgian history textbooks are generally organized around a series of narratives. They 
convey historical processes as events that have a beginning, middle and end. In most cases, the 
beginning of each historical period (and end of the previous one) is marked by the appearance of 
a “new enemy” (sometimes the term “new” or “another” is in the very titles of textbooks 
chapters). The element of “enemy” is a motif that sets the boundaries of a setting within which 
characters are revealed and relations are established. This is the dominant motif that drives the 
action, but it also creates conditions through which “Georgianness” is realized. This is possibly 
why in collective imaginaries, “Georgia under threat” is conceived as a condition of existence.     
In the analysis of the textbooks the emphasis on the narrative form and other textual 
means that organize meaning stems from my approach to memory that has been shaped by the 
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works of James Wertsch (1998, 2002). Cultural tools and linguistic forms such as narratives are 
central to his analytic framework, which emphasizes the agency of symbolic mediums in both 
organizing and transmitting collective memories. Linguistic mediums, especially narratives are 
useful and effective instruments for grasping reality in a coherent whole and the following quote 
by Aristotle on the “play” points to this special faculty of the narrative form:  
…If you string together a set of speeches expressive of character, and well finished in 
point of diction and thought, you will not produce the essential tragic effect nearly so 
well as with a play which, however deficient in these respects, yet has a plot and 
artistically constructed incidents. (Aristotle, Poetics).  
What Aristotle once wrote about tragedy is at the core of narrative form and function. 
Tragedy he wrote, “is an imitation of an action that is complete, and whole” and “whole is that 
which has a beginning, a middle, and an end”. More generally narratives are typically composed 
of these three parts, and as commonsensical as this may sound the point that any plot of an 
artistic form has a beginning, a middle and an end, and that the meaning of each part is only 
evident once the end is known is critical in understanding narrative-reality relationship. Do life 
events have a strictly defined beginning “which does not itself follow anything by causal 
necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be”? (Aristotle, Poetics). To re-
state the question posed by Hayden White, “Does the world really present itself to perception in 
the form of well made stories, with central subjects, proper beginning, middles, and ends, and a 
coherence that permits us to see ‘the end’ in every beginning?” (1981, p.23). Authors like White 
show why this is almost certainly not the case.  Instead narratives convey reality as if it is a story 
that begins with specific events or actions and ends somewhere.  While an event in reality may or 
may not have meaning for consequent happenings, narrative plots structure them in a way that 
only meaningful ones are conveyed, while leaving out things irrelevant to the plot. Plot in its 
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own right is the meaning, the explanation, the line of argument that defines characters and their 
actions.  
When it comes to history, univocal memory narratives are often employed, and they are 
useful because they are capable of simplifying matters (Novick, 1988). Louis Mink has pointed 
out that “we cannot make sense of history, unless it is possible to discover in it a single theme, a 
‘regular movement,’ [that] beyond … mere chronologies there should be a ’larger theme’ about 
the movement and direction of history’” (Mink, 1981 p.190). For Mink, the idea of “narrative 
form as cognitive instrument” is part of a broader dialogue with Kantian claims about “universal 
history”.  Mink questions the notion of universal history because it fails to accept the constraints 
of narrative. The point is that narrative rather than simply representing reality constructs it 
according to a certain plot, and the plot is not given in real experience but posited by human 
imagination. With that, what narrative form does is help make sense of events by grasping 
together how they relate to each other. It posits a plot of a story with “a single theme”, taming 
uneven and multilayered flows of historical occurrences according to a unilinear narrative 
schema.   
In examining the semantic organization of the texts I shall consider, ideas from Russian 
Formalist scholars, especially Vladimir Propp’s (1968, 1984) approach in the Morphology of the 
Folktale. Propp’s principal postulate is that in a folktale objectively identifiable constants are the 
“functions” of the dramatic personae. These are the basic components that “serve as stable, 
constant elements in a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled” (1968, p.21). A 
number of Russian scholars have elaborated Propp’s thesis on the folktale. Several of his 
interpreters have taken his postulates further in a general discussion on semiotics, and some of 
these ideas are used here in the analysis of historical texts. 
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 I.I. Rezvin, (1975) another Russian formalist and Propp’s interpreter, elaborated on 
dramatic functions to suggest that two types of predicates (constructs) can be found in folktales 
as well as epic texts: ones that express constant and inherent characteristics of actors and ones 
that reveal action/transformation. These latter are what drive siuzhet or the plot of a story. These 
elements explain not “referential semantics” but “inner semantics that serve to form links within 
the text”, hence they show the ways in which text is made into a coherent whole (p 83). Another 
of Propp’s interpreters, B.N Putilov (1971), wrote about motifs as elements that form siuzhet. He 
pointed out that there is a certain collection of settings, relations, episodes and psychological 
states that form the arsenal of the epos and that this is not immobile and absolute.  
 My interest here lies not so much in the morphological analysis of textual units, but rather 
in using these theoretical terms to extract from historical texts certain patterns as paradigmatic 
categories that make up the semantic field of memory.  From this perspective these elements 
matter not as structuring mechanisms strictly on a textual level but as meaningful markers of 
historical processes that consequently serve as lenses for framing and conceiving historical 
reality on a discursive level28.  
2.4. UNSTABLE ORDER OF THE PAST 
 
 
Georgians trace historical antecedents of their statehood to the ancient Kingdom of 
Colchis (Bronze Age), the mythical land of the Golden Fleece. The memory of this proto-
Georgian state is entrenched with the myth of the Argonauts who came from the Black Sea. With 
the help of Medea, the daughter of the Colchian King Ayet, who fell in love with Jason, they 
were able to steal the Golden Fleece from the King. Mythical imagery associated with Medea 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  kind	  of	  discourse	  “framing”	  practice	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  corresponds	  to	  George	  Lakoff’s	  notion	  of	  “framwork”	  and	  discourse	  framing	  in	  his	  popular	  Don’t	  Think	  of	  an	  Elephant:	  Know	  Your	  Values	  and	  Frame	  the	  
Debate	  (2004).	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and Golden Fleece have been employed and appropriated under different political conditions and 
for very different purposes in contemporary discussions of the past and Georgia’s cultural 
belonging (see Khalvashi forthcoming). As such this myth is overlain with various ways of 
reading, including conflicting interpretations. Medea’s image has been appropriated to symbolize 
Georgia’s belonging to European civilization (even its birth giver) and the photograph below 
(Figure 2.1) of a mosaic fragment on the facade of the Georgia’s Presidentail palace (constructed 
by Saakashvili’s administration) is an example of such appropriation of this myth. But the myth 
also represents one of the first instantiations of an alien force intruding to take away something 
valuable from Georgians, an effort that succeeds because of an internal collaborator. 
Bendukidze and his associates entertained this formulation when they mentioned “Argo 
treacherously sieging Colchis” (see Chapter 1).   
The history of Georgian territories is represented from that point on as an unending cycle 
of invasions and attacks, often aided by backsliding internal agents. Georgian lands become a 
terrain for competing empires to gain control over these territories and expand the borders of 
their empires. The era of King Parnavaz in the third century B.C.E. marks the beginning of 
Georgia’s movement toward territorial integrity and strong statehood. Describing this period 
authors of the 2001 textbook write: 
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The formation of the Kartli Kingdom took place against the background of bitter 
confrontations for supreme power among various aristocratic clans. In this battle, rulers 
of various Eastern Georgian entities even relied on external forces for assistance. For 
instance Azo, is referred to as “The first King” in Georgian historical chronicles, but the 
official version (“Kartlis Tskhovreba”) does not recognize him as such, since he came to 
Kartli as an invader with the help of external forces (Greeks). Azo’s rule based on 
external power did not last for long.  Rebellion erupted in the country, spearheaded by … 
Parnavaz 29 . The rebellion ended with the success of Georgians and Parnavaz’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  According	  to	  the	  Georgian	  chronicles	  Life	  of	  Kings	  King	  Parnavaz	  was	  a	  descendant	  of	  mythic	  Kartlos	  	  the	  eponymous	  ancestor	  of	  Georgians	  (himself	  a	  descendant	  of	  Noah	  and	  Japeth).	  Parnavaz	  is	  credited	  not	  only	  for	  laying	  the	  foundation	  of	  Georgian	  statehood	  but	  for	  creating	  writing	  and	  literacy	  for	  the	  Georgian	  
Figure	  2.1.	  On	  the	  facade	  of	  the	  President’s	  Palace	  of	  Georgia,	  constructed	  in	  2009	  is	  a	  mosaic	  art	  piece	  (by	  Natalia	  Amirejibi)	  titled	  “Important	  Fragments	  from	  the	  History	  of	  Georgia”	  composed	  of	  18	  separate	  plates.	  Each	  plate	  depicts	  significant	  events	  or	  figures	  from	  Georgia’s	  history	  spanning	  several	  thousand	  years.	  The	  very	  first	  one	  (top	  one	  on	  this	  photo)	  depicts	  the	  myth	  of	  Argonauts.	  The	  text	  next	  to	  the	  picture	  reads:	  “King	  Aeëtes,	  Medea,	  the	  Aurgonauts,	  the	  Golden	  Fleece	  –	  a	  symbol	  of	  freedom	  and	  sacrifice”.	  The	  next	  mosaic	  fragment	  (bottom	  one	  on	  this	  photo)	  depicts	  King	  Parnavaz	  and	  the	  text	  reads:	  “King	  Parnavaz	  –	  the	  first	  King	  of	  Kartli,	  the	  unifier	  of	  the	  Georgian	  nation	  and	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  Georgian	  alphabet.	  	  (photo	  taken	  by	  author	  from	  the	  brochure	  “The	  Palace	  of	  the	  President	  of	  Georgia”	  given	  to	  me	  by	  the	  president’s	  chief	  of	  staff	  in	  2010)	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ascendance to the throne. The year of 284 B.C.E. is identified as the date of Parnavaz’s 
accession which is also the beginning of the Georgian national chronology… 
 
In this passage, (A) creating the Kartli Kingdom appears as a self-induced process, left 
unexplained as to what processes and forces mobilized this creation.  It is as if it emerged 
spontaneously out of some common ethos. And this process was foiled by aristocratic clans who 
are portrayed as aberrations from the norm, as traitors relying on external forces while rebellion 
implies the common will of the nation led by a king of distinguished leadership.   
In the 1974 textbook, chapter five is titled “The Struggle Against Foreign Invaders in the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries”, and it opens with the following passage: “On its way 
toward progress, Georgia’s normal path of development was arrested by a new dangerous 
invader - Tatar Mongols” (emphasis in the original)”. Subsequent paragraphs describe the 
cruelty with which “enemies” treated the local population. “Thus the ravaged and tortured 
country was unable to render necessary resistance to Mongols … Part of the nobility met the 
enemy with obedience. Friction and disorientation showed in Georgia’s military leadership. 
Mongols used this to their benefit and occupied Georgian fortresses one after another.”  This 
internal disorientation is further aggravated when Queen Rusudan, Georgia’s ruler at the time, 
died: “In the country left without the King several lords strengthened by support from Mongols 
strove to gain complete power, acting adamantly and together with the occupants who were 
ravaging the population.” In contrast, the “patriotic part of the nobility from the first year of 
Mongol rule was designing plans for liberation and was plotting rebellion.” However a traitor 
gave away the rebellion: “The rebellion planned against the Mongols was thwarted by internal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  language,	  as	  well	  as	  establishing	  a	  unified	  religious	  cult	  which	  in	  turn	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  subsequent	  conversion	  to	  Christianity.	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betrayal, but the Georgian people did not gave up in their struggle against intruders” (pp 94-97).   
Later on, discussing events of 6th century Georgia, the authors of the same textbook 
wrote: 
From the beginning of 6th century Iranian conquerors re-intensified their attack in Kartli 
for the eradication of Georgian customs and culture. Under the Shah’s command peoples 
of Transcaucasia had to be induced to reject the Christian faith and convert to Iranian 
Zoroastrism. To these demands of the conquerors Georgians responded with rebellion.  
The Georgians were defeated and the Kingdom of Kartli became a vassal of Iran.  
The very next section of this textbook narrates a similar heroic struggle of another 
“Georgian Kingdom” - Egrisi. According to this narrative Egrisi became a target of Iran as a 
strategic point for its power-struggle against the Byzantine Empire. “Egrisians at this time found 
themselves between two fires: on the one hand they wanted to overthrow Byzantine rule, on the 
other, they were conducting a life and death struggle against a new invading enemy – the 
Iranians.” (P 40) Between these two fires, the authors recount how Georgian chiefs disagreed on 
choosing between Byzantine and Iran as the less damaging force.  But the disagreement was 
surmounted by a persuasive speech by one of the Egrisi chiefs, where he argued: “Iranians are 
enemies of our customs, of our faith; they will prohibit our ancestral customs and will try to 
convert us to their religion.” Based on this argument the Georgians decided to side with the 
Byzantine Empire. Recounting the end of an enduring and long struggle, the authors conclude: 
“The Georgian people, under the threat of complete destruction by two potent Middle Eastern 
empires - Iran and   Byzantine, through continuous self-sacrificing struggle and smart flexible 
politics, rescued its physical existence and defended its old culture” (p 42)  
 The same storyline is played out in the account of “the struggle of Georgian people for 
freedom in 17th century” against Iran’s Shah Abbas, or later against the Ottomans with public 
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rebellions and continuous acts of resistance (1974 textbook, p 123-128). Here too, “success in 
the struggle against the Ottomans was foiled by disagreement between kings and the 
nobility…and continuous internal feudal wars” (p 128).  
 The repeated elements in these narratives represent motifs that speak to the theme of the 
story, forming a pattern of historical occurrences. Of course this is from a particular perspective, 
one that demarcates events from non-events, stories from non-stories, visible actors from 
invisible ones. As Peter Brooks has pointed out  “It is in the peculiar nature of narrative as a 
sense-making system that clues are revealing that prior events are prior, and that causes are 
causal only retrospectively, in a reading back from the end” (2003 p.93). 
In 1783 King Erekle II of Kartl-Kakheti Kingdom (Eastern Georgia) signed a treaty with 
Russia that placed his kingdom under the tsar’s imperial protection. Provisions of the treaty 
guaranteed the preservation of the throne to Erekle’s descendant, but limited their sovereignty 
(Suny, 1988). Given these circumstances, this case of Russian-Georgian relations poses a 
somewhat different “enemy” paradigm, first and foremost because Georgians pursued the 
alliance with Russia, with the promise of security from other enemies such as Persia and the 
Ottoman Empire.  
The textbook published in 1992, soon after Soviet disintegration, conveys Georgia’s 
annexation by the Russian Empire following the same thematic framing. In the narrative of 
Georgia’s annexation by Russia, we encounter the same basic plot motifs that shape the siuzhet 
of all other encounters with foreign invaders. These same elements not only reinstantiate the 
single repeated storyline but reinforce the image of Georgians’ immutable nature. Below is a 
schematic outline of how the 1992 textbook narrates the events of Russian-Georgian relations, 
framed by recurrent motifs:     
	   48	  
-­‐ New enemy motif: The 1992 Georgian history textbook frames the arrival of Russians in 
terms of deceit and treachery of a new enemy disguised as an Orthodox Christian 
relative, “but the effect of this deceptive trick,” write the authors of the textbook, 
“bursts at once like a soap bubble” (p 4).  -­‐ Internal weakness facilitates enemy’s success motif: “Russia was devoted to the principle 
of ‘divide and rule’ and used existing disagreements between Western Georgian 
principalities and ‘rendered assistance’ to the chief of Samegrelo [a region in western 
Georgia] … Samegrelo was occupied by Russian troops and turned into a bridgehead 
for the battle against the Imereti principality [another Western Georgian region]”  (p 
13) -­‐ Resistance motif: “The anti-Russian, national-liberation movement of the Georgian 
people began right away with the annexation of eastern Georgia. To be more accurate 
this movement only redirected its course. If earlier it was targeted against Iranian and 
Ottoman occupiers, now it was mainly conducted against tsarist politics” (p 38). Under 
the heading “national-liberation movement of the Georgian people” the textbook 
mentions rebellions in 1802, 1804, 1812, 1819-1820 in several provincial regions as 
public uprisings against tsarist rule as well as an 1832 conspiracy that failed as a result 
of internal treason (pp 37-55).  -­‐ Preserving culture motif: “After the Russian occupation, the significance of national 
literature further increased. Besides framing past events in their own historical settings, 
its aim was to assess the past and define perspectives of the future. After the abolition 
of national-statehood, it  [literature] was to function as the only unifying and 
supportive [medium] of the Georgian people.” All the while, “Tsarist imperialist policy 
was an impediment to the accomplishment of this difficult and honorable mission by 
Georgian literature. It regarded the repression of Georgian literature as one of its major 
means for realizing its goals for assimilation and Russification” (p 81). Despite, all the 
difficulties and barriers, “Georgian literature was on the way to revival and renewal”.  
The concluding passage of the chapter re-asserts in highlighted letters the purpose of 
Georgian literature as being to “serve the liberation movement of Georgian people, 
who once again found themselves enslaved” (p 88).   
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Despite the diversity of historical episodes being analyzed and the context in which the 
book was published, all three of these textbooks employ similar themes and motifs to frame, or 
sometimes to take a stance toward events. Across various historical periods and episodes, then, 
the following narratively organized “functions” appear repeatedly as stable elements that make 
up a general narrative framework:  
I.  An “initial situation” is characterized by path of normal development.  This usually 
presupposes movement toward integrating Georgian territories into a strong and 
successful political unit, as well as the flourishing of Georgian culture. In history 
textbooks, constructing or rebuilding Christian monasteries usually symbolize the path of 
normal development, as these were both markers of Georgian spiritual integrity as well as 
expressions of cultural progress. 
II. Normal development is thwarted by the appearance of a new enemy.  Usually this takes the 
form of much more powerful but less cultured and civilized actors than Georgians, and 
they threaten the nation’s cultural purity and integrity. One of the perpetual memory 
images related to the country’s unending struggle is that Georgians repeatedly find 
themselves caught between the forces of two competing empires. 
III. Regardless of circumstances, Georgians resist external domination.  Resistance is one of 
the most important defining motifs of the Georgian narrative framework.  However, a 
wide range of actions can be implied under the heading of resistance - rebellions, acts of 
individual martyrdom, language preservation, religious devotion, or cultural activism 
(such as production of poetry, literary or historical texts). The act of resistance in its own 
right symbolizes the endurance of the Georgian spirit.  Its importance is not in the 
outcome of a rebellion or uprising, but the act itself bears significance as a testament to 
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the survival of common national will and the incorruptibility of the Georgian soul.  
IV. In this struggle for freedom some internal weakness impedes the nation’s liberation.  This 
might involve betrayal during rebellions, internal frictions or power struggles, or 
collaboration with an enemy to gain advantage in the internal hierarchy. Internal 
weaknesses are represented as Georgia’s Achilles heel.  In many cases they are explained 
or justified in terms of an enemy’s treachery and attempts at manipulation to “break the 
castle from the inside”30.     
V.          Once the internal weakness is surmounted, united Georgians free themselves from 
external domination and manage to maintain their cultural values (especially language 
and religion). In many cases the overcoming of internal dissent is due to the appearance 
of a talented and powerful leader, a monarch who crushes traitors and monopolizes 
otherwise dispersed power.     
  
These recurrent motifs frame historical events throughout different periods of retelling 
the past in Georgia. In these elements one can see that Georgians’ inherent nature is revealed in 
two contradictory tendencies: on the one hand they are characterized by an unsubdued nature and 
the capacity for heroic struggle and resistance; on the other hand, internal disagreements, 
betrayal and collaboration represent an opposing tendency of Georgians. In many instances, the 
dialectics between these two contradictory functions is what determines the outcome of whether 
Georgians succeed or fail. These two polar functions of Georgians are at the basis of self-
idealizing and self-condemning voices I introduced earlier.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  “The	  Castle	  always	  broke	  from	  the	  inside”	  is	  a	  common	  Georgian	  aphorism	  that	  embodies	  and	  encapsulates	  collective	  memory	  of	  betrayal	  and	  treason.	  People	  would	  refer	  to	  this	  aphorism	  when	  conveying	  either	  historical	  events	  or	  reflecting	  upon	  certain	  present	  circumstances.	  The	  aphorism	  is	  just	  another	  instance	  of	  “memory	  code”	  that	  I	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  4,	  a	  speech	  element	  that	  implies	  judgmental	  undertone	  by	  way	  of	  indexing	  certain	  memory	  maxim.	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 The presence of contradictory functions is something that goes against Propp’s 
theorization of the folktale, since for him the storyline of a folktale grows out of a coherent set of 
functions. For Propp the function of dramatic personae is “an act of character, defined from the 
point of view of its significance for the course of action”, which is assumed to be coherent (p 
21). Christopher Booker has pointed out that any feature of a “fatal flaw” that inhibits a hero’s 
success is part of the plot-line of a tragedy (Booker 2004), but Georgia’s memory narrative does 
not have the quality of a tragic story because the end-result, what Brooks calls the “inevitable 
discovery” of the narrative (2003), is measured in terms of preserving culture and national 
identity and the Georgian mnemonic community takes this to have been accomplished 
successfully.  
One can conceive of the internally contradictory nature of Georgia’s memory narrative in 
terms of the following axioms found in fairy-tales:  
I. If a hero resists temptation/trial from a giver, then the hero acquires a special/magical quality. 
II. If a hero, acquires a magical quality then he is able to overcome the consequences of any 
damage begotten by a perpetrator (Rezvin, p 88)  
In the case of Georgian memory framework, the actors need to tame their internal 
disagreements, or temptations in order to overcome an enemy’s treachery. In consequence, 
national unity as a magical quality would render them invincible. As Rezvin points out (in his 
attempt to address the question posed by Propp on why people tell tales) “a fairy-tale functions in 
a collectivity as a model, a paradigm (in a wide sense of the word paradeigma) of a coherent 
text, on which a language-bearer is oriented for creating new texts” (p. 90). Further he suggests 
that a fairy-tale depicts a “certain game situation (igrovaja situacija) and every game situation 
can be viewed as a peculiar model for complex situations that for instance a child can come 
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across” (pp. 90-91).  
Similarly, my claim is that recurrent elements function as paradigmatic categories that 
perpetuate the modes of thinking about Georgia and Georgianness. Which of these are 
highlighted or downplayed in any particular instance is shaped by the “addressivity” involved in 
any given context of communication. As a general rule, the more ritualistic, public, and 
performative the act of communication, the more it accents the self-idealizing elements of 
freedom fighting, resistance, and the unsubduable nature of Georgians.  In contrast, in an 
informal “off stage” (Goffman, 1959), behind the scene discursive encounter, Georgians may be 
able to talk about the internal weaknesses of their nation that have contributed to failures in the 
historical past and in the present.  
This mode of discourse that I shall call self-condemning does not reject the existence of 
the former element, but it re-accents in a different way that reflects the interpretive demands of 
discussion—usually informal discussion among Georgians in a private setting. Elements of 
internal flaws can be found in all textual representations of the past, but it is a matter of 
balancing virtues and flaws in memory performances that end up conveying historical outcomes 
as successful, given that Georgia is a nation that has survived all attempts of destruction and 
annihilation. Although what survival means may be contested, the notion that Georgians have 
survived and endured is an underlying axiom, both for vehement critiques and proud, self-
promoting nationalists.  
 
2.5. THE DUAL PERSPECTIVE OF GEORGIAN MEMORY 
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When thinking about the means for representing reality, one of the important categories 
to take into account is the idea of a perspective. Denis Cosgrove in Social Formation and 
Symbolic Landscape (1998) writes about the emergence of landscape in the history of European 
culture and thought, and he points to the idea of perspective as an important technique for 
“spatial control”. For Renaissance artists, he writes that perspective was the most significant tool 
for the realistic representation of the world: “perspective was regarded not merely as a technique, 
a visual device, but as a truth itself, the discovery of an objective property of space rather than 
solely of vision” (p 21-22)  
In his overview of how perspective was devised in Renaissance painting and theatre, 
Cosgrove writes that it “was a device for controlling the world of things, of objects which could 
be possessed. It was related to a cosmology in the Renaissance which regarded creation as 
ordained by fixed geometrical rules. The painter or architect could understand and apply these 
rules and thereby emulate the creative act” (p 25). Perspective for a landscape is what plot is to a 
narrative, both define the limits of the horizon of what “can be seen” and what needs to be 
perceived. That limit has a structuring force in shaping the plot, the motif, the point to be made 
of a visual or verbal representation of the world. In both cases, the flow of history is arrested in a 
single perspective and it draws a cosmology with its inherent logic of what reality is. This points 
to the idea that narratives always portray reality from a particular perspective and this certainly 
applies to the examples I examined. However, the presence of two contradictory functions of 
Georgianness allows for the two distinct points of entry on the discourse of the national past and 
national identity. The co-functioning of self-idealizing elements with self-condemning ones 
enables this dual perspective. While in textual representation, “narrative form as a cognitive 
instrument” (Mink, 1978) may impose its own limitations on playing out of this dual perspective, 
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on the discursive level such dualism is much more viable.    
 
2.6. METANARRATIVE AND THE “TRUE-SELF”  
 
The final questions I address in this chapter are: What is the cultural impact of the 
historical consciousness that narrative frameworks convey? What kind of imaginaries of social 
order and moral registers can they sustain? And how do these images from the past translate into 
discursive modes on Georgian identity, history and politics in the present?  
While the following chapters provide more in depth answers to these questions, I want to 
introduce a few examples at this point from popular sources to demonstrate how the basic motifs 
outlined above, can facilitate stance-taking and how memory maxims open discursive windows 
for certain political judgments.  Specifically, I turn to an example from a blog entry by Tariel 
Putkaradze, a famous or even infamous historian and ethnolinguist teaching at one of the 
Georgian universities. In the Georgian scholarly community, especially among historians and 
linguists, Putkaradze is well known (although possibly not well established) for his radical 
ethnocentrism and religious nationalism. In 1990s Putkaradze served as the member of Georgia’s 
state council and was later appointed by Georgia’s first President Zviad Gamsakhurdia as the 
prefect of the city of Batumi. Putkaradze is one of the more outspoken radical scholars who 
became vocal in the wake of Georgian nationalism. As an ethnolinguist he has published several 
manuscripts on Georgian language arguing against granting the status of language to Kartvelian 
languages other than Georgian (e.g. Svan, Mingrelian and Laz31). Liberal intellectuals view 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Kartvelian	  languages	  are	  indigenous	  language	  family,	  spoken	  primarily	  in	  Georgia.	  Kartvelian	  languages	  are	  not	  know	  to	  be	  related	  to	  any	  other	  linguistic	  family.	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Putkaradze as a typical case of politically motivated pseudoscientist whose theories are shaped 
by ethno-nationalist agenda. But the ideas he has been promoting for decades have had a broad 
impact on the proliferation of public discourse on linguistic issues. From this perspective 
defending the status of the Georgian language is equated with defending the nation and its unity. 
In an article titled The “Putkaradze Syndrome” and Intellectual Shahidism in Georgian Science 
written by one of the liberal intellectuals, the author points out that it was due to Putkaradze’s 
skillful promotion that in the discussion of linguistic analyses of Georgian languages every other 
“doctor, bus driver, fireman, religious clergyman, journalist, flight attendant” is involved. The 
point is that Putkaradze’s vision is interesting not only because it finds resonance among many 
radical and not so radical nationalist groups, but because it manifests the ideological worldview 
that persisted in the official rhetoric of the 1990s. But apart from that, excerpts from his text 
manifest how memory maxims are appropriated as framing mechanisms for authoritative 
judgments.   
In his History of Georgia: A Short Version, written in the context of strained Russian-
Georgian relations, Putkaradze asserts:32⁠ 
In its struggle against various invaders Georgian selfhood (identity) and its culture of 
statehood (which implies a centralized but tolerant state) have been formed. Historically, 
some intruders were capable of tearing apart Georgia or partially incorporating it into 
another state. In such times, the Georgian church remained as the guarantor of the 
Georgian state’s indissolubility, while the Georgian people never complied with the 
occupant.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  This	  text	  has	  no	  date	  of	  publication	  or	  the	  date	  when	  it	  was	  uploaded,	  but	  from	  the	  text	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  it	  was	  written	  sometime	  after	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  war	  in	  August	  of	  2008.	  This	  is	  important	  in	  light	  of	  discussion	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  historical	  representations	  are	  aligned	  with	  present	  political	  orders.	  In	  Putkaradze’s	  text	  we	  see	  that	  he	  both	  maps	  his	  discussion	  onto	  current	  political	  predicament,	  but	  frames	  historical	  representation	  in	  culturally	  pre-­‐given	  symbolic	  forms. 	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In this passage the author, on the one hand, reproduces one of the dominant historical motifs as a 
given truth, namely, that Georgia has continuously faced attacks from multiple invaders. But he 
attaches and posits something else to this that serves to essentialize Georgian identity and make 
this general identity claim synonymous with “historical truth”.  
Putkaradze uses this as a preamble to his ensuing discussion where he points out that for 
contemporary Georgia “the major problem is de-occupying territories of Abkhazia and the 
Tskhinvali [South Ossetia] region that have been occupied by Russia” (for more on this conflict 
see chapter 1). Most of Putkaradze’s blog entry is dedicated to exposing the strategies of Russian 
“imperialistic” aspirations: 
…the aim of the Russian Empire is unaltered: by disorienting the international 
community or Georgian citizens, [Russia pursues] the gradual occupation and annexation 
of Georgian territory, and in parallel, by ethno-linguistic dissociation of Georgians, 
[Russia’s aim is to] complete its assimilation of the nation that historically owns these 
territories.  
But he also deems it necessary to remind readers of “what is unalterable is the goal of the 
Georgian nation and generally its population: to preserve national identity and culture by saving 
its statehood.”  
In a contemporary globalist world this aim can only be realized if a new, depoliticized, 
and academic history of Georgia and the Georgian nation is created. We consider 
documenting the 200-year conflict to be the major aspect of this history.   
While this example demonstrates how the past is mapped onto current political 
challenges, it also builds on and reinstates pre-existing formulas that impose a certain form of 
reasoning and moralizing logic. It may be hypothetically true that any kind of new past can be 
construed with a need to meet present needs in mind, but not any new past can sustain moral 
power. In other words, memory’s art of persuasion and its moral weight rest on the 
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embeddedness of culturally shared and legitimized imaginaries.  As a result reinventing memory 
normally is launched only from the semiotic and semantic basis that is already in place and that 
conveys a particular social order.  
Putkaradze’s formulation of Georgia’s eternal mission, “to preserve national identity and 
culture by saving its statehood”, is one pre-given historical axiom – a memory maxim –  that is 
part of an accepted social order in Georgia. Statehood here appears only as an auxiliary or an 
accessory to national identity and culture. It seems that Georgia’s realization as a political entity 
is only a second order mission. The major premise of this statement is that the Georgian nation 
did not cease to exist when “some intruders were capable of tearing apart […] or partially 
incorporating it” (in other words abolishing it as a political entity).  His inference is predicated 
on the dialectics of the narrative he employs as part of the preamble to his discourse.  
 Putkaradze’s vision is not unique, but is instead punctuated by the recurrent motifs 
outlined earlier in textbooks that are common forms of historic ideation in Georgia. The list of 
motifs in Georgian memory includes the struggle against the enemy, the claim that Georgians 
have never complied with invaders, and acceptance that a powerful enemy like Russia can 
“disorient” and “tear apart” (in one way or another undermine an internal strength in the form of 
unity) Georgian society.  These are all basic motifs that underpin not only Putkaradze’s 
reasoning but serve as an underlying code for all forms of engagement with the past in Georgia. ⁠  
Abstracted from concrete historical circumstances these recurrent motifs form what I 
shall refer to as a “metanarrative” of Georgia’s past, a narrative about the narratives of all 
specific events and historical processes. It is a conceptually compressed reproduction of an 
atemporal “historical truth.”  A metanarrative is a transhistorical narrative that not only 
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encapsulates historical processes taking place over several thousand years, but conveys 
Georgia’s inherent nature, its mission, its character and how it relates or must relate to the rest of 
the world.  
The metanarrative of Georgia’s past is a mythical construct, but not because it obscures 
or falsifies true course of events.  Instead, it is because it abstracts away from reality—a set of 
complex, ambivalent, indeterminate historical processes—to create a coherent sense-making 
structure that fixes multiple happenings over several thousand years into a single symbolic 
construct. Events of distant periods and processes of a complex nature are emplotted into the 
narrative of one story that occurs over and over. It encapsulates the pattern of historical 
development and grasps a sequence and set of multiple events in a single frame (on Georgia’s 
national narrative see Batiashvili & Wertsch, 2008; Batiashvili, 2012) Its capacity to compress 
vast period of time and variety of happenings in a single coherent plot is related to what Amartya 
Sen calls the “miniaturization of reality” (Sen, 2006) that can be so dangerous in conflicts around 
identities.   
Dolgin and Magdoff (1977) make the point that “as time passes, events of import to a 
people…retain only the skeleton of their significance, having lost much of their previous 
content” but “these events become vehicles for new significations. At the same time, such events 
embody contemporary meanings, legitimated by an implicit reference to a historic past, 
simultaneously they (event-meaning) legitimate the past by exemplifying its continuity in the 
present” (p. 351-352). When employed as an argumentative tool, this two-fold nature of memory 
form assumes special effectiveness. “The very principle of myth” writes Roland Barthes is that 
“it transforms history into nature…[myth] is not read as motive, but as reason” (1972, p. 129) 
Georgia’s metanarrative functions as a “condensed symbol” (Dolgin and Magdoff, 1977 p. 352) 
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in two ways, first as a condensed representation of all the historical events in Georgia’s past as a 
distilled pattern of meta-history; second, as a condensed symbol of Georgianness.  
By way of illustration, consider two examples of formulations of metanarrative.  The first 
comes from the foreword of a children’s history book called “My Georgia” (chemi sakartvelo) 
published in 2009 and the second from the forward of the 1974 history textbook of Georgia’s 
history discussed above.     
The author’s foreword to “My Georgia” includes the following passage:  
I have tried to convey a consistent narrative of the centuries-long existence of the 
Georgian nation, of the heroic struggle for self-preservation and a free and noble life. 
Georgia has always faced powerful empires due to the geopolitical importance of the 
Caucasus. Despite this, it is astonishing that Georgians have formed and, most 
importantly, have preserved their original, distinct culture. . . . Georgians created their 
country with their sweat and blood: they have never seized a single inch of others’ land 
and to this day have maintained their language, traditions and everything that is called 
culture. Along this, I have tried to explain to young readers that although there were the 
traitors and backsliders, there were many true patriots [of Georgia], who were devoted 
sons of country and nation; because of their dedication Georgians in the end achieved 
victory in unequal battles even with world conquerors such as the Mongols, Timur Leng 
[Tamerlane], Shah Abbas and others. . . “We have said more than once that a nation’s 
deterioration, decay and erosion begin when it forgets its history, when it forfeits 
remembrance of its past, of its former life”. This was preached by the great Ilia [Ilia 
Chavchavadze]. My aim has been to transmit a genuine heroic past of the Georgian 
nation and not a false history of lamentation which [our heroic past] is evidenced by a 
multitude of illustrations from our very rich cultural heritage.  
The foreword to the 1974 textbook conveys an almost identical image of Georgia’s past. 
Moreover, here, too, the author cites a quote from Ilia Chavchavadze to lend authority to the 
claim that remembering nation’s history is a moral obligation of every citizen. In both cases the 
quotes are extracted from a single letter by Chavchavadze published in 1888, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  The 1974 textbook includes the following 
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passage in the foreword: 
The Georgian people have traversed an extremely difficult and long road. Every page of 
our past was written with the blood and sweat shed in the struggle for a better life and for 
independence. This book tells us about this interesting and heroic past and present…Our 
patriotic duty is to know the history of the Georgian people, how they managed to 
overcome powerful and numerous enemies and preserve their national existence, how 
they arrived at today’s light day”.  
As a testament to this duty, the author quotes familiar words from the “Great writer and social 
activist Ilia Chavchavadze,” who wrote:  
What is the strength of our life and what is weakness and futility only history can explain 
and translate33 to us, and if we forget this history, then we have forgotten the origin of our 
life, its root and its foundation, and if we do that, then on what are we to base our present 
and future? Indeed, historical knowledge, first and foremost, is a tool for better 
understanding the present and future and [a tool] for the conscious and purposeful labor 
of humans. (p 4).    
These two formulations were written four decades and three political ideologies apart 
from one another, but they reproduce the same thematic elements that I have outlined earlier, and 
they are nearly identical in their conception of the past and in their stance toward remembering.  
The amount of details with which this narrative can be spelled out varies. One can 
relocate the emphasis and intensify certain aspects depending on the context. For instance some 
formulations emphasize that Georgia is a very small country or conversely that Georgian lands 
have exceptional strategic importance to the entire world. Then each of these has its own 
imposing logic: the former seeks to pronounce the exceptionality of Georgian people in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Chavchavadze	  uses	  the	  word	  gvitargmnos	  literally	  meaning	  translate	  to	  us,	  although	  it	  is	  an	  odd	  formulation	  it	  makes	  sense	  in	  his	  poetic	  form	  of	  discourse	  in	  which	  he	  lends	  certain	  agency	  and	  voice	  to	  the	  “past”.	  He	  vocalizes	  history	  as	  if	  it	  can	  be	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  performative	  and	  speak	  to	  its	  people,	  as	  its	  father	  and	  procreator.	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ability to defy powerful enemies, regardless of being small, and the latter speaks to the cause of 
invasions and reasserts the country’s exceptionality in terms of its lands.   
There are two defining properties of a metanarrative that I would emphasize. First, it is a 
narrative that encapsulates and absorbs all specific narratives (Wertsch 2002) into a single 
whole. As such, it is a formulation often encountered in the introduction of history textbooks or 
in an attempt to briefly convey what Georgia’s history is about. It says something about the past 
by “telling” us what the underlying grand schema that guides historical processes is; it states up-
front the moral of the story. Second, metanarratives relate not only “historical truths” but provide 
a commentary on why knowing this “historical truth” is important. This didactic value of 
memory builds on the idea that “stories of peoplehood” provide a directory of exemplary models 
that can serve as nation’s moral compass and guarantee survival of a polity (Smith, 2003).  
Another dimension of my argument concerns the role of narrative formulations for 
transmitting and fixing memory maxims vis-à-vis general conversational discourse. Scholars 
such as John Shotter (1990), David Middleton and Derek Edwards (1990), have pointed out that 
since thoughts must be expressed in language in order to be communicated, discourse is a bridge 
through which remembering is constituted. Their focus is on conversational forms of 
remembering. As Shotter points out, “Our ways of talking about our experiences work … to 
represent them in such a way as to constitute and sustain one or another kind of social order” (p. 
122). But such accounts often have little to say about the ways in which the social order is 
linguistically mediated.  The notion of narrative as a cultural tool provides the natural bridge 
between memory and social order. For example, the capsule formulations of the past such as 
those outlined above play a most significant role in the proliferation and reproduction of 
crystalized memory images. These function as easily retainable cognitive shortcuts (Kahneman, 
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2011) that are much easier to remember and reproduce than specific historical narratives  
(Wertsch 2002).   
The examples of metanarrative I introduced above represent the kind of symbolic forms 
that convey social order by narrating both what happened and who we are⁠3.  They relate not a 
particular story but condense recurrent motifs into a single whole and expose a schema that 
underlies the flow of history. The notion of schema is important when considering semiotic 
means that organize and mediate people’s understanding of their past. The concept of a narrative 
schema, specifically when tied to memory, builds on the work of Frederic Bartlett whose 
experimental studies in psychology dealt with social and cultural factors involved in the 
processes of remembering. Bartlett maintained that remembering or understanding events 
involves an “effort after meaning” and the patterns such events might reveal. In his experiments 
individuals displayed a “constant effort to get the maximum possible of meaning into the 
material presented” (p 84) by for instance conventionalizing unfamiliar elements or simplifying 
complex content. It is in this “effort after meaning” that humans deploy what Bartlett called 
“schemata” based on recurrent themes and link them in a coherent way (1995, p. 44).  
But forewords to textbooks and other such summary statements convey the same 
recurrent motifs not as underlying themes but as extracted historical and cultural truths. They 
reflect a general, schematic formulation of historical axioms, or what I shall call “memory 
maxims”.  As an axiomatic statement it not only takes a stance toward what happened but toward 
memory itself and mends the narrative into a moral dictum that knowing “our past” is important 
as a civil obligation and a moral duty. The effort after meaning is a defining element of 
metanarratives. By expressing reality in certain ways such formulations not only explain the past, 
but impose their own reasoning logic about reality. The “moralizing impulse” as Hayden White 
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suggested is an inherent property of narratives, because unlike mere sequence of events as White 
wrote “every fully realized story...is a kind of allegory [that] points to a moral or endows events, 
whether real or imagery, with a significance [thus] every historical narrative has as its latent or 
manifest purpose the desire to moralize the events of which it treats” (1981, pp. 14-15, italics in 
the original).  
 In the case of metanarratives this moralizing impulse is put forth not as veiled authority 
as White or Bowen suggest, but as exposed dictum. The moral weight of “historical memory” as 
it is employed in discourse stems not from some abstract, detached category, but from the 
metanarrative of Georgia’s past that this term indexes. In other words, moral weight is the 
faculty of a specific form of historic ideation, it stems from what this narrative says about 
Georgia’s past and Georgian “true self”. 
The notion of a true self is essential to nationalism almost anywhere. Even Americans, 
who are not particularly nationalistic in ways found in Europe, have an idea of what an 
“American ideal” is or should be. To Georgians the image of “true Georgianness” is drawn from 
representations of the past, and vice versa. One of the episodes in Lewis Caroll’s Through the 
Looking Glass, provides a flippant look at this notion, suggesting that the “self” can turn into an 
evasive notion when our relationship to the world becomes unrecognizable. When Alice, who 
has lost herself in the wonderland, is asked by Caterpillar, “Who are you?”, she responds: “Why, 
I hardly know sir, I’ve changed so much since this morning ... I’m not myself, you know” (Lewis 
Caroll 1865).  
Alice’s sense of “being the same” being her “true self” is shattered because the reality she 
found herself in is so different that she can no longer grasp it. This is not the case with the image 
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of “Georgianness” posed by the metanarrative. This metanarrative captures the past in a way that 
ensures the coherence, continuity and integrity of a collective image. It does not matter what the 
structure of the world was in third, fifteenth, or eighteenth century Georgia.  Regardless of the 
forces shaping individual actions in these various contexts, Georgians are viewed as construing 
and acting in the world in the same general terms.  The father of the modern study of collective 
memory, Maurice Halbwachs, was the first to recognize that collective memories are tied to a 
group’s identity. In Halbwachs’s view memory, unlike history, emphasizes the recurrence of 
themes, events that resemble one other, and “represent currents of thought and experience within 
which we recover our past” and as such conceive collectivity in terms of certain immutable 
qualities (1950, p.64).  
2.7. CONCLUSION: A MODEL OF BIVOCAL MEMORY 
 
The “true self” stemming from Georgia’s historical paradigm that I have outlined is both 
canonical and intact. It is canonical because it conveys an absolute ideal evidenced by historical 
truth; it is intact because it remains true regardless of particular circumstances.  Part of its 
strength in remaining impervious to challenge stems from the fact that it incorporates two 
seemingly contradictory claims. The symbolic plane of memory harnesses both virtues and vices 
that are viewed as inherent to Georgians.  These are taken to be polar, but generic and coexistent 
characteristics, and they engender two parallel discursive regimes: one that builds on a self-
idealizing tendency (heroic elements such as resistance, freedom-fighters, non-compliance with 
arbitrary authority, martyrdom for the nation, and so forth), and one that harnesses self-
condemning rhetoric by admitting to shameful elements of Georgianness (betrayal, internal 
friction, collaboration with enemies, internal dissention).  The latter locates the blame of 
misfortune within the intimate space of we-ness. As a result Georgians often treat breaches of 
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unity both as stemming from the inevitable and insurmountable disorder of their character and as 
part of their cosmological order.  
National integrity and unity are central elements of the self-idealizing rhetoric that is usually 
part of a public and somewhat ritualized speech genre, a performative domain where nationhood 
is celebrated or where nationhood needs to be upheld and reinforced. This is highlighted in 
history textbooks. Historians who were socialized during the Soviet era seem to hold on to the 
idea (and the practice) that school children need to be cultured and socialized into these modes of 
self-perception to become part of a collectivity and carry on the ideal model.  
The voice of self-condemnation, in contrast, is hardly ever silent in private discussions, and 
even in public ones that problematize the state of Georgian affairs. It surfaces in speech genres 
involved in a “truth discourse” for critical reflection on “we-ness”. When discussing what he 
described as “dual nature of Georgians” Vaja, the director of the History Institute explained this 
to me: “The school textbook has its own demands, more patriotic elements need to be 
emphasized... We can talk [about the dualistic nature of Georgians] in private discussion, [or] 
with part of a wider society but the school textbook has its demands” (personal communication). 
Such comments point to the conclusion that one should think of these two polarities not in terms 
of mutually exclusive conceptions of Georgia’s past and Georgian identity that have disparate 
users, but in terms of alternating modes of discourse that exist in dialogic tension and hence are 
involved in mutual definition.  
*** 
While examples from the textbook presented here lay the groundwork for the claims I make, 
this analysis is certainly not exhaustive. In the following chapter I rely on different sets of data to 
further my propositions. In what follows I pursue two goals: a) I expand the claims I have 
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outlined by examining data other than history textbooks that suggest that recurrent elements in 
historical representations function as paradigmatic categories that perpetuate the modes of 
thinking about Georgia and Georgiannness, and b) I seek to demonstrate the ways in which these 
paradigmatic categories are devised as authoritative maxims that lend moral weight in speech 
acts.  Chapter 3 situates these historical paradigms in the discursive field were contests over 
Georgian culture, politics, and national belonging take place. The textual material in chapter 4 
demonstrates one way in which only the “self-idealizing” voice is employed for certain 
expressive and argumentative purposes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: IT’S A POOR SORT OF MEMORY THAT ONLY WORKS 
BACKWARDS      The Value of “Historical-Memory” for the 
Future of Nationhood 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is about how “historical memory” is articulated and employed as a morally 
charged category to talk about the future of statehood, national identity and forms of citizenship. 
I draw ethnographic and textual material from diverse settings to shed the light on the value of 
historical-memory as an emic category that, when employed in an argument opens a discursive 
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window and enables individuals to make certain kinds of judgments or claims. At the same time, 
I want to demonstrate that a discursive tradition in which the past is made simultaneous with the 
future has its antecedents in 19th century emergence of nationalism. Founding texts by Ilia 
Chavchavadze written in late 1980s (that I discuss below) employ the past and a particular 
memory image as symbolic signifier of the Georgian nationhood.  
This chapter unfolds the discursive field in which both Georgian memory and Georgian 
identity are problematized over contests about the nation’s geopolitical and cultural belonging. 
Disputes over “historical memory” become sites for voicing the anxieties over future 
“citizenship” and “cultural values”, anxieties that arise from shifting and unsettling political 
trajectories, but are shaped by and transposed through pre-given historical imaginaries. In other 
words, I want to demonstrate how the memory maxims outlined in the previous chapter shape 
both contested political imaginaries and modes of discourse about culture, nationhood, and 
Georgian geopolitics. In many of these debates and arguments what is being said explicitly is 
steeped in implicit, assumed and culturally shared meanings. These encounters embody forms of 
cultural interaction where statements index meanings beyond their straightforward definitions 
and words make sense or have emotional impact as part of the complex web of cultural 
meanings.   
In this connection, Mikhail Bakhtin’s notions of “hidden dialogicality” and “hidden 
polemic” are apt concepts for exploring the dynamic between overt and covert meanings in 
Georgia’s national debates. Bakhtin defines hidden polemic and hidden dialogicality in terms of 
forms of the “addressivity” that the speakers’ discourse manifests in a communicative setting: 
In a hidden polemic the author's discourse is directed toward its own referential object, as 
in any other discourse, but at the same time every statement about the object is 
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constructed in such a way that, apart from its referential meaning, a polemical blow is 
struck at the other's discourse on the same theme, at the other's statement about the same 
object. A word, directed toward its referential object, clashes with another's word within 
the very object itself. The other's discourse is not itself reproduced, it is merely implied, 
but the entire structure of speech would be completely different if there were not this 
reaction to another person's implied words...In a hidden polemic... the other's words are 
treated antagonistically, and this antagonism, no less than the very topic being discussed, 
is what determines the author's discourse. (1984, p. 195)  
The general idea behind hidden dialogicality, (and hidden polemic) is that it  describes 
kind of speech encounter in which addressee “is present invisibly, his words are not there, but 
deep traces left by these words have a determining influence on all the present and visible words 
of the first speaker” (Bakhtin, 1984 p. 197). Each spoken word “responds and reacts with its 
every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to 
the unspoken words of another person” (1984, p. 197).   
Critical to Bakhtin’s theory of dialogicality and speech in general is his notion of voice 
and multivoicedness.  On the one hand, every utterance is produced by the voice, “the speaking 
consciousness”, and this voice implies certain “perspective, conceptual horizon, and world view” 
(Wertsch, 1991 p. 51). On the other hand, an utterance can incorporate multiple voices that 
originate not from the actual speaker, but enter his/her discourse or are appropriated by him/her 
from the sociocultural setting in which communication takes place. This phenomenon is best 
understood in terms of Wertsch’s notion of mediated action, in this case mediated speech which 
suggests that all human action is carried out through cultural instruments that are pre-given in the 
social milieu in which the action is situated (1991, 2002). As Wertsch notes “the agent of 
mediated action is seen as the individual or individuals acting in conjunction with mediational 
means” (1991, p. 33).  Mediational or semiotic means may include a wide spectrum of symbolic 
forms such as language, speech genres, narratives, or memory maxims. But the crucial thing 
about them is that when we use such media, we become borrowers of others’ words and the 
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others’ voices enter our discourse as an “alien,” and sometimes even “hostile” word in the 
utterance (Bakhtin 1981).  
The debate I introduce below demonstrates characteristics of hidden dialogicality that are 
usefully understood as instances of mediated and multivoiced speech acts. Beyond responding to 
each other, interlocutors’ utterances can be fully understood only by recognizing the presence of 
antagonizing words of others; they reflect the hidden dialogicality that comes from engaging in a 
polemic with non-present addressees. Understanding the hidden dialogism that is involved is 
essential because of how the meaning of the spoken words relate to the explicit subject of the 
discussion, on the one hand, and on the other, are involved in the mutual constitution of 
antagonism of the interlocutors, all of whom are shaped by implicit, schemas of memory.  
Understanding the hidden meanings that stem from indexing the voices of others in these debates 
is only possible if one bears in mind the Georgian memory paradigm (outlined in previous 
chapter) as a symbolic vocabulary that sustains and substantiates the polemic and as a source of 
authoritative voices that fuse or juxtapose with a speaker’s words.    
  
3.2. HIDDEN POWER AND “RIGHTS ON MEMORY” 
 
“This is some kind of experiment that they are trying to conduct on Georgia…you are 
trying to raise global citizens and uproot patriotism in this country…that’s what it is!”  With 
these words Tavadze, ⁠1 a historian socialized during the Soviet generation and teaching at the 
University of Georgia, responded to the presentation by Simon Janashia, the director of the 
National Curriculum and Assessment Center at the Georgian Ministry of Education, on new 
history textbooks. I was one of the initiators of this talk that took place on December 29, 2008 at 
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one of the universities in Georgia.    
I had met Janashia earlier that month to interview him on state initiated changes in the 
history curriculum that entailed the production of new textbooks.  My pre-existing prejudices are 
reflected in the fact that I had envisioned meeting a typical bureaucrat with vague (if any) 
understanding of what anthropological research on collective memory could mean. Instead, a 
man in his early thirties walked in, dressed in cargo jeans holding a folder of papers. He put the 
papers in front of me and we started talking. But it was not his appearance only that challenged 
my stereotype. As I inquired about the proposed method behind the new history curriculum 
Janashia pointed to the small bundle of papers he had put in front of me earlier.  There I found 
some of the leading scholarly articles on memory, history teaching and the limitations of 
historical narratives (some of which I even cite in my work). Janashia was well acquainted with 
critical academic discourse on history teaching, which in turn informed and guided his approach 
to history curriculum reform at Georgian high schools. However, his efforts were socially 
situated, underpinned by a particular political agenda, and aimed at redefining Georgianness to 
create a kind of civil consciousness that a modern democratic state requires as a basis of its 
functioning.  
After the interview, I suggested organizing a joint discussion on “history and memory” at 
the university where I had ties at the time. He agreed, but he anticipated something I did not—a 
controversial dispute. Janashia was more aware, possibly due to his somewhat unpleasant 
experiences, that history textbooks could become arenas of dispute and the source of public 
anxiety. His projects and his own legitimacy were questioned not only by historians of different 
generations and scholarly affiliation, but even by the leaders of Georgian Orthodox Church. 
During the seminar at the Georgian University, when Tavadze exclaimed “Who gave you the 
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right?” objecting to “someone else” having a “monopoly …over what kind of collective 
memories will be instilled” he was voicing a prevalent sentiment of the discourse of the 
intelligentsia that someone might be trying to annihilate Georgiannes by tampering with national 
memories.  
 Janashia had a presentation prepared for such occasions to explain the ideas behind the 
history curriculum reform, its intended goals and projected outcomes.  The first couple of slides 
were headlined - “imaginaries about Georgia” and included:  
1- Georgians have always lived on Georgian territory 
2- Georgians have always been surrounded by enemies 
3- Georgians have always had a peaceful nature [this, for instance, included 
“Georgians have respected other cultures” or “helped their neighbors”]  
4- Relations with external powers have always been dangerous 
5- Georgian statehood is a natural phenomenon 
6- The source of Georgians’ failure is mostly in Georgia (this included poor rulers 
as well as internal collaborationism) 
 
 
Figure	  3.1:	  	  Slide	  2	  “Imaginaries	  about	  Georgia	  -­‐2”	  from	  Simon	  Janashia’s	  slideshow	  presentation	  Red	  section	  displays	  the	  list	  of	  enemies:	  Urartu,	  Scythians,	  Greeks,	  Iran,	  Rome,	  Byzantine,	  Arabs,	  Selchuks,	  Mongols,	  Turks,	  North-­‐Caucasians,	  Russia	  (with	  the	  permission	  of	  Janashia)	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These imaginaries are derivatives of the memory paradigm that I have discussed in the 
previous chapter and represent examples of what I refer to as memory maxims. We can see that a 
number of the points made by Janashia can be mapped on the basic motifs that I have outlined 
earlier. But the question is why these memory images were important for Janashia and for what 
purposes he questioned or problematized them? On the one hand, displaying them had no 
informative value for any individual present in the audience that day. As members of a 
“mnemonic community” (Zerubavel, 2004) any Georgian listening to his presentation was 
already a bearer of this knowledge.  Usually these memory maxims operate as authoritative 
voices that underpin any communicative encounter whether implicitly or explicitly when 
“history” is a subject of discussion and becomes instrumental in “effort after meaning” (Bartlett, 
1995) for making sense not only of past but of present and future as well.  
 By linking these memory maxims with the “problematics” of the old history curriculum, 
Janashia pointed out that history teaching was “mono perspective, non-inclusive”; it promoted 
“xenophobia, ethnocentrism, narcissism” and was based on “mythologizing history” that further 
reinforced “internalization of victimhood” and a diminishment of the role of an individual. His 
vocabulary was clearly informed by scholarly literature on collective memory. But his criticism 
like that of many others among the new generation of western educated intellectuals (see 
following sections) was motivated by his socio-political concerns as a citizen of Georgia. Such 
imaginaries, Janashia noted resulted in a lack of social institutions and deficiency of loyalty 
toward the state.  
The new history curriculum had to accommodate the same principles that general 
education reform sought to follow. It was aimed at learning outcomes categorized in three 
clusters: general skills, specific skills, and values. In his closing remarks on a general conception 
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of history instruction, Simon Janashia displayed these latter - ‘values’ (“girebulebebi” Georgian) 
that he thought students should be taught at school. There were eight points. Respect of human 
values and rights, empathy and care, and love of homeland were the top three items on the list.  
It was at this point of Janashia’s presentation that Tavadze erupted in criticism. It was the 
order in which “values” where displayed that for Tavadze epitomized what “the state project” 
was all about: “This is exactly what I am saying…” he exclaimed. “How can you have ‘love of 
homeland’ in third place?...So what does that mean?… We are getting rid of patriotism now?” 
Tavadze’s astonishment epitomized what his logic was all about, something that was not just 
about history teaching—be it for him, Janashia, or the state for that matter.  
 
This ethnographic vignette provides an entry into memory’s discursive terrain and 
political landscape within which the debate took place in Georgia. The exchange between 
Tavadze and Janashia reflects Bakhtin’s hidden dialogicality and implies that statements made 
that day were addressed not only to the specific interlocutors present at the time, but were 
overlain with chain of texts as a part of a “generalized collective dialogue” (Wertsch, 2005).  In 
Figure	  3.2:	  Janashia’s	  final	  slide	  displayed	  this	  painting	  from	  the	  wall	  of	  one	  of	  the	  Georgian	  high	  schools	  that	  depicts	  Ilia	  Chavchvadze,	  and	  his	  famous	  slogan	  “Language,	  homeland,	  Faith”	  (top	  center)	  St	  Nino	  who	  brought	  Christianity	  to	  Georgia	  (top	  right)	  Boy	  and	  a	  girl	  reading	  “mother-­‐tongue”	  (center)	  	  (used	  with	  Janashia’s	  permission)	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particular, they were constructed as a response to another “chain of texts” circulating within the 
community. The logic and the arguments on both sides were mediated by cultural frames that 
make things thinkable in a certain way, and the hidden dialogue of this kind bears a relationship 
not only to the specific subject matter under discussion, but indexes larger frames of cultural 
cognition. These frames are linguistically and semantically embedded formulations for 
conceiving Georgian history, politics and more importantly the notions of Georgianness, part of 
which is what earlier I have referred to as memory maxims.   
As such, the theme of this debate goes beyond the concerns of history teaching narrowly 
construed. It has to do with a number of other issues, including conceptions of future citizenship, 
democracy, Georgian statehood, and above all how knowledge and collective memory of what it 
means to be a Georgian reflect people’s imaginaries of the country’s changing future. Situating 
this debate in a broader context of transformation is important for understanding part of the 
hidden dialogicality.  
Soon after gaining power as a result of the “Rose Revolution” in 2003, the new “western 
oriented” government of Georgia embarked on educational reform intended not only to 
modernize and enhance the educational system, but also to eliminate structural remnants of the 
Soviet and post-Soviet system34.⁠ In an attempt to reverse seventy years of isolation Georgia’s 
new elite had appropriated the notion of “modernization” as a principal instrument for 
ideological detachment from the Soviet past, but had cast this goal not in terms of western 
“universalizing forms”  (Chakrabarty, 2002) but posed it as Georgia’s authentic path of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The	  reform	  first	  and	  foremost	  was	  intended	  to	  fundamentally	  transform	  entrance	  examinations	  for	  higher	  education.	  This	   involved	   the	  standardization	  of	   tests	  and	  required	  applying	  changes	   in	  exam	  subjects	  and	  the	  way	  tests	  were	  conducted.	  
	   75	  
development toward “regaining its place in Europe” (Weathley, 2005, p.37).  
Of the many radical reforms undertaken by the government few have sparked as much 
conflict and heated argument in the society as educational reform. Georgia’s Ministry of 
Education and Science (MES) collaborated with several international agencies such as the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) to draft a law to shift to a decentralized system 
but at the same time develop centralized mechanism for accreditation. 
 While reforming and modernizing education in general was part of the wider geopolitical 
agenda to improve the system and appropriate western standards, changes specifically in the 
history curriculum were directed at re-modeling the national cosmology and realigning symbolic 
categories. At least that is how Janashia envisioned reconfiguring Georgian citizenship. By 
recasting or questioning fixed imaginaries about the past (the ones he outlined in his 
presentation) he sought to re-orient someone like Tavadze in his construal of both Georgia and 
its relationship to the external world. 
As Janashia’s presentation implied, certain formulations of the past breed imaginaries on 
the essential character of Georgians and their relationship to the external world. His aim was not 
so much to problematize history as it was, but to point to the shortcomings of certain modes of 
representations. His argument concerned what Maurice Halbwachs calls “Collective frameworks 
of memory […] currents of thought and experience within which we recover our past […]” 
(1950, p.64). Collective frameworks operate as social matrixes into which cultural, social, and 
political meanings are woven. As such, they do much more than recover the past; they mediate 
collective imaginaries of the future and quite frequently shape how individuals respond to 
ongoing events. Inversely, it was exactly these “currents of thought” and modes of perceiving 
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external world that sustained Tavadze’s fears of “uprooting patriotism”. His sense of threat, that 
a new western-oriented state was aligned with alien “global” forces and that novices in education 
were endangering Georgianness were rooted in the very imaginaries Janashia’s presentation 
displayed; namely that “Georgians have always been surrounded by enemies” or that “relations 
with external powers had always been dangerous.” These memory maxims served him as 
authoritative voices that underpinned criticism and suspicion toward state’s modernizing and 
Europeanizing projects. The photograph below (Figure 3.3.) of a poster is just another example 
of the culturally and historically shaped significance ascribed to the knowledge and education as 
a shielding mechanism against the fear of cultural annihilation.     
This is why Janashia’s effort to dismantle such modes of representing the past were 
aimed at disempowering “faulty” or “idealized” notions on Georgianness and recharting the 
world order in such a way that the “Europeanization” is no longer equated with “uprooting 
patriotism.” Although he acted as an agent of state, Janashia’s vision and agency were shaped by 
his extended competency in academic discourse. For him, it was not only a matter of how 
mistaken historical imaginaries mis-serve state interests, but how they reinforce the 
malfunctioning of civil society by inhibiting the process of forming critically thinking, 
autonomous individual agents. As he noted during the interview, his goal was not to impose an 
alternative memory narrative, but to introduce new textbooks with multivocal historical sources.  
In such an effort part of the challenge is to develop the capacity to reflect on the underlying 
assumptions and voices in the hidden dialogue that shape the debate in the first place. In short, 
Janashia was implicitly convinced that alternative mnemonic frameworks would emerge as a 
result of students’ engagement with such multivocal, de-centered historical sources.  
In fact Janashia and Tavadze may not have been as far apart as they seemed. Perhaps 
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without conscious awareness they both agreed on at least on two points: a) historical memories 
have a special role in forming citizenship, and because of that b)  ‘right’ memories can salvage 
Georgia’s future and furthermore, help it overcome existing or anticipating political and cultural 
threats. In that they shared common ground. What they didn’t share was how they defined the 
threat.  
 For Tavadze both the larger context of transforming and “tampering” with “historical 
memories” signaled a threatening “experiment” conceived and orchestrated from beyond the 
boundaries of Georgia. His antagonism toward Janashia and his project was sustained by a 
memory paradigm that allowed him to frame the “West”, “modernity” or “Europeanization” as 
well as all forms of “tampering” with Georgian cultural values as just another attempt of a new 
enemy to eradicate Georgian culture and nationhood. In his eyes Janashia represented a 
collaborator aiding the alien force, examples of which populate Georgian historical narratives.  
 
 
Figure	  3.3.	  The	  poster	  in	  the	  hallway	  of	  a	  provincial	  public	  school,	  in	  Kakheti	  (eastern	  Georgia)	  reads	  a	  quote	  from	  a	  famous	  Georgian	  writer	  and	  poet	  Vaja-­‐Pshavela	  (1861-­‐1915):	  “Knowledge	  is	  a	  stronghold	  erected	  in	  fear	  of	  an	  enemy”	  	  (photo	  taken	  by	  author)	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His sentiments spoke to more widespread public anxieties over the projects of the 
Ministry of Education. Part of the criticism was based on fears of upsetting the pre-existing order 
that would render much of the Soviet-trained generation of the intelligentsia disempowered and 
detached from the new “modernized” system35. Public apprehension and mistrust toward these 
projects were articulated not in terms of power contests, but in terms of the threat that changes in 
the education system presents to the cultural values. Changes in education alarmed part of the 
public to such an extent that a whole genre of conspiracy theories surfaced.  There were 
suspicions for instance, that the Minister of Education was a co-conspirator with alien forces 
(e.g. Free Masons) who were intent on  annihilating cultural uniqueness. Some of these 
conspiracy theories exemplified what Harry West and Todd Sanders (2003) call “occult 
cosmologies”—the belief that expresses “profound suspicions of power”, the power that is 
concealed from the view of a common citizen but orchestrates the entirety of world processes (p. 
7). Georgia’s new pro-western government evoked suspicions in part of the public in the form of 
the belief that it operated from beyond national boundaries and was appointed by a “global 
power”.  
 Tavadze’s choice of word “experiment” had this hidden reference to other voices and 
pre-existing utterances, that something much more threatening than reforming history textbooks 
was taking place, orchestrated not by a government with national interests, but by a hidden 
power. This is why Tavadze exclaimed that educational reform that tampers with memory is 
aimed at eradicating patriotism and raising “global citizens”. He saw the threat in Janashia’s 
project emanating as if from this “global power”.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35 	  Tamta	   Khalvashi’s	   work	   in	   progress	   offers	   an	   extensive	   and	   insightful	   analysis	   of	   how	   Georgian	  intelligentsia	  enacts	  its	  role	  in	  public	  space	  where	  fears	  and	  worries	  serve	  them	  as	  emotional	  capital	  for	  self-­‐definition	  (upcoming	  dissertation	  project	  “Feeling	  Like	  a	  Nation,”	  University	  of	  Copenhagen,	  Denmark)	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This episode provides an entry point for the remaining discussion, focusing mainly on 
two conceptual issues. First, I address how emic notions of “historical memory” empower certain 
moralizing perspectives in disputes about the nation’s present and future, where contestation of 
authority and power is inevitable.  I discuss the “value of historical memory” not so much as an 
analytical assertion, but engage it as a culturally meaningful category that reinforces a certain 
discursive genre. Second, I trace this moral authority to the mode of historical representation that 
sustains certain imaginaries about the cosmological order. This links back to the discussion on 
the paradigmatic elements involved in conceptions of the past that I claim frame forms of 
engagement with memory. 
 
 
3.3. “Historical Memory”: A Looking Glass 
 
 The moralizing impulse of “the value of remembering” can enter different discursive 
arenas. But it is most pervasive in the contestation of ownership of historical knowledge 
production, what Tavadze referred to as “rights on history”. This is so because it underlies talk 
about the future of nationhood and forms of citizenship. The letter written in 2008 by a group of 
Georgian historians addressed to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili (and number of other 
state officials including the Head of the Parliament David Bakradze, Prime Minister Grigol 
Mgaloblishvili and Minister of Science and Education Ghia Nodia) is a good demonstration of 
this. While their statement expressed concerns with history teaching in Georgian schools, 
specifically with new curriculum policies and the decentralization of history textbook 
production, it also reminded Georgia’s officials of the importance of “Georgian history” in 
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general: 
The role and significance of Georgia’s history are utterly exceptional for raising future 
generations with national spirit (erovnuli suliskveteba) and high civil consciousness 
[especially] today, in the context of extremely painful events, for every Georgian citizen […] 
It is essential for the improvement of the situation that a new state program of history 
teaching be created… We believe that our initiative will promote building a civil, legal, 
democratic, morally elevated Georgian society that is founded on historical memory… 
 
Written only few months after the Russian-Georgian war over the secessionist region of 
South Ossetia (or as Georgians prefer to refer to it “Samachablo” - land of Machabeli aristocratic 
lineage) in August of 2008, the historians evoked these “extremely painful events” as 
circumstances elevating the importance of historical memories.    
In general they argued for the increased role of history in all education spheres and for 
“professional historians” to be included in state projects concerning history teaching. But more 
specifically, this group seemed to have been unsettled by losing its grip on what in Tavadze’s 
words were “rights on what kind of collective memories will be instilled”. In light of this, they 
proposed to form an official commission that would oversee all textbooks and policies in the 
history curriculum. One of the recommendations listed in the statement, pointed out that “it is 
necessary that authors of Georgia’s history textbooks are professional historians and not 
representatives of adjacent disciplines as is now the case”, while another asserted that “it is 
unacceptable that the selection of problematics in current textbooks is entirely dependent on the 
desires of its authors. It should be mandatory that the above commission work out the unification 
of [historical] problematics”.  
Hence while the state pursued somewhat decentralized politics with regards to history 
textbooks, historians of the sort Tavadze represented deemed such an approach unacceptable. 
Namely they objected to the idea that history textbooks could be written by any group of authors 
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and that high school teachers had the freedom to choose among several suggested course 
material for class instruction36.⁠ Most importantly they  criticized the established practice (in the 
new history textbooks) of “replacing Georgia’s history with a chrestomathy of Georgian 
history”. What seemed to be at stake was a certain framework for envisioning the past, since a 
multivocal text such as a “chrestomathy” blurred the contours of a coherent narrative of the past 
that had been the focus of all previous textbooks.  [Figure 3 illustrates the difference in textual 
layout between old and new textbooks] It was in light of such concerns that hitorians who had 
been trained in the Soviet era argued for the “unification of historical problematics,” which 
implied a fixed set of themes that should be explored in Georgia’s past. 
              
 
 
The discussion in Georgia on the importance of history for preserving “national spirit”, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  The	  process	  was	  coordinated	  by	   the	  National	  Center	  Simon	   Janashia	  was	  heading.	  The	  center	  would	  make	  a	  call	   for	  certain	  textbooks	  to	  be	  written,	  it	  would	  then	  consider	  all	  applications	  and	  approve	  of	  several	  textbooks	  to	  be	  admissible	  for	  school	   instruction.	  As	   Janashia	  explained	  during	   the	   interview,	  he	  was	   trying	   to	  promote	  a	   liberal	  market	  approach	  and	  was	  convinced	  that	  competitive	  market	  would	  yield	  better	  product	  than	  if	  the	  state	  were	  more	  narrow	  in	  its	  focus.	  But	  to	  be	  sure,	  state	  did	  provide	  certain	  instructions	  on	  the	  format	  of	  history	  textbooks	  and	  in	  that	  its	  main	  focus	  was	  that	  new	  textbooks	  should	  combine	  multiple	  historical	  sources,	  instead	  of	  conveying	  a	  coherent	  narrative-­‐text,	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  give	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  multiethnic	  and	  religiously	  diverse	  Georgia	  and	  include	  analytic	  tasks:	  “students	  should	  learn	  to	  work	  on	  historical	  sources	  and	  make	  their	  own	  sense	  of	  what	  was	  happening”	  Janashia	  explained	  to	  me	  during	  the	  interview.	  	  
Figure	  3.4.:	  2001	  textbook	  (left)	  with	  linear	  narrative;	  2008	  textbook	  (right)	  sectioned	  boxes	  displaying	  different	  historical	  sources	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instilling cultural values in future generations and for solving challenges of the present is not a 
phenomenon invented in post Soviet or even Soviet Georgia. In fact, many of the current debates 
reflect a 19th century intellectual tradition. Certainly, under Tsarist Russia, Georgian society 
faced challenges of an essentially different nature, but the ways of approaching national 
“grievances” reveal a certain historical continuity.  Ilia Chavchavadze Georgia’s most renowned 
and venerated public figure, a writer, poet, journalist, and lawyer who spearheaded the national 
movement in the second half of the nineteenth century, wrote:  
We have said more than once that a nation’s deterioration, decay and erosion begin when it 
forgets its history, when it forfeits remembrance of its past, of its former life … The past is a 
foundation of the present, as present is of the future…Many nations did not have any past at 
all, did not have history, that is, the kind of conscious life that usually expresses spiritual and 
physical identity of a collectivity, its gravity (Geo: miziduloba - attraction/gravity) its point 
and principle of existence, its sacredness, that which harvests for its time and at the same 
time seeds the future… [A nation] that had history but has forgotten it …does not have strong 
foundation to struggle for existence either, because what it was—it has forgotten, therefore, 
does not it know what it is. It does not know how to strengthen itself, what to sacrifice itself 
for, what to stand up for and what not.  
Our nation has lived for two thousand years with historical life. [Our history] has thrown 
many strong and many futile rocks in the bedrock of our present that has been established for 
erecting our future. Evidence of this is in front of our eyes. What could have saved this tiny 
group of people for these two thousand years amongst these great restless enemies? Why and 
how would greediness of foreign tribes yield to us this beautiful oasis that is called Georgia, 
if our past had not laid a strong bedrock as the foundation of our life. This is the case on the 
one hand, and on the other, what would degrade us so mercilessly compared to other counties 
either in education or in wealth if it had not been for our history to have thrown few crumbly 
rocks in our foundation?37  
What is the strength of our life and what is weakness and futility - only history can explain 
and translate to us, and if we forget it, then we have forgotten the origin of our life, its root 
and its foundation, and if that happens, then what are we to base our present and future on? 
Apart from all this, we have said many times and we will repeat once again, that history is a 
great temple, where a liturgy for the common soul of the nation is held and where the nation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Chavchavadze’s	   use	   of	   the	   “past”	   and	   “history”	   is	   obscuring,	   because	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   he	   points	   to	   the	  significance	  of	  remembrance	  of	  a	  nation’s	  “former	  life”	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  deploys	  a	  poetic	  speech	  genre	  to	  speak	  of	  “the	  past”	  as	  something	  concrete	  that	  has	  an	  agency	  of	  its	  own	  and	  “can	  throw	  crumbly	  rocks”	  (i.e.	  nation’s	  weakness)	  or	  “lay	  strong	  bedrock”	  (i.e.	  strengths	  to	  defeat	  enemies	  and	  preserve	  the	  country)	  for	  the	  Georgian	  nationhood.	  These	  phrases	  make	  no	  sense	  unless	  viewed	  as	  mythic	  and	  metaphoric	  expressions	  that	  use	   the	   “past”	  not	  as	  a	   temporal	  dimension	  of	   the	  nation,	  but	  almost	  as	  a	  mythic	   creature	   that	  determined	  nationhood,	  its	  strengths	  and	  its	  weaknesses.	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has erected sacred icons of its great and great-natured men and inscribed on it the story of 
their great deeds, a kind of will to its descendants. When a nation remembers this liturgy of 
its common soul, those great-natured men and stories of great deeds, it is revamped, 
encouraged and inspirited and is self-assured everywhere in joy or sorrow… [This nation] 
fights steadily, embraced with an example of its ancestors and their will, and only such a 
relentless fighter gets to keep a playground to itself.   
 
Written in 1888, Chavchavadze’s words have as much significance and symbolic value in 
Georgia’s contemporary imaginaries as ever, and this publication has probably played the most 
crucial role in the sacralization of history and memory in Georgian nationalist consciousness38.⁠ 
One hundred and twenty years after Chavchavadze wrote “Nation and History”, professional 
historians addressing the government of independent Georgia convey similar sentiment in 
asserting the value of memory for raising future generations. Chavchavadze’s conviction that 
history reveals to its people who they are is an encryption in Georgia’s modern nationalist 
consciousness. The belief that the past is the only true mirror for reflecting the true image of 
Georgianness, because “only history can explain and translate” Georgia’s strengths and 
weaknesses lies at the heart of the social processes that this study investigates. But apart from 
this, clues are ingrained in this text about the principal notions of Georgia’s past and Georgians’ 
nature that are operative in the present context. Several key elements in Chavchavadze’s text can 
be mapped onto basic thematic motifs of memory paradigm that I have outlined in the previous 
chapter.  The following key themes can be extracted from Chavchavadze’s text that shape the 
contours of modern Georgian historical and national consciousness: 
- Survival in the face of countless invasions “amongst these great restless enemies” ⁠39   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  	  This	   text	   “Nation	   and	   History”	   along	   with	   other	   literary	   works	   and	   poems	   of	   Chavchavadze	   is	   part	   of	   the	   school	  curriculum.	  We	  will	   see	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   the	   imprint	   of	   Chavchavadze’s	   authority	   on	   students’	   imaginaries	   and	   the	  ways	  in	  which	  his	  words	  are	  deployed	  as	  authoritative	  utterances.	  39	  His	  use	  of	  proximal	  demonstrative	  pronouns	  such	  as	   “these	  enemies”	  may	  suggest	   that	  he	  addresses	  Georgians	  as	  a	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- Because of virtues that Georgians possess (“strong bedrock in the foundation of our 
life”) they have been able to endure hard times and survive as a nation (“What would 
have saved this tiny group of people for these two thousand years”)  
- But it is because of their weaknesses that Georgians occasionally failed in other respects 
(“what would degrade us so mercilessly compared to other countries either in education 
or in wealth if it had not been for our history to have thrown few crumbly rocks in our 
foundation”) 
What memory can accomplish, in Chavchavadze’s words is to explain both its strength 
and its grave weaknesses, while memories of its exemplary heroes can “revamp, encourage and 
inspirit” a nation to “fight steadily”.   
Chavchavdaze wrote this letter with an understanding that Georgian territories were and 
had been inhabited by ethnically and religiously diverse groups and that a modern national 
consciousness could not depend on markers of Georgianness that harnessed ethnocentrism and 
religious exclusivity if his project of modern Georgian state was to succeed at all. A shared past 
was what he conceived as a common symbolic terrain, as a unique ground of national 
consciousness. In public memory Chavchavadze is credited as being one of the most zealous 
fighters for Georgia’s independence from Russia, but in reality he advocated the idea that 
Georgia had to evolve first as an autonomous society, based on civil institutions and modern 
national consciousness and only once it accomplishes these goals should it break away from the 
Russian Empire. Most of his projects emanated from this idea. Chavchavadze was part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  particular	  mnemonic	   community	   (Wertsch	   2002)	   in	  which	  memories	   of	   Georgia’s	   struggle	   and	   survival	   against	   “great	  restless	   enemies”	   are	   already	   shared.	   But	   if	   not	   in	   Chavchavadze’s	   times,	   certainly	   in	   today’s	   Georgia	   the	   memory	  narrative	   of	   struggle	   and	   survival	   in	   the	   face	   of	   continuous	   attacks	   and	   foreign	   invasions	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   national	  imaginaries.	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nucleus of young Georgian nobility reinventing itself as a national intelligentsia (Reisner, 2009; 
Manning 2004, 2011) Known as “Tergdaleulebi” (literally those who drank river Terek40) due to 
their Russian based education, they were inspired by contemporary liberal movements in Europe. 
In the spirit of the modern ideas with which Chavchavadze was familiarized during his education 
in Russia, he spearheaded countless public projects. He was the founder of the Society for 
Spreading Literacy Among Georgians, "The Bank of the Nobility", "The Historical-
Ethnographical Society of Georgia", to list just the few.41  
Some nine years after publishing “Nation and History” (Georgian: eri da istoria) on New 
Year’s Eve 1897 Chavchavadze wrote an open letter with a somewhat different message. This 
letter addressed the Georgian public in a voice of reprehension and criticism. What is interesting 
here for our present purposes is how Chavchavadze attempted to ignite his public by recourse to 
the past as an exemplary model. The title of this later piece is presented in the form of a 
rhetorical question: What can I say to you? What can I cheer you up with?  (Georgian: ra 
gitxrat? rit gagaxarot42?⁠) with a regretful undertone that there is nothing in Georgia’s state of 
life to be cheerful about.   
All that has happened to us, all those enemies that have fallen upon us, all the ordeal, 
bloodshed…we have endured all…[We have] preserved ourselves, kept our country, our 
land. Langtemurs (Tamerlane) bathed us in our own blood.  Still we survived and 
revived. Shah-Abbazs (he uses the plural here) made us tear up our own children with our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  The	  Terek	  River	  runs	  through	  Georgian	  and	  Russia	  to	  the	  Caspian	  Sea.	  Anyone	  traveling	   from	  Russia	  to	  Georgian	  (or	  vice	   a	   versa)	   through	   Greater	   Caucasus	   Mountain	   had	   to	   cross	   river	   Terek.	   Tergdaleulebi	   was	   the	   term	   devised	   by	  Georgia’s	  older	  generation	  of	  aristocratic	  elite	  with	  conservative	  beliefs	  to	  refer	  to	  new	  generation	  of	  Russian	  educated	  intellectuals.	  	  	  	  	  41	  In	  his	   analysis	  of	   one	  of	   the	  most	   significant	   literary	   texts	  by	   Ilia	  Chavchavdze,	  Paul	  Manning	  argues	   that	  during	  his	  studies	   in	  Russia,	  Chavchavdze	  was	  disenchanted	  with	   the	  promise	  of	  Russian	  civilization	  and	  came	  back	  to	  rediscover	  authentic	   culture.	   This	   is	   possibly	   so,	   because	   Chavchavadze	   saw	   the	   potential	   of	   “authentic	   culture”	   as	   a	   powerful	  medium	  for	  “imagining	  national	  community”	  and	  certainly	  “history”	  for	  him	  was	  important	  for	  reigniting	  the	  interest	  in	  “authentic	  culture”	  (Anderson,	  1986)	  	  42	  Google	   search	   renders	   approximately	   10000	   results	   for	   this	   title	   and	   in	   recent	   years	   and	   months	   a	   number	   of	  journalists,	  publicists,	  bloggers,	  and	  others	  have	  referred	  to	  it	  to	  claim	  that	  nothing	  has	  changed	  in	  over	  100	  years.	  I	  found	  an	  article	  written	  by	  a	  21	  year	  old	  blogger	  who	  discusses	  this	  text	  in	  length	  to	  argue	  that	  Georgians	  are	  failing	  in	  much	  the	  same	  ways	  that	  Chavchavadze	  has	  pointed	  out	  here.	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teeth, and still we recovered, came back to our senses. Agha-Mohammad-Khans (plural 
again) toppled us, exterminated, slaughtered us, and still we stood up on our feet… 
straightened ourselves up. We endured Greece, Rome, Mongols, Arabs, Ottoman-Turks, 
Persians, pious and impious and the flag of Georgianness torn with spear, arrow and 
bullet, soaked in our blood, but we kept it in our hands, did not let anyone take it away… 
Would it not be a shame for this flag to be eaten by a moth, or torn by a mouse!…the 
present lingers with this possibility….What can I say to you? What can I cheer you up 
with? 
 
If in “Nation and History” Ilia proclaimed the past to be the mirror of the nation’s virtues 
and faults, here he employs the past - this narrative of struggle and survival - to warn his 
compatriots that what “an armed enemy could not seize from us…[One] who comes with labor 
and diligence, knowledge and method will … abolish our name, exterminate us…and will 
occupy our country as it would an ownerless church.”  
Chavchavadze’s publications are voluminous and apart from his literary activities as a 
poet and a writer he published countless articles commenting on cultural, social, political, and 
economic problems (For some very insightful analysis of Chavchavadze’s texts and 19th century 
publications see Paul Manning, Strangers in a Strange Land). But here I chose to focus on two 
pieces as paradigmatic texts that best exemplify the ways in which past is engaged in 
Chavchavadze’s rhetoric, and also because these two are possibly among the most influential, 
more memorized, and quoted texts from his writings (apart from his prose). Of these two, the 
first is commonly referenced as a source of authoritative quotes when the value of historical 
memory is invoked, while the second can be traced in discursive settings where “Georgianness” 
is problematized. Each provides the underpinnings for one of two distinct discursive voices on 
Georgianness. 
 These founding texts provide an entry point for understanding several things. First, 
Chavchavadze’s address paints the contours of Georgia’s dominant memory narrative; second it 
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functions as a canonical text for notions about the importance of the past (that we see repeated in 
historians’ statement above and will see play out in chapter 4 again in students’ essays) and the 
ways in which memory rhetoric can be employed as both a language of self-conception and self-
reflection. More importantly, Chavchavdaze’s texts introduce two distinct voices or modes of 
discourse on Georgianness, in a sense polarized voices that emerge out of the core of national 
consciousness—one self-idealizing and the other self-condemning. These two contradictory 
visions engender notions about Georgians’ dual nature, but they also represent two polarities in 
an endless dialectic of internal contestation over Georgian identity. Because these voices are at 
the core of historical consciousness they harness two modes of discourse both on Georgianness 
and on the Georgian past, with each having its own context and purpose of articulation.   
Chavchavadze’s text might have paved the way for the tradition of appreciating memory 
and his words continue to be cited as a source of authority when claims are made on the basis of 
the indisputable value of memory for national identity. He grounded the symbolic plane of 
nationhood in a certain image of the past and provided the foundations for a discourse of two 
distinct voices for contemplating Georgian identity. He may not have invented this opposition, 
but his texts canonized it in the modern discursive traditions. The canonical authority of 
Chavchavadze’s discourse is transmitted by social means, and formal education in school is most 
crucial in this. In my conversations with Georgian students, many of them have maintained that 
two school subjects - Georgian language and literature and Georgian history play the greatest 
role in monumentalizing Chavchavadze, and chrystalizing historical imaginaries into the notions 
of national identity.  
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3.4. CONCLUSION 
 
In the Georgian mnemonic community the discourse on “memory” is almost always 
saturated with claims about national identity and assertions about the nature of Georgianness. 
These discussions are inherently political. As Gillis argues identities and memories “have no 
existence beyond our politics, our social relationships, and our histories” (1994, p. 5 emphasis in 
the original). The need to stress the importance of memory and re-assure communities of the 
categories of selfhood usually arises with some kind of political and identity crisis. As 
Kansteiner points out “memory is valorized where identity is problmetized” (2002, p 184) and in 
instances like these memory becomes both a tool and an object of power (Nora, 1996). 
This points to certain forms of “presentism” guiding the recourse to memory—the idea 
that collectivities construe the past according to their current needs which is a topic widely 
discussed in memory studies (Mead 1929, Halbwachs 1981, Nora 1989, Assmann 1995). 
However, while acknowledging the role of present political needs in shaping representations of 
the past, understanding how memory functions also requires an appreciation of discursive 
traditions and established linguistic forms that remain stable, even with strong ideological shifts. 
While my main focus is on the current memory debate and how it relates to earlier discursive 
traditions, the following chapter further advances the claim on the persistence of certain 
linguistic forms that sustain historical conceptions.  
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CHAPTER 4:  “THINGS CODED IN OUR GENETIC MEMORY” 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The title of this chapter is a quote from an essay written by a Georgian high school 
student in a writing competition in March 2011 at the Free University in Tbilisi. In her essay, 
Maka an 18-year-old high school student from Tbilisi wrote, “culture and traditions ... are 
something coded in our genetic memory... Traditions are reflection of our history...” Another 
Georgian student used similar wording and made a point that this “code” is what sets Georgia 
apart from the rest of the world: 
Tradition ... is not simply a word, it is a national code embedded in us from birth that 
bestows individuality and differentiates us from others. By modernization this 
individuality is lost, ...Furthermore, traditions can be a good precondition for business 
advancement, aren’t tourists amazingly attracted to cultural diversity?!” 
 
This short passage exemplifies the extent to which essentialist notions on Georgian culture and 
Georgian identity are assumed to mark Georgia off from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, it 
also demonstrates how these forms of self-conception are entertained within the context of 
Georgia’s evolving development projects and are attached to the desires to be integrated into the 
international space.  
More than 200 young Georgians from about 15 cities and towns across the country 
participated in the 2011 competition geared toward winning a Free University scholarship. 
Throughout the contest, conducted on the two sites simultaneously (at the Free University’s 
Tbilisi campus and in Kutaisi (city in the western Georgia) – students sat in several large 
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auditoriums and were given two hours to answer the question; the question that the Free 
University faculty determined an hour prior to the competition (see section 4.2. on how the 
faculty deliberated). The question they had to address juxtaposed tradition and modernity in the 
context of the society’s progress. In their attempt to formulate a persuasive argument, the 
overwhelming majority of the students resorted to the symbolic domain of the past, reiterated 
historical narrative and imposed judgments that stemmed from it (see chapter 2). This chapter is 
based on the analysis of these 204 essays43.  
Although, it is not particularly surprising that the term “tradition” prompted young 
Georgians’ to enter the “semiosphere” of the past (Lotman 1990), there are several unique 
aspects in these texts that help me further my argument on Georgian memory and its role in 
public discourse as a special speech genre. What is of special interest here is the ways in which 
students’ arguments were socioculturally situated and relied on a cultural “tool-kit” (Wertsch 
2002) to sustain and substantiate their claims. Ethnographically these essays are important as 
sites where various critical discourses come to light; more so, because the topic of “tradition and 
modernity” frames Georgia’s geopolitical aspirations and dialogizes prevalent critical debates on 
Georgia’s past and its future.  
These essays are critically positioned at the intersection of: a) social institutions such as 
schools that instill cultural knowledge, b) political conditions that act upon individual 
worldviews and practices, and c) powerful ideological forces that shape the public sphere. As 
such they animate the voices of young Georgians as they produce their own constellations and 
transliterations of the voices that emerge out of these social domains.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  Free	  University	  administration,	  especially	  Giorgi	  Meladze	  and	  Aleko	  Shelia	  for	  not	  only	  allowing	  me	  to	  use	  the	  essays	  for	  my	  dissertation	  project,	  but	  for	  putting	  me	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  organizational	  work	  for	  the	  writing	  contest	  in	  “independent	  reasoning”.	  Such	  close	  involvement	  gave	  me	  an	  opportunity	  to	  observe	  the	  entire	  process	  and	  look	  closely	  into	  how	  academic	  faculty	  deliberated	  on	  the	  essay	  topic.	  To	  retain	  the	  anonymity	  of	  the	  contestants,	  when	  quoting	  the	  essay	  I	  use	  pseudonyms	  throughout	  this	  chapter.	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As these contemporary issues come into focus, students dwelled upon society’s progress 
through the lens of Georgia’s absolute and ideal future that has no existence without the image of 
an absolute and ideal past. This is why most students invested their arguments in the idiom of 
memory as a distinct form of speech genre that builds upon historical narratives and expresses 
meaning through code-words that hint toward shared memory maxims. Below is figure with a 
schematic formulation of these maxims: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I advance the claim that memory is operative on a discursive level as a structuring force 
and a sense-making mechanism by showing how students referenced the memory maxims 
(sometimes directly, sometimes implicitly) to impose truth judgments that are embedded in these 
symbolic forms.  In other words, these memory symbols functioned as what Bakhtin calls an 
“authoritative utterance” or “authoritative discourse”: 
In each epoch, in each social circle, in each small world of family, friends, acquaintances, 
and comrades in which a human being grows and lives, there are always authoritative 
utterances that set the tone – artistic, scientific, and journalistic works on which one 
relies, to which one refers, which are cited, imitated, and followed. In each epoch, in all 
areas of life and activity, there are particular traditions that are expressed and retained in 
verbal vestments: in written works, in utterances, in sayings, and so forth. There are 
always some verbally expressed leading ideas of the ‘masters of thought’ of a given 
epoch, some basic tasks, slogans, and so forth. . . . This is why the unique speech 
experience of each individual is shaped and developed in continuous and constant 
interactions with others’ individual utterances. This experience can be characterised to 
Enemy	  =	  endangers	  polity	  +	  threatens	  culture[Christianity/Language/spirituality/traditions/national	  identity]	  	  	  
Georgians	  =	  fight	  fearlessly/resist	  heroically/always	  preserve	  culture[Christianity/language/spirituality/traditions/national	  identity]/are	  always	  united[few	  exceptions:	  traitors/collaborators]	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some degree as the process of assimilation – more or less creative – of others’ words (and 
not the words of a language) (1986 pp. 88-89) 
 In the discourse on modernity and tradition the narrative of Georgia’s past (see chapter 2) 
serves as such a “master of thought” that “sets the tone” for the students’ mode of judgment and 
for re-voicing their individual perspectives. “Our past” becomes an “authoritative utterance” 
oftentimes appears in these texts in the form of a message within a message, what Roman 
Jakobson relying on Volosinov’s stylistic refers to as “reported speech” – “a speech within a 
speech” (1971, p 130).  But unlike any form of reported speech in students’ texts Georgia’s 
narrative of the past is posited as what Victor Turner called a “dominant symbol” because the 
narrative (in many ways likened to the “milk tree” in Ndembu ritual) stands for a set of 
axiomatic values and carries a range of condensed meanings, anchoring a specific moral (or 
moralizing) framework (Turner, 1967). 
In their essays the students sought to deploy the past as a rhetorical device that lends 
authority to their words and advance their arguments according to a cultural logic embedded in 
the modes of historical conception. These essays demonstrate how memory maxims open a 
discursive window and sustain argumentative logic in a speech act that appears to have no 
political agenda, but nevertheless enacts political thinking.  
On the other hand, the students’ mode of reasoning (in the majority of the essays) 
presents a case of a discursive genre in which only one of two opposing memory voices is 
employed. Because students pursued their argument on the value of traditions, one of the 
dominant memory maxims they relied upon was how “Georgians have always struggled to 
preserve their nation and culture”. Thus for the purpose of their argument students engaged the 
voice of ‘self-idealization’ as a structuring element and steered clear of the self-critical element 
almost entirely.  
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This chapter conveys a multilayered and somewhat complex argument, both 
ethnographically and theoretically, first of all because these texts are themselves multilayered 
and multivalent. While I claim that the majority of the students relied on the same pool of 
cultural material and concentrate on the use of memory symbols, obviously there were diverse 
perspectives. More importantly the multivoiced and dialogic nature of these texts implies that a 
wide spectrum of social issues and public discourses come in contact with students’ discussions. 
As such, one can take different angles in analyzing them and focus on any one of a number of 
important issues such as religious beliefs, traditional outlooks, political imaginaries, 
understanding of modernity, global politics and so forth.  
In this chapter I orient the analysis of the texts to strengthen my claim that “memory” 
(and the symbolic forms outlined in previous chapters) functions as an authoritative idiom that is 
culturally tied to a set of discursive themes. Here for instance, the term “tradition” inevitably 
triggers cognitive frames that enable this idiom as a dominant form of expression. The only cases 
where the memory idiom was not employed were a few essays where authors chose to address 
the question by employing an example other than Georgia.  
“Any utterance,” wrote Bakhtin, “is a link in the chain of speech communication” (1986, 
p. 99). In spoken as well as in written texts utterances animate discursive events and social 
settings that are not necessarily given in an immediate speech situation, but address voices that 
may be both spatially and temporally distant. Bakhtin’s theory of the utterance provides a useful 
framework for the analysis of the texts I undertake. His conceptual vocabulary points to the 
dialogic orientation, multivoicedness, and heteroglossic nature of words (texts and speech) and it 
frames my analysis below. Since “the living utterance [takes] meaning and shape at a particular 
historical moment, in a socially specific environment” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 274) I enter discussion 
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first by introducing the specific setting in which these texts were created and later turn to a more 
complete outline of theoretical framework, followed by the analysis of the essays. 
I begin by introducing a vignette that described how the topic of the writing competition 
was selected. This episode, on the one hand, ties the writing contest to the discursive landscape 
on the “Georgian mentality”, “Georgian memory” and broader context of the nation’s 
sociopolitical challenges. On the other hand it unveils how the intellectual elite construes the 
image of the Georgian public as its internal alterity and inflects this image into the notions of 
stereotypical “mentality” that is different from its own patterns of thinking. This is especially 
relevant when considering the Free University textbook project (discussed in subsequent 
chapters), because it evolves out of similar concerns for “Georgian mentality” and orients its 
discourse against the models of thought on Georgia’s past and Georgian identity that are at play 
in students’ essays.  
 
4.2. “GEORGIAN MENTALITY” AND INDEPENDENT REASONING 
 
Sofio was a high school graduate from Chiatura in the western region of Georgia. I met 
her in January of 2011 during the Free University information and recruitment campaign. She 
was preparing for the national exams and came to Free University to attend the short 
introductory program for prospective students. I remembered her among several hundred of her 
peers, because I did not know of many people from Chiatura who had applied to Free University. 
So I recognized her when we met again in March of 2011. That day, she had taken a three-hour 
trip to the capital of the country to participate in an essay contest organized by Free University. 
Roughly five hundred students competed for a chance to win one of the five university 
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scholarships to study at the country’s top ranked and one of the most expensive undergraduate 
programs.  
On that chilly March day, while Sofio was on her way from Chiatura to Tbilisi, I sat at a 
table with a small group of Free University professors, who were deliberating on the topic of an 
essay contest in “independent reasoning”.  Among them were a biologist, a philosopher, a 
classicist, a psychologist, a historian, a scholar of Indian literature and a mathematician; the 
group was diverse and so was their understanding of how one should formulate a question 
prompting students to “reason independently”. Topics varied, ranging from a question Aristotle 
posed to some legislation discussed in the Georgian Parliament. Members of the group disagreed 
on many things: “Can we give a question about Don Quixote if not everyone has read it?” “Will 
they be able to address a question on democracy?” “The question should not be too complicated” 
“No questions about religion, please, or we will drive them into a tough spot” and so forth, but 
they all agreed on some principle issues:  
(Tamuna): We want them to think beyond pregiven frames, to overcome cliches... 
 
(Leri): Right, they should be able to formulate arguments and reason logically toward 
their conclusions as opposed to merely repeating what they hear in public discourse or 
what their school teachers have had them memorize.  
  
 Most of the deliberation was couched in terms of the ability to predict what and how 
students would write and then deciding based on that prediction whether students should or 
should not be led to a certain type of reasoning, as well as how possible it would be to 
objectively evaluate these essays depending on the subject matter of the topic. This deliberation 
conceived of students’ conceptual horizons and approached the subject of discussion (essay 
topic) through a triangular lens. It was triangular because professors predicted an outcome (what 
the essays would be like) through the lens of their preconceived subjects (what students are like) 
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which in turn was overlain by their desire to act upon such subjects (how do we want them 
write).  When it came to discussing the essay question on “tradition and modernity”, concerns of 
this sort became even more salient and substantial.  
Giorgi (a philosopher who was teaching several undergraduate courses):  We don’t want 
them to write in terms of mythical notions they have of Georgia’s past .  
  
Beno (a biologist): Well, Nutsa can tell us all about Georgian “national narratives”, how 
they sustain claims on “purity of Georgian traditions” and so forth, right Nutsa? ...This is 
the way they teach at Georgian schools!  
  
 This was a remark from a western educated scholar, internationally published biologist 
and possibly one of the most intelligent, insightful and immensely knowledgeable (in fields far 
beyond his profession) individuals I have known in my life. Beno like many other intellectuals in 
Georgia felt disquieted by the overwhelming patriotic discourse and nationalistic overtones in 
Georgian schools, especially with regards to history and the Georgian language curriculum.  
The criticism of the school history curriculum by new western educated intellectuals is 
akin to what scholars of collective memory would concern themselves with when looking at 
history texts, but unlike them, Beno’s or Tamuna’s worries arise from culturally embedded and 
politically shaped motivations (Similar to those of Simon Janashia, discussed in chapter 3). 
Beno’s desire is for Georgians to develop civic consciousness, and engage critically with their 
own cultural prejudices in order to build a successful state with well functioning social 
institutions. He feels that the “mythologized” view of “Georgianness” and Georgia’s past is 
thwarting progress. Beno is just one among many Georgian intellectuals I have come across who 
would readily tell you the flaws of “Georgian mentality” and the ways in which Georgians’ 
“misconception” of their past is a source of these flaws. Thus, there was a degree of sarcasm 
	   97	  
implicit in his mentioning of “pure traditions” and “national narrative” that indexed what might 
be called a “mainstream model” of the public with its “predictable” modes of thought. 
Certainly, the perspectives and worldviews of these professors are culturally conditioned 
and socially embedded in their own right. Deliberation on the essay topic silently reflected 
discourses prevalent in some intellectual circles that critically engage such mainstream cultural 
models and modes of thought. When needed, these models can be communicated by mere hints 
or a sort of “code words” such as  “pure Georgian culture” or “Georgian spirituality” (or 
“mother-history” mentioned in chapter 1 by the group working on the history textbook). This 
mode of cultural intersubjectvity produced a baseline of the discussion on the essay topic. But 
more importantly it yielded an image of the public with certain characteristics, modes of thought, 
and accompanying dispositions.  With that image of the public in mind, the Free University 
Professors “knew” in advance how 90% of several hundred students would respond to a certain 
type of question. Familiarity with “cliches” or cultural “formulas” that are in the public space 
allowed them to predict the schooled and socially modeled mind-set of an “average” eighteen 
year old Georgian. Their deliberation, to borrow Bakhtin’s words, was “dialogized in the belief 
system” of this imagined public, oriented “toward a specific conceptual horizon, toward the 
specific world” of their internal alterity (1981, p 282, 283). Their aim was to single out 
applicants who would think beyond pre-formulated discursive frames, rely on “logics and 
reasoning”, in other words, discursive modes of thought.   
After a couple of hours of deliberation they agreed on the final formulation of the 
question.  The essay topic addressed tradition, modernity and progress of society. It 
simultaneously referenced current state projects of modernization, Georgia’s ambition to become 
a successful nation-state, as well as nationalist discourse on unadultarated Georgian traditions. 
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Such a formulation dialogized two anatognistic voices in the social milieu, but posed the 
question in such a way that did not necessitate polarization.  Not everyone agreed with the choice 
initially but eventually everyone conceded that this might be a good way to see if students are 
capable of contemplating or even deconstructing these two concepts (tradition and modernity) by 
overcoming “Georgian cliches” about the purity of Georgian traditions, sanctity of culture and so 
forth, without taking either modernity or progress for granted.  
Meanwhile Sofio rode her bus, possibly in a state of uncertain anticipation of her 
experience at Free University. A few hours later, in her essay Sofio (18 years old) would write 
the following: 
Throughout the centuries, in people’s psychology certain rules, norms, are formed that 
they obediently abide by, and they perceive living by these norms to define their 
integrity/self-sufficiency as a nation. Indeed, certain types of traditions bestow 
individuality and mystery upon a nation, make it interesting/attractive to other nations, 
which in its own right shapes a thriving economy and tourism […] Were we not able to 
stand this many centuries, survive so many enemies?!  And slowly, step-by-step we 
developed into a modern country. Traditions have not interfered with that. On the 
contrary they helped us become different from everyone else and exceptional. In fact, let 
us remember Greek colonization, about which an historian tells us that Greeks have 
spread their customs in all colonies, but were unable to do the same with us, because 
Colchian [early proto-Georgian tribes developed in Bronze Age] traditions were much 
stronger and firmer. But instead, it became possible for us to adopt some things from 
them that were unknown to us before. […]  
 
After, few paragraphs on the importance of progress, on the capacity of a country to 
adopt to the rhythm of modern world, and on Japan44 as a successful example of how modernity 
and tradition can be reconciled resulting in a flourishing nation-state, Sofio concluded with the 
following lines: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  A	  number	  of	  students	  used	  other	  countries	  as	  examples	  supporting	  their	  claims	  on	  tradition	  and	  modernity.	  There	  was	  an	   evident	   trend	   in	   this	   too.	   Nineteen	   students	   used	   Japan	   as	   an	   example	   of	   successful	   merging	   of	   traditions	   and	  modernity.	   Five	   students	  used	   example	  of	   Israel	   as	   a	   testament	   to	   the	   claim	   that	   a	  nation	   can	   exist	  without	   a	  political	  entity	  and	  will	  succeed	  if	  traditions	  are	  preserved.	   	  A	  few	  students	  also	  mentioned	  “Muslim	  countries”	  as	  an	  example	  of	  “bad	  traditions”	  that	  need	  to	  “modernized”.	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In short, a nation needs to defend and maintain traditions in order to preserve 
individuality and self-sufficiency/integrity, but it needs to be reconciled with the modern 
and [that which can] give a nation attractiveness and mystery and not prevent progress 
[more precise or literal translation of the word she uses “tsin’svla” is “moving forward”] 
and development. A good example of that is our tradition of hospitality that enchants and 
attracts everyone around us, but certainly does not thwart our development. 
 
Sofio’s position is exceptional in that she could readily admit to the possibility of 
Georgians having adopted something from the Greeks.  Very few were willing to entertain this 
possibility. Later on in my fieldwork, for example, one of the students explained to me: 
Every time we [in the classroom at school] would touch upon Greek colonization, the 
teacher would reiterate this over and over again - ‘Greeks couldn’t fool us, here they 
found themselves among people that were developed’, and then she would add that they 
were able to subdue everyone else.  
 
 
Much of what students wrote was informed by, and relied on the material provided by the 
school curriculum of Georgian literature and history. Their writing was heavily shaped by 
competences acquired at school, by how they had learned to talk about certain themes, what their 
schoolteacher explained and demanded of them.45 For instance, in students’ arguments one can 
encounter various formulations of an idea conveyed in the following passage: 
A nation that forgets its past, history and national character does not have prospects for a 
great future... A nation’s past is the foundation on which its statehood should be built and 
which should define its bright and prosperous future.  (Giorgi, 18, from Kutaisi) 
 
Giorgi’s sentence is a rephrased quote from Chavchavadze’s text “Nation and History” 
which reads: “...a nation’s deterioration, decay and erosion begins when it forgets its history, 
when it forfeits remembrance of its past, of its former life … The past is a foundation of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Jane	  Kitaevich’s	  recent	  research	  explores	  historical	  narratives	  and	  memory	  discourse	  among	  Georgia’s	  school	  teachers	  (forthcoming	  paper	  “History	  that	  Splinters”).	  Her	  findings	  show	  a	  pattern	  very	  similar	  to	  what	  I	  discuss	  here.	  	  
	   100	  
present, as the present is of the future” (see chapter 3). Around half of all participants quoted 
Chavchavadze directly and roughly another 30% used a rephrased formulation of his words.  
Like Giorgi, they often did this without explicitly identifying the author of the quote.  Here are 
some other examples that use Chavchavadze’s words as a kind of authoritative utterance to assert 
the value of traditions and remembering: 
 The nation’s spiritual downfall and physical failure was caused by forgetting traditions 
and by the desire to become a “modern society”. Everyone who moves toward a past-less 
future and as I. Chavchavadze said, who does not know “who is s/he, where it came 
from” will not know “where he is and where will he go” (Ika, 17) 
 
A great Georgian writer has said that a nation’s degradation and spiritual failure begins 
when people forget their own history. History amounts to traditions and national culture, 
thus national culture needs to be cherished. New generations are raised on its basis which 
(new generation) create a new society... (Tina, 18) 
 
Many students (some of which participated in this writing competition) in later 
conversations with me commented on how the school curriculum played a crucial role in forming 
the “cultural knowledge” that helped them formulate the arguments in the way they did. For 
instance, three years after writing her essay Sofio, who had become a Free University student, 
noted that the example of “Greek colonization” she used in her essay was “definitely a matter of 
the courses I was studying at the time. I don’t think I would have remembered it if I had to write 
this essay now”. Similarly, students were able to quote Chavchavadze by heart because they had 
to memorize it for Georgian language and literature classes. 
Another student commenting on her own essay, said, “We learn most of that patriotic 
stuff from our Georgian language and literature teachers and when we prepare for national 
entrance exams”. Further discussions with the students regarding this “patriotic stuff” they learn 
at school revealed a great deal about the system within which young Georgians are socialized 
into forms of cultural knowledge, and their comments resonated with my own experience at a 
	   101	  
Tbilisi high school. These reflections suggest that while social discourses, family discussions, 
popular media and other unofficial media play a significant role in socializing individuals into 
historical imaginaries, these essays suggest that the official schooling is the central mechanism 
for training individuals in how to master cultural knowledge and how to use cultural tools such 
as memory narratives.  This observation reinforces the suggestion made by Ernest Gellner that 
official schooling plays a crucial role in forming national discourse and identity (1990).    
Nevertheless, the operative field of the symbolic forms students draw upon in these 
essays is in no way limited to or bounded off by the student-teacher-school circuit. When Sofio 
wrote “Were not we able to stand this many centuries, survive this many enemies?!”, she posed a 
rhetorical question that demanded no answer or further explanation. In writing this, she was 
certain that it would not be just her Georgian or history teacher who would immediately 
understand what she was referring to.  Her question indexes a memory narrative that in various 
forms and for alternate purposes is employed in political rhetoric, religious and other public 
discourses, colloquial conversations in the household kitchens, and even in short conversations 
with taxi drivers. The memory narrative of Georgia’s past is a pervasive instrument that shapes 
how people engage the symbolic field of the past and “Georgianness” as its central category to 
address current political and social contexts. What empowers their words is not the authority of 
their schoolteacher alone, but their reference to a wider and often more authoritative domain of 
collective memory.  
 
4.3. THE “SCRIPTORS” AND THE MULTIVOCAL CONTEXT 
 
 
In spite of diverse perspectives and stances toward “modernization and tradition”, the 
overwhelming majority of the students relied on the same pool of textual tools, symbolic terms, 
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authoritative voices, and emplotment strategies. This is what Wertsch refers to as the capacity to 
use “off the shelf [cultural] technology” in mediated action (2002). My analysis here focuses on 
the nature of the textual tools used in such speaking and thinking, on what students draw upon 
from what Frederick Barth calls “surfeit of cultural material” (1993 p 4) to carve out their 
arguments. This in turn provides insight into the spectrum of imaginaries on the Georgian past 
and how these images come in contact with contemporary discourses.  For instance, Sofio’s 
argument follows two key discursive frameworks, both in turn from given socio-political 
discourses and both being invested in memory paradigm: a) traditions are important because they 
bestow individuality upon the nation (it is a selling point), and b) as distinguishing markers 
traditions have made Georgia firmer, more resistant to an enemies (it is a defense mechanism).  
The latter addresses the discursive circuit that embodies “semiosphere” (Lotman 1990) of 
Georgian memory (i.e., tradition as defense mechanism). Sofio’s rhetorical strategy builds on the 
authority of the voice extrapolated from this narrative; one that affirms that Georgia has endured 
multiple invasions throughout the centuries, starting with Greek efforts at colonization, and yet 
preserved its cultural uniqueness. She calls forth what is the very ethos of the nation. On the 
other hand, her argument also reflects another discursive genre encapsulating a modern model of 
Georgia, a model that has been forged by the state. So, I begin by situating the “modern model of 
Georgia” in the context of political and ideological forces that have acted on Georgia’s public 
sphere.  
Beginning in 2003, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration capitalized 
mainly on two principal policy orientations: first, Georgia’s integration into Western alliances 
(EU and NATO) as a route to political security, and second, embracing foreign investment as an 
economic strategy. Such political and economic action-plans involved the advancement of 
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tourism as a main tactic for both exposure to a western audience and increasing the flow of 
foreign capital. State projects and rhetoric on tourism harnessed both the discourse of 
modernizing Georgia, which involves progress of the state; and one of a culturally rich Georgia 
with its history, culture, and captivating scenery and nature. This legitimized the state’s effort for 
internationalizing the domestic landscape, but also has brought in the subjectivized experience of 
Georgian culture under the “gaze” of the western public (Foucault, 1973).  
However, the Georgian state has pursued this regime of “Europeanzation” and rapid 
modernization under continuous tension (though in some cases subterranean) with its major rival 
in power: the Georgian Orthodox Church. The church has acted (and still does) as the main locus 
of a strongly nationalist ideology, and in this it empowers the notion that a successful Georgian 
state cannot be realized beyond the boundaries of a particularly Georgian Christianity. To be 
sure, rather than loudly declaring these ideas and cursing the west openly, church leaders have 
circulated them in their congregations through the veiled discourse of pure Georgian culture vis-
à-vis dangerous foreign ideas. This strategy involved not going against EU integration, 
something that in surveys over several years was unequivocally supported by over 70% of 
Georgians.  Instead, the church has stressed the importance of “unadulterated culture” and 
harnessed skepticism toward the feasibility of Georgia’s European aspiration. So for instance, 
while Saakashvili often spoke of a multiethnic Georgia, one of religious diversity, and the 
“historically tolerant nature of Georgian people,” the church has often reiterated the importance 
of Orthodox Christianity in sustaining the Georgian state, culture and national identity. For the 
most part its promotion of animosity toward all forms of otherness, while not entirely hidden, 
was at least disguised in its insistent rhetoric about pure Georgian traditions and culture.  
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 Given the context of these competing voices, Sofio’s tactic is an intelligent one; she 
appropriates both voices in her multivoiced text so as to capture both the narrative of the past and 
futuristic perspective on modern Georgia in a way that favors her point of view: “…certain types 
of traditions bestow individuality and mystery upon a nation, make it [a nation] 
interesting/attractive to other nations, which in its own right shapes a thriving economy and 
tourism.”  Sofio mentions tourism not out of her own inventiveness, but because she knows the 
social weight given to that argument. Her tactic relies on forging linkages between what Thomas 
de Waal (2011) calls the “old model of Georgia” and the “new model of Georgia” and reconciles 
the two.  
In looking at these texts, the notion of “user” and the practice of “using” based on “tactics 
of consumption” as outlined by Michel De Certeau seems especially apt. According to de 
Certeau’s definition in her “scriptual play” (p 135) Sofio, is not simply a “consumer” of a single 
ideological discourse, but performs as a “user” of several rhetorical genres “by poaching … on 
the property of others” (1984, p xii). Thus, her argumentative tactic is a form of  “production, a 
poiēsis” (de Certeau, 1984 p xii, italics in the original). Such textual production is based on a 
“tactic” that: 
Insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, 
without being able to keep it at a distance. It has at its disposal no base where it can 
capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansion, and secure independence with respect 
to circumstances…because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time - it is always 
on the watch for opportunities that must be seized on the wing (p xix).  
 
Indeed, throughout the essays collected for this study one can see various instances of 
how students’ tactics of argumentation depend on “seizing the opportunities”, on capturing and 
re-weaving socio-culturally pre-shaped and imposed discursive forms. Creators of such texts are 
what Roland Barthes (1977) calls “scriptors” whose power is in compiling pre-given texts in 
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somewhat new ways. They are producers of textual “bricolage” (de Certeau, 1984). From this 
perspective, understanding a text is only possible if we turn to discursive norms and conventions 
that underlie such scriptoral performance.  
 
4.4. MEMORY MAXIMS AND AUTHORITATIVE DISCOURSE 
 
 
In this section, I discuss essays where students incorporate formulation of Georgia’s past 
as a point of departure for construing “authoritative discourse” (Bakhtin, 1986). These examples 
serve to a) reveal a set of essentialist notions about nationhood that can be attached to such a 
conception of the past, and b) vividly demonstrate the use of the moralizing impulse (White, 
1981) embedded in the conception of Georgia’s past (see chapter 2). While these examples 
support my claims on the discursive function of memory maxims, in the following sections I 
engage in a large-scale analysis according to the dominant argumentative trends I found in them.  
In the essays separate elements of the Georgian memory narrative appear in different 
forms and their analysis further reveals set of imagery attached to the Georgian past and the 
concept of Georgianness. Consider following example from one of the essays: 
The history of our nation is an endless struggle for preserving the integrity of the nation. 
For almost twenty centuries our nation has been defending Christian belief with the 
spear…They fought with Iranians, Arabs, Turk-Seljuqs, 46  Mongols, Kizilbashs, 47 
Russians…(Thea, from Tbilisi, 17) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Turk-­‐Seljuqs	  (Georgian	  turk-­‐selchukebi)	  refers	  to	  the	  Turkish	  tribes	  of	  the	  Great	  Seljuq	  Empire	  originating	  in	  1073,	   a	  medieval	  Turko-­‐Persian	  Muslim	  empire.	   Seljuq	  dynasty	   controlled	   the	  vast	   area	   stretching	   from	  Hindu	   Kush	   (central	   Afghanistan,	   northern	   Pakistan)	   to	   Anatolia	   (modern	   Turkey).	   Series	   of	   Turk-­‐Seljuq	  invasions	   of	   Georgia	   beginning	   from	   late	   11th	   century	   is	   known	   in	   Georgian	   historiography	   as	   the	   “Great	  Turkish	  Invasions”	  (Georgian	  didi	  turqoba).	  	  	  47	  Kizilbashs	  or	  Qizilbashs	  refers	  to	  variety	  of	  Shia	  militant	  groups	  that	  were	  established	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  Kurdistand	  and	  Anatolia	   in	   late	  13th	   century.	   In	   this	   context	  Thea	   refers	   to	   the	  Kizilbashs	   that	   established	  Safavyd	  Dynasty	   that	   ruled	   Iran	   after	   the	  Muslim	   conquest	   of	   Persia,	   from	  early	  16th	   century.	   In	  Georgian	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In this formulation Thea renders Christianity into the dominant marker of Georgian 
culture and Georgianness. Thus the struggle for self-preservation becomes a struggle for 
“defending Christian belief”.  It is noteworthy that at crucial points in her text Thea does not use 
the past tense (“the history of our nation is an endless struggle”).  In so doing she tells us that it is 
not just about some events in the past, but that this cycle of invasions is more of a sealed fate that 
continues to play out in the present. Furthermore her use of ellipsis makes her statement open-
ended, implying that the list is incomplete. Thea might have left out a few of Georgia’s enemies, 
but accuracy is not of primary concern here; what matters is the pattern. The narrative she brings 
to the forefront is not “prehistorical” but “transhistorical” in that the cycle of events it conveys is 
timeless (Ingold, 2001:57). She re-appropriates this memory maxim to argue that rejecting 
traditions will equal abrogating the essence of Georgianness. This memory maxim not only 
opens a discursive window for her, but gives her authority that transcends her own voice. In a 
similar vein, Luka (17 years old) from provincial city of western Georgia, Zestafoni writes: 
We Georgians have three thousand years of history… On this tiny territory God gave us a 
country enriched with traditions and we do not comprehend the possible outcome of 
forgetting traditions and culture. Our culture that  has endured the passage of time, 
endured the Ottomans, Mongols, Arabs who we so easily erase from the pages of history. 
Old words: language, fatherland, belief today remain solely as poetic verses […] The 
Georgian people without culture are like a cattle grazing. You can herd them in any 
direction you like. Living in slavery is easy; it is hard to live in freedom with great 
traditions and culture. Today [traditions and culture] are becoming degraded because of 
modernization … [this] results in blending the Georgian people with other peoples and it 
means the disappearance [of Georgian people]. We have no right to allow for our culture 
to vanish which equals our annihilation.    
 
Claims about the sacred nature of the culture - “God gave us country enriched with 
traditions” – set out an important premise in this text.  While few students made such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  history	  Kizilbashs	  appear	   in	  mid	  18th	  century	  as	  they	  established	  Kizilbash	  rule	  (Georgian:	  kizilbashoba)	   in	  eastern	  Georgian	  Kingdoms	  that	  lasted	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  	  
	   107	  
straightforward reference to divine authority or a direct procreator of the nation’s land and its 
traditions, the allusion to sanctity, whether metaphoric or literal, is implicit in many of the texts. 
What generally defines the rhetorical genre of these verbal performances is the use of tropes and 
powerful metaphors as we see in this passage. Speech genres of memory are essentially poetic. 
The very first words “We Georgians have three thousand years of history” is an example, as it 
attests not so much to the factuality of historical date but evokes a mythic sense of atemporality. 
Legitimacy of something that endured for “thousand years of history” is exposed by this phrase’s 
imposing sense of immortality.  Form-wise its function is poetic rather than factually informative 
in a strict sense.  Meaning-wise it is a classic demonstration of what Wertsch calls “a hallmark of 
essentialism” that commonly prevails in nationalist discourses (forthcoming).  
Georgian history has few precedents of political unity and political autonomy, yet 
Georgians hardly ever think of Arab domination, or Russian colonialism as instances when the 
Georgian nation ceased to exist. The historical periods when Georgia as a political entity was in 
abeyance are conceived in terms of “self-preservation” times when cultural boundaries 
(language, religion, tradition) were (or needed to be) demarcated. The fact that Georgia had no 
political autonomy and that administrative control over its territories was out of reach for 
Georgians is not entirely silenced in such representations of history, but it is de-emphasized and 
understated as opposed to the weight assigned to markers of cultural identity and spiritual 
solidarity. Hence, the idea of “nationness” is invested with sacred definition, and the following 
excerpt is an explicit demonstration of this idea:  
Maintaining the steadfastness of a nation and preserving its authenticity48 must be 
primary factors of movement for each individual. This implies both physical as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  The	  actual	  word	  that	  he	  uses	  here	  in	  Georgian	  is	  Tvitmkofadoba	  tvit	  meaning	  self,	  mkofadoba	  –	  being,	  existence.	  In	  terms	  of	  cultural	  connotation	  it	  implies	  both	  authenticity,	  uniqueness	  and	  ability	  to	  self-­‐sustain	  but	  its	  potential	  is	  in	  the	  way	  it	  obscures	  	  the	  presence/absence	  of	  political	  autonomy	  of	  the	  nation,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  alludes	  to	  it	  from	  the	  perspective	  that	  when	  a	  nation	  is	  unable	  to	  sustain	  itself	  as	  an	  autonomous	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spiritual preservation… Ignoring moral ideals and a revision of values can be mainly 
caused by forgetting one’s own history, by nihilism toward traditions, which will cause a 
nation’s spiritual depletion first, and then make its existence devoid of purpose. “A 
nation’s decay begins when it forgets its history” – the great Georgian writer and thinker 
Ilia Chavchavadze said a hundred years ago… For us to assert the importance of cultural 
“truth” and traditions, the example of Israel and Jews will suffice.  They were dispersed 
in every corner of the world, but they preserved everything that kindled their self-
consciousness and patriotism. What is the outcome? They founded a nation-state that is 
developing and progressing… (Rati, 17, from Tbilisi)    
 
Such a definition emphasizes two conditions, a stasis, of nationhood in physical, 
geographical terms and a stasis of the, spiritual (recall Putkaradze’s quote from chapter 3 that 
conveys similar understanding of nationhood).  In that account a nation exists as somethingness 
(nationness). This somewhat Platonic understanding, that a nation can be present as an idea, as a 
transcendental or metaphysical category, also underlines the essentialist understanding. 
Furthermore such ideas rely on a historical paradigm that conceives of a nation not only in terms 
of a political entity, but in terms of a spiritual force, as an agency that seeks to realize its full 
existence, but most of the time is present as a partially unrealized ideal. Perhaps it is due to this 
weight ascribed to the authenticity and uncorrupted nature of culture that this perspective 
embraces isolation as a means for resistance to global power.  
 Clifford Geertz wrote that symbols are “tangible formulations of notions, abstractions 
from experience, fixed in perceptible forms, concrete embodiments of ideas, attitudes, 
judgments, longing or belief” (1975, p.91). Building on Geertz’s definition one can say that 
Georgia’s historical narrative is a symbolic form that is  “multivocal” (Turner, 1976).  It is 
charged with multiple values and meanings and can be employed in a range of settings for 
different ends. In the case of the students’ texts they employed a same basic underlying narrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  political	  entity	  it	  must	  preserve	  this	  qualities	  as	  a	  guarantee	  that	  when	  moment	  arrives	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  exist	  as	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  state.	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regardless of the stance they took with regards to tradition and modernity – whether 
“conservative” or “progressive.” In both cases this narrative aided their effort to construe a 
persuasive text by availing their perspective of greater authority, and by lending the power of 
cultural truth.   
 
 
4.5. “OUR PAST”:  THE CODE WORD 
 
The 204 essays I analyzed can be clustered according to the stance the author took toward 
modernization and tradition. Provisionally, I labeled them either as “conservative” (those who 
argued against modernization and claimed that preserving traditions is of utmost importance) or 
“progressive” (those who argued that traditions are not important for the society’s progress). But 
such an approach sometimes obscured as much as it clarified. More than a half of the students 
made some version of a “hybrid” argument. In other words, they argued for the value of 
“tradition”, “cultural heritage,” “remembering,” and “preserving national integrity”, but saw 
these values as all compatible with modernizing projects. For instance, Sofio argued for the 
importance of the traditions, but deemed “keeping up with the modern world” to be equally 
important. Below is a classification of all 204 essays according these three clusters.  
       
 
 
 
 
Regardless of the stance they took, the majority of the students based their responses in 
Hybrid	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  104	  essays	  (33%)	  	  Conservative	  	  –	  66	  essays	  (51%)	  	  Progressive	  	   –	  34	  essays	  (16%)	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the idiom of memory (with the exception of 29 students among “Progressive”) who either 
avoided discussing Georgia as an example or maintained a “rational” outlook. My notion of 
idiom of memory emphasizes that these texts communicate not so much specific events from the 
past, but a pattern of judgment through symbolic language that denotes culturally embedded 
notions of how to think about the past. Collective memory then, provides both a cognitive and a 
verbal basis for the argumentative mode and rhetorical genre of these texts.   
 As noted above students did not always spell out these symbolic forms, but merely hinted 
at them. They did so by employing code words or phrases that would tip off any competent 
Georgian reader. Code words function as what Roland Barthes terms “second-order signs” 
(1986). 
 Semiosis as a production of meaning through signs, according to Roman Jakobson 
depends on the existence of frameworks within which these signs make sense (1971). For 
instance, Sofio’s question, “Were we not able to stand this many centuries, survive this many 
enemies?!”, is a rhetorical tactic that hints of a powerful cultural symbol. Her question serves as 
a “headline” to a story line that is a shared, assumed and legitimized cultural construct. By 
hinting at this “dominant symbol” she calls upon a reader to make a set of judgments that the 
Georgian memory narrative evokes; simultaneously she draws the boundary of a “textual 
community” to which her reader must belong (Stock 1983). 
In many of these essays, certain speech elements (such as Sofio’s question for instance) 
assumed the function of codes, because they indexed Georgian memory maxims indirectly or 
implicitly and their assumed presence as a “hidden transcript” (J. Scott, 1990) is only evident to 
the reader who shares the same symbolic landscape. I refer to such verbal forms as “codes-
words”, speech elements that function as idiomatic expressions by carrying meaning about 
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memory’s pre-determined “semiosphere” (Lotman 1990). Code-words, in turn exist as part of an 
existing speech genre a special idiom that builds on existing historical conceptions.  
In his discussion of speech genres Mikhail Bakhtin pointed out that “At any given 
moment … a language is stratified not only into dialects in the strict sense of the word (i.e., 
dialects that are set off according to formal linguistic markers), but is … stratified as well into 
languages that are socio-ideological: languages belonging to professions, to genres, languages 
peculiar to particular generations, etc.” (1981 p 271-272). From this perspective the 
conceptualization of language reveals a system of co-existing and distinct, but interanimating 
idioms that comprise what Bakhtin refers to as “heteroglossia.” Using this perspective, I 
understand codes-words to be part of the idiom of memory, a socio-ideological language that is 
inherent to certain discursive settings. As any speech genre, the idiom of memory exists not 
merely as a constellation of words and phrases, but it functions against the background of 
memory’s symbolic and conceptual framework that makes using the genre meaningful.  
 With that in mind, my analysis approaches collective memory as a pool of usable 
symbols and explores the mnemonic field on which young Georgians play in an attempt to shape 
their arguments by employing culturally meaningful “code-words”.  When used, these code-
words or phrases: a) index a memory narrative, b) signal speech genres, c) anchor cultural 
schemas, and d) impose reasoning logic embedded in the schema. For the sake of clarity, below I 
provide a representative sample list of the code-words or phrases that were used by students 
more than five times: 
 
*our past 
our history 
our history of many centuries 
our long history 
*Possessive	   pronoun	  “our”	   in	   case	   of	   “our	  history”,	  “our	  past”	  not	  only	  denotes	  history	  of	  
us,	   but	   functions	   as	   a	  demonstrative	  pronoun	   that	   indexes	  shared	  narrative	  of	  the	  past,	  as	  in	  ‘the	  past	  we	  all	  know’.	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 Using such code-words or phrases enable young Georgians to appropriate the authority of 
the memory narrative without actually articulating it. These phrases function as rhetorical 
shortcuts for vocalizing powerful voices that lend the argument moral gravity49. Consider 
following passage as an example: 
Our ancestors fought for many centuries in order for our generation to live in the country 
called Georgia and not merely read about it (Georgia) in historical sources. We are 
obliged to defend and preserve for future generation, the traditions that Georgia and 
Georgians had. (Nino, 18, from Tbilisi) 
 
Nino’s assertive tone indexes the assumption not only that her point is obvious, but that 
her utterance points to a shared and undisputable truth. Another advantage in alluding to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  parallel	  can	  be	  drawn	  with	  ceremonial	  speech	  in	  religious	  rites.	  The	  idiom	  employed	  there	  is	  invested	  with	   divine	   authority,	   namely	   that	  whatever	   is	   said	   God’s	   presence	   behind	   these	  words	   is	   assumed	   as	   an	  authoritative	   voice.	   Thus	   in	   religious	   speech	   “God”	   serves	   as	   an	   underlying	   structure	   -­‐	   a	   “schema”	   that	  dictates	  both	  how	  one	  should	  interpret	  the	  words	  and	  how	  one	  should	  act	  relative	  to	  them.	  In	  similar	  vein,	  a	  speech	   genre	   that	   enacts	   a	   narrative	   schema	   of	   the	   nation’s	   past	   has	   a	   meaning-­‐dictating	   and	  moralizing	  force.	  	  
we have struggled to preserve 
culture/traditions/religion/language/nationhood/national 
spirit/national values/identity 
how did we survive... 
for centuries we have preserved our culture 
we endured throughout history 
all those great enemies 
we always stood united 
in spite of continuous misfortunes 
endless struggle for self preservation 
traditions that our ancestors fought for 
our ancestors shed blood to preserve our culture 
Others have always fought Georgia, Georgian people and 
Georgian values 
history shows that Georgia always fought for unity and 
freedom 
our country was always attacked by powerful enemies 
we have endured countless wars 
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memory narrative is to cultivate its patterning logic and apply it to the issue at hand so that 
events or actors are rendered recognizable. For instance, by evoking this narrative as a starting 
point of their discussion, students were able to make sense of “globalization” by inserting it into 
the narrative schema. Such reductionism of complex phenomena like “globalization” to the 
familiar and simpler category of “just another enemy” affords for a process of sense-making by 
which abstruse or ambivalent variables are rendered manageable.  
 
 From ancient times our ancestors fought for self-preservation. Only two times, 
throughout our history have we had bright patches of statehood, in all other instances we 
were compelled to struggle for self-preservation. Our ancestors had internalized 
traditions, and for them the primary tradition was love of homeland, love of God and love 
for each other (if we can deem these three as traditions)50 (Nika, 18, from Tbilisi) 
 
Narrative form allows speakers and writers to frame the discourse and then control the flow of 
meaning according to that very frame. More importantly, it allowed students to construe a moral 
argument in which the source of authority is transcendental in that it surpasses any single voice 
but embodies common “truth”.   
 
 
 
4.6. SELF AND OTHER 
 
There are two main genres of discourse in the texts. One conveys Georgia as a solitary 
nation in its own closed cosmology and casts the rest of the world as a homogenous source of 
threat and corruption.  The other genre subjects both Georgian modernity and Georgian tradition 
to a wider geopolitical structure that gravitates ‘westward’ (treated in the next section). The 33% 
of the essays that I labeled as “conservative” fall in the first category, and the 51% that I labeled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Remark	  in	  parenthesis	  in	  the	  original	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as “hybrid” fall into the second category. In the first case, Georgian culture is something pre-
given, a sanctuary, a “treasure house” in and of itself and in its own right; in the second case it is 
something posited in relation to an external measure. Here “culture” functions as commodity that 
acquires its value in relation to the market that transcends its margins. The following two sub-
sections of this chapter elaborate on these two trends. 
 
 
4.6.1. Pure Us and Polluting Others 
 
 The essays categorized as “conservative” (33%) mostly centered around the claim on the 
purity of the Georgian culture or the “ethnos” and pursued an argument against any form of 
otherness as a potential source of pollution and cultural annihilation. The following excerpt from 
Vaja’s essay is an example of such isolationist view that equates modernity to globalization and 
defines these two as forces that endanger the ethnos: 
 
It is as if Georgia and small nations in general are on the verge of an abyss. They are 
facing a dilemma, either they have to confine their countries in complete isolation and 
with this try to rescue the ethnos or they have to open doors to globalization, in case of 
which, it is not hard to believe that rescuing a nation as an ethnos will be even minimally 
possible. So what is the salvation route for us - small nations? (Vaja, 17, from Tbilisi) 
 
In instances such as this it can be seen that nationalist ideologies rest on the claims of 
uniqueness, purity, intrinsic nature, and the unilinear path of cultural and political development, 
the boundaries of which are asserted by the innate characteristics of the group. This approach 
avoids assumptions about foreign influences and intercultural relations as shaping forces of 
cultural and social characteristics; rather any contact with the external world is represented as an 
impingement on its purity. From such a perspective change equals annihilation. Cultural 
formations are understood not as outcomes of historical processes (including intercultural 
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influences), but as solidified, preordained conditions originating from the essence of a given 
nation or from being divinely bestowed. 
As an argumentative tool within the nationalist discourse the Georgian memory narrative 
allows harnessing imaginaries that sustain a closed nationalist cosmology. According to such a 
cosmology the nation is elevated and glorified in a way that asserts its intrinsic value 
independent of value systems beyond its boundaries, while every form of “otherness” is defined 
as threatening. Irakli follows this line of reasoning but expresses more specific concerns with 
contemporary threats facing Georgian culture:  
Let us remember our past, for on a number of occasions Georgia was invaded by invaders 
with different traditions and faith. Certainly, these countries tried to change the nation, to 
convert it to their traditions and faith. Had they been successful in accomplishing this, 
unquestionably the Georgian nation would no longer exist. Today European culture is 
being established in Georgia. (Irakli, 17, from Tbilisi) 
  
Irakli goes on to expose his critical outlook on what he defines as “European culture”, 
emphasizing the differences in social relations and social attitudes that seem unacceptable to any 
Georgian.  
Concerns with “Europeanization”, “modernization”, “globalization”, and 
“Americanization” play an important role in the essays. As noted earlier, Saakashvili’s 
modernizing projects played big role in valorizing worries with Western influences infiltrating 
Georgian cultural domain. While not everyone saw these forces as intrusive and threatening, but 
rather regarded modernization as intrinsic to Georgia’s natural path of development, for some, 
especially Christian church congregations and nationalist groups the “West” signified impure 
ideas and dangerous ideologies.  
These views were reflected in the students’ essays. Among the 33% who made 
“conservative” arguments, many (28 essays out of 66) voiced concerns about “global” forces 
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threatening Georgia’s cultural integrity.  In their language, the terms globalization, 
modernization, “Europeanization”, and “Americanization” were posited as nearly synonymous 
and were viewed as carriers of the threat of annihilation, as destructive forces against cultural 
uniqueness and individuality. The role of the Georgian Orthodox Church’s authority and its 
pervasive rhetoric was especially evident among the “conservative” perspectives. In all 
instances, however, the Georgian memory narrative anchored students’ argumentative strategies 
and their effort to map the “threat” of “global forces” onto a familiar schema. Consider the 
following passage that has overtly religious overtones, but alludes to the memory narrative to 
invigorate his argument: 
Throughout the centuries, none of the invaders were able to exterminate Georgia, because 
the nation never once collapsed spiritually; it always had faith in God and with this we 
have reached this far. Today his Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II is taking care of our 
spiritual unity, and in that Georgia is superior to other countries. Spiritual solidarity 
facilitates our progress…I think that modernizing the national cultural heritage and 
traditions is more of an imitation/parroting and desire to be like another country. Every 
nation is individual and imitating actions will not change their culture and traditions, but 
will entirely destroy them as a nation, will eradicate their history and fundamentally alter 
the psychology of a nation and social vision. In such case a nation’s degeneration takes 
place, its merging with some other nation and fundamental mutation. (Saba, 17, from 
Tbilisi)  
 
 Here we see that religion is something that “Georgians fought for” throughout the 
centuries, while simultaneously serving as a defense mechanism for the nation to preserve its 
cultural boundaries. This particular view is imbued with religious discourse, in which Georgia’s 
Orthodox Church and its leader are presented as the single most important defender and 
proclaimer of the nation’s spiritual unity. It is spiritual integrity that drives the society’s progress 
and not cultural adaptation to popular trends.  
Like any form of “otherness”, globalization is viewed as a similar source of corruption 
from this perspective, and it attacks if the gates are left open. The isolationist perspective builds 
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on the tenet that preserving nationhood is humankind’s single most important mission. We see 
this vocalized in many instances (26 essays have similar claims) throughout the texts.  For 
example, Lika emphasized this in writing: 
Preserving individuality and defending traditions is much more critical and necessary 
[now] than it was before, since the problem of globalization is much more powerful and 
dangerous than any empire with its almighty army. Everything [forced] together, for a 
common purpose, with one language and single currency – this is the general image of 
globally unified universe. The Soviet Union was a similar model of “state” …Imagine the 
future of similar globally unified world! (Lika, 18, from Rustavi) 
 
In this example, not only are modernity and globalization posed as synonymous, but the 
uniformity and homogeneity that they bring about are equated with the totalitarian regime of the 
USSR. With a final rhetorical question this young author presents a picture of globalization’s 
detrimental impact on Georgian culture similar to the one begotten by the Soviet regime. 
In Identity and Violence Amartya Sen makes a point that nationalism can be built around 
a “solitarist perspective” and promote “a sense of inevitability about some allegedly unique—
often belligerent—identity that we are supposed to have and which apparently makes extensive 
demands on us (sometimes, of a most disagreeable kind)” (2006, p.xiii). In the essays such a 
solitarist perspective is entrenched with the understanding of how the world outside Georgia 
operates and what it represents. A narrative of the past anchors such perspectives. 
 
4.6.2. WHAT IS IT THAT ATTRACTS TOURISTS? 
 
 
 In the majority (68 out of 104) of the essays categorized as “hybrid” argument, globalizing 
power is mitigated and dealt with from an aspirational perspective, one that seeks to belong to, 
and take advantage of the source of power rather than combat it. In these discussions tradition 
and culture were represented as “sites of attraction,” not as ways of being that stand in the way of 
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modernity.  They are treated as commodities that can be exploited and used for the purpose of 
progress. Traditions then, were conveyed not as immanent, intrinsic forms of existence, 
representations of order but as embellishments of a nation.  As one student wrote, “tradition is 
that something exotic that adds extraordinariness to every nation and country”.  
[Traditions] make our country more diverse and interesting. That is why we should make 
use of this wealth and exploit for the country’s welfare…  If we ask the question, what is 
it that attracts tourists? My answer would be – culture. We have witnessed on many 
occasions how old Georgian architecture or choreography astonished 
foreigners…[Nations] should move forward but we should not forget national culture 
which makes our lives so much more interesting. (Tatia, 18, from Tbilisi) 
 
 The conception of Georgianness within the context of Georgia’s Europeanization 
discourse, can produce articulations, definitions and imaginaries of national culture that are 
dialogic, in that their implicit value is measured with respect to Georgia’s positioning vis-à-vis 
western civilization, in a dialogic conception of self-other relationship. In essays that reflect this 
tendency, students present elements of traditional culture as markers of Georgia’s uniqueness, 
but also as embellishments of “our country” that contrast with other European cultures. Tradition 
becomes a commodity that generates difference and produces distinguished “labeling” for 
Georgia in the international market economy of cultural uniqueness.  
 “A nation must be unique!” wrote Eka (18), asserting that traditions should not be rejected 
for the sake of modernization, and she elaborated by saying, “The existence of tradition and 
culture is generally essential for the nation to feel what its cultural position among other 
countries is”.  Her expression provides another example of the ways in which the value of 
tradition is defined in terms of its capacity to assign a certain “position” to a nation among 
others.  
 A statement by Vako is even more straightforward in this regard.  
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The tradition of a culture is a visiting card [Georgian “sa’vizito barati – invitation card or 
business card]. A nation is rich that possesses a great history and culture. That is why this 
factor incites interests toward this country [Georgia]. Americans visit who have no 
traditions. This is not an insult, it’s just a reality. Georgia is progressing. Each day new 
projects and ideas come in and that is why a threat exists of transforming our traditions. 
(Vako, 17, from Tbilisi) 
 
 Vako further argued that Georgia needs to preserve its tradition to gain respectable position 
among modern states and remain “attractive” for the international public (i.e. tourists). The 
labeling of this essay as “hybrid” points to the fact that Vako (as well as Sofio and 102 other 
students) argued neither for Georgia’s isolationism (as did 66 students with “conservative” 
views) nor for the kind of “modernization” which assumes the disappearance of all Georgian 
traditions. Rather they incorporated the claim that traditions need to be preserved within the 
scope of Georgia’s modernizing and Europeanizing goals.   
 Such judgments embody at least two important social processes that are relevant to the 
current Georgian context. On the one hand, these essays reveal an internalization of the recent 
state rhetoric on the country’s modernization, on Euro-integration and on the importance of 
tourism. On the other hand, they reproduce the resistance discourse that emphasizes traditional 
culture, Georgia’s uniqueness and resents the state politics of “becoming like somebody else”. In 
a sense, what these young Georgians express can be viewed as reconciliation between the two 
antagonistic discourses. It shows how students forge linkages and create their own constellation 
of discursive forms that in the public space are often put forth as more stark and simple 
Manichean oppositions.  
 
 
4.7. CONCLUSION: WE MUST NEVER FORGET! 
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In all types of representations of culture, tradition, and Georgianness, the term “past” and 
what it refers to provides a framework for arguments and judgments. None of the models 
whether isolationist or modernist, conservative or moderate, where detached from “the past”51; 
rather, they all sprang from and were rooted in it as their departure point and shaping force. The 
past often times is articulated as a force that invigorates the nation and imbues every corner of 
the country with uniqueness and exceptionality. The essays in all the categories I have outlined 
are driven by the claims on distinctiveness and idiosyncrasy.  If in one instance these traits are 
charged with value as Georgia’s defense mechanisms, in others they function as practical 
market-oriented commodities. In fact, students almost never spoke of any specific values, or 
even traditions for that matter; the ethos of all this is “remembering” and “not forgetting” itself. 
Hence, the term “past” can be treated as a code-word that has significance as an interpretive 
schema for a conceptual framework to which it points. When a Georgian mentions “our past” in 
a conversation with another Georgian, most likely the listener is not going to wonder ‘which’ 
past his interlocutor had in mind52.   
These texts suggest a hierarchy of generalization of various terms.  Namely, the “past” 
(tsarsuli) is of a higher order as a parent category for “tradition” (tradicia) and “cultural 
heritage” (kulturuli memkvidreoba). This hierarchy of categories was reflected in the argument 
that  “modernizing traditions will result in forgetting the past” and in many instances tradition 
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  In	  total	  I	  have	  identified	  less	  than	  20	  essay	  (out	  of	  204)	  that	  had	  no	  mention	  of	   	   terms	  such	  as	  “Georgian	  history”,	  “our	  past”	  and	  so	  forth,	  or	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  historical	  events	  or	  historicity.	  	  52	  I	  did	  actually	  respond	  with	  a	  question	  about	  this	  to	  a	  taxi	  driver	  (as	  a	  way	  to	  provoke	  him)	  while	  engaged	  in	  a	  heated	  discussion	  of	  Georgia’s	  political	  affairs.	  While	  making	  political	  claims	  (on	  the	  contemporary	   issue)	  the	  taxi	  driver	  was	  referring	  to	  “our	  past”	  as	  something	  of	  a	  divine	  significance	  and	  as	  something	  that	  guided	  his	  interpretation	  of	  current	  political	  actions	  -­‐	  of	  what	  was	  wrong	  and	  what	  was	  right.	  My	  question	  that	  came	  across	  as	  something	  like	  “which	  past	  do	  you	  have	  in	  mind”	  seemed	  to	  have	  caught	  him	  off	  guard.	  Caught	  him	  in	   astonishment	   he	   slammed	   on	   his	   brakes	   and	   turned	   around,	   possibly	   making	   sure	   that	   I	   was	   in	   fact	  Georgian	  and	  even	  then	  he	  did	  not	  deem	  it	  necessary	  to	  provide	  an	  answer.	  He	  took	  my	  question	  merely	  as	  cynicism	   about	   “this	   past”	   as	   he	   assumed	   that	   I	   knew	   (or	   rather	   remembered)	   what	   he	   had	   in	   mind	   as	  perfectly	  as	  he	  did.	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and culture were defined not as ways of life but as “knowledge” or “memory” about Georgia’s 
past. For example in her essay Maka argued against modernization not in terms of any tangible 
impact it might have on the Georgia’s social or cultural life, but in terms of how it can “create 
conditions” for “forgetting” the past. In arguing that, Maka as many others provided a 
paraphrased quote of Chavchavadze’s words to establish why “remembering” is important.  
Consider the following excerpt as an example: 
By modernizing our cultural heritage we will destroy one of the most important bedrocks 
of our history. We will create conditions for our descendants to forget their past, and 
without a past no nation and no child of that nation will be able to lead a complete life, 
because they will not know where they come from, whose descendants they are, and what 
their ancestors fought for, and henceforth they will not know which way to go, what to 
sacrifice their life for, and what to guard with their life…” (Maka, 17, from Tbilisi) 
 
The “knowledge of history” is where a nation’s certainty about its future and its mission 
is inscribed. Ultimately, the notion of national, cultural identity is upheld through memory 
discourse, a line of reasoning reflected in a comment from Goga: 
Forgetting the cultural heritage that our ancestors shed blood to preserve equals crossing 
out our history, which eradicates the face of the nation…Without its past it is impossible 
for a nation to exist in the present or to build a future. As Ilia Chavchavadze writes in his 
public letter “the present born out of past is a parent to future”. On the other hand, 
preserving traditions does not mean inalterably following them and not stepping ahead of 
it. Certainly not. (Goga, 18, from Tbilisi) 
 
It seems that this passage reveals a chain of associations evoked with the word “tradition” 
and it exposes the hierarchy of meanings that these symbolic term carries. In the beginning Goga 
treats tradition as a mere vehicle for that abstract notion of the past. While he invests the “past” 
with unquestionable and indispensable authority, he obscures the particularity of “tradition”, 
mistreats it as something intangible as a mere medium and not as a “thing” in its own right.  
The entire statement focuses on preserving something that matters only with regards to 
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“memory” that is the “face” of a nation. Here, again the term “tradition” functions as a code-
word referencing that which has to be “remembered.” But once he shifts focus from “preserving 
traditions” to “following them” his judgment takes on a different angle. From this angle tradition 
ceases to function as a code but is reinstated with its original meaning.  It becomes a sign that 
signifies a set of practices. Here, and in many other essays we see that, on the one hand, 
preserving traditions is about remembering and not forgetting the ethos of the nation. It centers 
around the principal purpose and mission of a nation’s existence that encapsulates the 
miniaturized cosmology of a nation and its environment. On the other hand, following traditions 
accentuates an individual’s attraction to a set of actions and behaviors or customs that need to be 
followed. It enacts ways of being as opposed to ways of seeing. In light of this, the term 
“tradition” is transposed in a different field of meanings and connotations, where students realize 
that for instance enacting old mountain traditions of a tribal vendetta is not such a good idea.  
In the following definition that Koba gives to the term “tradition” we see this ability of 
terms to serve as an operative vehicle for meanings not relating to customs and actual behaviors: 
Tradition …is that knowledge that a nation has acquired over time. Forgetting it, or 
crossing it out, equals erasing all information from the mind. No human can exist with an 
empty mind and will not create anything new, just like a nation cannot exist without 
history, without a past…(Koba, 18 from Tbilisi) 
 
These texts in a sense reveal that the term “tradition” is a constitutive element of a certain 
speech genre (Bakhtin, 1986). In this context “tradition” is more of a term of art, of a poetic 
nature, rather than a “real thing”. Yet it has some “real” argumentative value in memory 
discourse.  
From this perspective “tradition” becomes a code-word that indexes some larger schema 
with generalizable notions about the nation and its past. It speaks to consciousness and not to 
action. As evidenced from the essays the term “tradition” bears significance not as a singular, 
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self-sufficient object, or as an independent entity but as a symbolic denominator, denoting things 
beyond its immediate content that demarcates self and other and functions as an indexical 
category in a web of meanings. 
 Various strands of scholarship on memory have shown: a) how historical narratives can 
serve as interpretive tools to make sense of present political and social events; and b) the ways in 
which collective memory is invested with ideological weight to provide the basis for collective 
self-imagining, thus being an indispensable resource for construing, making or re-making 
national and cultural identities. In this chapter my aim was to show how in students’ writings an 
underlying narrative about the past served as a semiotic basis to produce a distinct discursive 
genre.  Wertsch has argued that remembering is a form of mediated action, a semiosis which is 
transpired through using textual tools like narratives and underlying schemas (2002).   
 But these narratives infused with cultural meaning and overlain by continuous uses in 
sociocultural settings, can in turn become vehicles for shaping speech whereby speakers deliver 
messages not directly, not through the surface forms and words, but through code-words that 
elicit indirect meaning.  
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CHAPTER 5: MEMORY GAME: VOICE, COUNTER VOICE 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The title of this chapter has a double allusion, one theoretical and another literary. The 
term “Memory Game” is meant to echo Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “language game”, 
defined in his own words as “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven”. Although Wittgenstein did not give a precise definition of the concept, the idea is that 
using language relies on the language rules that are analogues to the rules of a game, a chess 
game for instance, in which every move is meaningful in terms of the pre-established set of rules 
(Wittgenstein 1958). While meaning always depends on the interrelation between the word and 
	   125	  
the reality in which it is pronounced, the use of language is also governed by a set of rules that 
mark the boundaries of the “game”.   
The memory game I describe here, reflects the process of social poiesis, of meaning 
making through discourse on the Georgian past. Memory here figures as a form of expression, a 
speech genre, rather than temporal orientation of the discourse. But what shapes this specific 
form of cultural poiesis is the presence of pre-fixed memory maxims, paradigmatic categories 
that underscore all forms of engagement with the past in Georgia (see chapters 2 and 4). Memory 
maxims function as “game rules” in that they define the boundaries of the “game” and make 
“moves” meaningful within those boundaries. Thus every “user” of memory has to orient her 
discourse toward these categories as indexed by the initial authoritative words to produce new 
meanings or reproduce old.   
The idea of a game becomes more evident in light of dialogism between a voice and a 
counter voice, reflected in the subtitle of this chapter. While the notion of voice is at the center of 
Bakhtin’s theory of utterance, the formulation voice, counter voice is a literary allusion to the 
novel by Alduos Huxley – Point, Counter Point which in its own right references the musical 
technique known as a counterpoint. A counterpoint is a kind of musical score composed of 
conversing voices that are interdependent harmonically, but independent in rhythm. This allusion 
makes sense in light of the context I am describing where two accounts of the same historical 
period were produced, each accenting one of the two voices given in Georgia’s bivocal memory 
paradigm. Much like in a musical score composed according to counterpoint, the two voices in 
Georgian memory are interdependent as the co-existing truths, but independent in their mode of 
articulation. Similarly two textbooks on Russian-Georgian relations were produced in a single, 
bounded discursive domain, as conversing parts of a single social script, but while one of the 
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textbooks accented the voice of self-idealization, the rival textbook was conceived as a counter 
account to the former one with an intent to re-accent the initial utterance and emphasize the self-
condemning voice. None of these accounts entirely silences either of the two voices, owing to 
the fact that both voices vocalize co-existing and interdependent “truths”.   
In this chapter I situate the two textbook projects in the wider sociocultural and 
geopolitical processes that shaped Georgia’s discursive landscape and triggered production of the 
textbook on Russian-Georgian relations. While focusing on the second, “rival” textbook in 
particular, I argue for the neccessity to understand the inherent dialogism in this text in relation 
to both the initial textbook as well as the “conceptual horizon” of the reader, the Georgian public, 
against which writers of the textbook were oriented (see chapter 4). In doing so, I appropriate 
another of Bakhtin’s notions closely tied to hidden dialogicality and speech genre, the 
phenomenon of “re-accenting” or “revoicing” (Bakhtin, 1986). This notion is central to his 
discussion of “translinguistics” and is inseparable from dialogism. In Bakhtin’s words “when we 
select words in the process of constructing an utterance... we usually take them from other 
utterances ...we choose words according to their generic specifications” (1986 p. 87). In other 
words, we construct utterances from words that belong to one or another speech genre, and 
speech genres, as Bakhtin notes, “submit fairly easily to re-accentuation, the sad can be made 
jocular and gay, but as a result something new is achieved” (1986, p.87) Reaccenting is a 
deformative practice that displaces the accent of the initial utterance and “relies on the sites or 
nodes of repetition or resistance within a social matrix” (Amsler 2012, p. 45).  
Re-accenting is important for understanding how social actors enact Georgia’s past to 
displace the accents in the symbolic matrix of Georgianness and produce shifts in how 
nationhood is signified. In other words, this deformative practice enacts the dialogism between 
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the two voices built in Georgia’s memory paradigm, but places an extended accent on the self-
condemning voice. Its ambition is to transform memory as a site of mythic, idealized conception 
of Georgianness into the frame of reference that is not abstracted and detached from the 
ontological order, but is mapped on it. The significance of this practice is in how it tackles 
critical sites of nationhood through symbolic language of memory and how it seeks to undo 
present reality by resorting to the symbolic forms that concern the nation’s past.  
 
5.2. THE ENEMY, THE NEIGHBOR AND THE “MIS-ORIENTED” GEORGIAN PUBLIC 
 
 
In June 2013, I went to the History Institute to record an interview with several historians 
who had written the textbook on Russian-Georgian relations; the textbook that remained 
unpublished for more than two years. Dodo, one of the authors, who was a welcoming and 
engaging woman in her 60s began by relating her approach to writing history along with 
expressing her own anxieties about this project and about Georgia’s political “fate” in general. 
Dodo’s quote below provides an entry into a range of issues that elucidate the ongoing socio-
political battles and position both the textbook and the authors in a wider scheme of events:  
 
Do you know what journalists wrote? That the same people who used to write parthistory 
(partistoria – history that was controlled by the communist party) are now writing this 
book and “How would they write it?” [they said]. I have to tell you I am a woman of the 
old generation, I published my first book in ‘72 (1972): poems; I am more of a poet, 
historian is my profession. I have never written a party (partiuli) poem, nor [anything] 
komsomolski (komkavshiruli – Young Communist Union)…As for this book I would not 
have taken it on, well you know, it is very difficult to write this book, for one because 
there are very different opinions among us and mostly overwhelmingly pro-Russian 
thinking (azrovneba - thinking mode, reasoning). As much as we say that this percentage 
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[of population] supports NATO, UN, Eurounion there still are those against it53. I can’t 
be certain on how this [research] was [done], I respect research and possibly it was 
accurate, but when I am looking at it, the greater part of society, especially the 
intelligentsia which is supposed to have a more European orientation, is more pro-
Russian and they think that Europe will export something that will degrade our values, 
traditions and that we are closer to Russia and that Russia is better in that sense and 
“What damage has Russia done to us?!” (ra dagvishava) - there is this opinion and we 
cannot escape it. For me as a historian the point of departure is Georgian statehood - 
whatever impedes or damages it, that I evaluate negatively. (Dodo) 
 
On May 5, 2010, the Georgian government passed a resolution according to which 
Georgia’s National Social Science Fund (Rustaveli Fund, hereafter RF) announced a competition 
for the production of a “thematic” history textbook on Russian-Georgian relations. Six project 
proposals were submitted to RF. Ultimately, a proposal by a group of historians from the History 
Institute was awarded the grant54 (hereafter I shall refer to their textbook as HI textbook). This 
was not, however, the first collaboration of these historians with the state. Earlier they had 
worked with Georgia’s Ministry of Defense for the project called the “Warrior’s Library” to 
produce a handbook of military history and had also been previously funded by RF for the 
project on “the history of Russian colonialism.”  
In their proposal for the current textbook on Russian-Georgian relations, authors Dodo 
and Vaja wrote: 
  
 In our work the emphasis will be on the following: the events taking place in Abkhazia 
and Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia), the attitudes of non-Georgian populations on 
ongoing political processes, the artificial ethnic conflict instigated by Russia, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Dodo	  is	  refering	  to	  several	  surveys	  conducted	  by	  the	  NDI	  (National	  Democratic	  Institute,	  a	  U.S.	  organization	  devoted	  to	  developing	  civil	  society	  in	  places	  like	  Georgia)	  over	  the	  years	  of	  2010-­‐2012	  according	  to	  which	  74%	  of	  Georgians	  agreed	  with	  government’s	  goal	  to	  join	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  70%	  agreed	  with	  NATO	  aspirations.	  In	  the	  same	  survey	  49%	  thought	  Russia	  is	  a	  real	  and	  existing	  threat	  to	  Georgia	  and	  30%	  thought	  that	  Russia	  is	  a	  threat	  but	  is	  exaggarated,	  only	  8%	  declared	  that	  Russia	  is	  not	  a	  threat	  according	  to	  the	  NDI	  research.	  (Public	  Attitudes	  in	  Georgia,	  National	  Democratic	  Institute	  	  February	  2012	  Survey)	  	  54	  Representatives	  at	  the	  Rustaveli	  Fund	  refused	  to	  give	  away	  the	  information	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  five	  proposals,	  hence	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  find	  out	  who	  were	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  other	  projects	  in	  the	  competition.	  
	   129	  
involvement of international organizations in the resolution of this problem, 
collaborationism, the struggle of Georgian emigrants against Russian imperialist politics 
in Georgia, etc. 
 
Evident from this excerpt is the extent to which both the state’s initiative and historians’ 
response to it were framed in terms of Georgia’s ongoing political battles. This entire project was 
carried out in a continuous state of urgency and with a sense of emergency triggered by political 
crisis. Vaja, director of the History Institute and one of the two authors of the textbook made a 
point of this pressing urgency during our interview: 
They were rushing us, quickly, quickly… even the headmaster of the (Tbilisi) No. 1 
Public School reviewed it, because we had to know how it would be perceived in 
school... Well, you know, school is a completely different sphere […] As far as I know it 
received positive feedback. At first, it had a hard time winning [the grant by RF] over 
those [competing] groups some of which were evidently pro-Russian. Once we won it 
was of utmost importance that we completed it in time and then unexpectedly even 
though we were rushed all the time, then it (i.e., the demand from the state) suddenly 
disappeared. No one told us what had happened and then I just know this that some were 
very much against it, because [they said],”Why is it specifically about the relationship 
with the Russia?” This was wrong in their opinion55. (Vaja) 
 
According to the initial plan the HI textbook had to be published by August 2010. It was 
intended as an addition to the high-school history curriculum. But because this project was 
intimately tied to the state agenda of Saakashvili’s administration, the shift in political leadership 
that took place as a result of 2012 Parliamentary elections altered the textbook’s fate.  Therefore, 
although Vaja and Dodo had completed their work on time, publication was delayed several 
times, even before the change of power in 2012 took place. Vaja, had his suspicions about the 
reasons driving the process. At the time of our interview in the summer of 2013 he was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Although	  Vaja	  did	  point	  out	  that	  it	  were	  not	  state	  representatives	  who	  criticized	  the	  approach,	  he	  refrained	  from	   naming	   specific	   individuals	   he	   had	   in	   mind.	   He	   mentioned	   that	   a	   member	   of	   “Euroclio”	   -­‐	   European	  Association	   of	   History	   Education	   that	   works	   in	   different	   countries	   to	   promote	   “European	   standard”	   for	  developing	  history	  curriculum	  -­‐	  was	  one	  of	  those	  critics.	  I	  later	  enquired	  with	  one	  of	  Euroclio	  members	  who	  denied	  any	  involvement	  of	  this	  organization	  with	  history	  textbook	  on	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  relations	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convinced that the textbook would never see the light of day (and in fact as of April 2014 it had 
not).   
 Both Vaja and Dodo emphasized the role of some anonymous pro-Russian groups in 
advancing hesitation or even fear of “irking” Russia. It seemed less probable, both to them and to 
me that any form of hesitation could be ascribed to Saakashvili’s government whose extensive 
anti-Russian rhetoric had been piercing through the years in the global and local community. But 
it made more sense in the context of the new government’s rhetoric. In fact Saakashvili’s rival in 
power, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili whose coalition won the elections in October of 2012, 
lured the Georgian public with the promise of a “balanced”, “mild” and “diplomatic” approach to 
Russia.  
 The context of the new government’s “mild” rhetoric and the proliferation of the 
discourse on the Orthodox kinship by the Georgian Orthodox Church facilitated a climate in 
which the expression of pro-Russian attitudes became publicly sanctioned. So much so that 
briefly after the October elections certain groups held demonstrations demanding that the 
“Museum of Soviet Occupation” be shut down.  As one of the protestors declared, the museum 
represented the effort of Saakashvili’s government to aggravate Russian-Georgian relations, 
shutting it down would have been a first step in normalizing neighbourly liaisons with Russia. In 
his words:  
...if we are talking about occupation in Georgia, then we must have a museum of 
Ottoman occupation, Persian occupation, Arab occupation. This land that we stand on 
right now was under Arab occupation for 400 years. In general throughout Georgia’s 
3000 years of history Georgia was occupied many times by different countries and if we 
establish museums for all occupations that would just be wrong.  
 
The shift in political climate and reinvigorated discussions on “normalizing” Russian-
Georgian relations had their impact on the textbook project. Most importantly, the state was no 
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longer interested in publishing the textbook and pursuing changes in the history curriculum for 
Georgian schools. In the eyes of Vaja these new circumstances also amplified the sensitivity 
toward Russia’s reaction:     
 
I know that it annoyed Russians severely as soon as they learned [about the textbook]. I 
know this because they came to me for an interview - BBC’s Russian representative. 
They obviously were speaking to me from the pro-Russian position that “we think 
that... well the only thing… that we are united, we have such Orthodoxy and you are 
saying that even that was bad?” (Vaja conveyed this almost inarticulate statement in 
Russian that sounded like a mockery of an “innocent” Russian argument about unity of 
Russians and Georgian in their Orthodoxy (“Hу, мы думаем что, единственное что 
мы, единое, у нас, такая, православие, а вы говорите, что и там нехорошо, что 
было?”) There was a big reaction from Russia in advance and it seems all of this had 
its impact on some circles and some in the form of fear, others knowingly, they 
blocked it. I think not printing it was wrong, because there was nothing out of the 
ordinary in there that could not have been delivered to pupils or the society.  (Vaja) 
 
The theme of the Russian-Georgian relationship presents an extraordinary predicament over 
lived and living, voiced and silenced imaginaries and sensibilities, even though most history 
textbooks (discussed in chapter 3) frame it as just another instantiation of Georgia’s perennial 
struggle against foreign invasions. Mainly because the memory of the Russian-Georgian 
relationship hinges upon the current political condition and as such embodies the unresolved 
tangle of present exigencies and future contingencies. As a result, it produces dual or ambivalent 
attitudes in interpreting the present political strategy toward Russia, but also in contemplating 
how events of the past must be judged.  
The war in August of 2008 played a crucial role in stirring up public sensibilities in this 
respect and further aggravated an internal fracture on what was regarded as a sensible political 
approach. President Saakashvili’s opposition blamed him for reckless, aggressive politics that 
provoked Russia’s military intervention. In some instances, people would express their attitude 
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toward Russia as one of toward a dormant Goliath who should not be disturbed and annoyed. 
Such views were usually expressed to me with an overtone of regret or a sense of a compromise 
and an admission that “Yes, Russia is an enemy, but…” This “but,” at times followed by silence, 
was a link in a chain of multivalent and multivocal arguments for rationalizing the acceptance of 
Russian power. The framing of the arguments varied.  Some made claims based on religious and 
cultural kinship between Russians and Georgians, others pointed to the inevitability of this 
political tangle.  Yet some explained their position in terms of the juxtaposition of Western 
versus Russian cultural influences on Georgian spiritual, national, cultural integrity. Many of my 
respondents articulated their perspectives with varied levels of intimacy, depending on the 
position from which they spoke or the nature and the context of the communicative exchange.    
At the same time, it seemed that in a post-war state of emotion many ordinary Georgians 
were compelled to think that dependence on Russia was an inevitable and necessary condition of 
Georgia’s existence. They usually justified their position with what they referred to as 
“realpolitik,” a term that embodies inherent juxtaposition to a certain form of “idealism” 
characteristic of memory discourse or the state’s performative rhetoric. Realpolitik questions the 
feasibility of Georgia’s Euro-integration and usually finds articulation in statements like: “The 
west will not engage in a conflict with Russia for a small country like Georgia”56.  With 
realpolitik individuals articulate reality in a “pragmatic” vision and posit it as a quandary of 
limited choice in the existing geopolitical triangulation: “What other choice do we have other 
than dealing with Russia?!⁠57” At the same time people employed the argument of realpolitik in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Throughout	  the	  years	  of	  my	  research	  and	  countless	  informal	  conversions	  I	  have	  heard	  such	  statements	  made	  more	  than	  once	  from	  a	  number	  of	  respondents,	  so	  although	  I	  place	  it	  in	  quotation	  marks,	  I	  am	  hesitant	  to	  identify	  any	  one	  particular	  individual	  as	  its	  author.	  	  57	  I	  have	  had	  different	  individuals	  articulating	  these	  phrases	  on	  multiple	  occasions,	  hence	  I	  cannot	  attribute	  it	  to	  any	  of	  my	  particular	  respondents.	  I	  have	  heard	  similar	  claims	  made	  in	  media	  outlets,	  on	  Facebook	  posts,	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parallel with, or sometimes against the justificatory frame of “Russia the Orthodox Brother”. 
Realpolitik allowed them to navigate this strained debate by evading moral pressure, which 
generally compels Georgians to identify Russia as an enemy. Such moral pressure exists more as 
a corollary of the mnemonic model and less because of the reality that Russian troops were 
located in less than 50 kilometers from the Georgian capital. In other words, in every debate 
about Russia’s role and the status or legitimacy of Georgia’s disposition toward Russia, most 
Georgians would experience a moral pressure to condemn Russia as an enemy and embrace 
resistance against it.  There is a sense of obligation to stay committed to the truth of the memory 
maxim that functions as a cultural imperative.  In any dispute on this topic, Georgia’s memory 
maxim assumes its hidden presence as a voice that is heard even when it is silenced. Contrary to 
this, discursive frames such as realpolitik, Orthodox kinship, or skepticism toward the west 
overshadows or conceals this moral imperative of the memory maxim. These frameworks 
introduce alternative categories that shift or shatter fixed and axiomatic definitions of who the 
enemy is and who is not.   
However, in the eyes of the state and the individuals with whom I worked, public attitudes of 
this sort signaled internal “disorientation” of the Georgians.  For them such going off the tracks 
was a repercussion of distorted or forgotten historical memories.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  during	  conversations	  with	  taxi	  drivers,	  sales	  associates	  in	  stores,	  my	  friends	  and	  family	  members,	  university	  professors,	  etc.	  In	  many	  cases	  even	  the	  wording	  was	  identical.	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From their point of view, this was a case where the memory-model did not work as an 
interpretive frame, because there existed no “right” and specifically appropriate memory-model 
and because the image of Russia (both past and present) was charged not with definitive and 
unequivocal meanings, but with ambivalent or dubious signifiers.58   
As a consequence, the state decided that such a model was needed to “properly” map Russia 
onto the schema of a paradigmatic memory narrative. “Reminding” the public of the atrocities of 
Russian rule, both during Tsarist Empire and the Soviet era was the main motive behind the 
textbook project on 200 Years of Occupation and “State Commission for Assessing Historical 
Truth.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  At	  the	  end	  of	  his	  presidency	  Saakashvili	  regretfully	  stated	  on	  several	  occasions	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  promote	  the	  memory	  of	  Russian	  occupation	  could	  have	  been	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  mistakes	  of	  his	  administration.	  He	  said	  that	  this	  should	  have	  been	  an	  issue	  of	  continuous	  discussion,	  that	  his	  administration	  should	  have	  put	  up	  posters	  at	  every	  school	  and	  engaged	  in	  extended	  public	  discussions	  (source)	  
Figure	  5.1.	  On	  the	  first	  anniversary	  of	  2008	  war	  with	  Russia,	  the	  Georgian	  government	  organized	  an	  open-­‐air	  exhibition	  “200	  Years	  of	  Occupation”	  in	  the	  center	  of	  Tbilisi.	  Above	  a	  dozen	  banners	  placed	  on	  Rustaveli	  Avenue	  displayed	  various	  archival	  material,	  documenting	  the	  last	  200	  years	  of	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  relations.	  (photograph	  taken	  by	  author)	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The state project involved a hidden dialogue with the part of the society that disapproved of 
aggressive rhetoric against Russia, with those who deemed that Russia’s animosity could be 
mitigated by religious kinship between the two nations. The goal was to dismantle the “illusion” 
that any form of constructive relationship with Russia was at all possible.  
The state campaign rested on the belief that history is a powerful metaphor that can reset 
individual mindsets and clear the ambivalence between “Russia-the-enemy” as opposed to 
“Russia-the-Orthodox-relative”.  The new account of the “200 Years of Occupation” was 
intended to reinstate fixed and certain definitions, projecting a clear image of the “reality” and 
produce a single, univocal interpretive schema for comprehending the current state of the 
Russian-Georgian relationship.  
Figure	  5.2.	  Open	  air	  exhibition	  on	  August	  7,	  2009	  (photographs	  by	  author)	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Memory, it seems, is a language in which discourse on national identity can be valorized in 
Georgia, and in this case national identity needed to be evoked in order to re-orient a “mis-
oriented” public. This is why the state memory campaign also sought to “remind” Georgians of 
the internal weaknesses and misdeeds of the Georgians themselves in the past and devise an 
analogy as a technique of disambiguation. In this regard, the moral impulse of the state’s 
rhetorical game was two-fold: it had to reinstate an image of Russia as an “ordinary villain” (no 
different from any other historical enemy faced by Georgia), and it had to emphasize Georgians’ 
heroic resistance and amplify Russia’s demonism (more emphasis on heroic struggle and more 
demonic enemy).  In this scheme the image of submission, betrayal and collaboration on 
Georgians’ part was to serve as an “identifying reference” (Ricoeur 2004) for the citizens, 
especially with regard to political leaders and public actors endorsing the possibility of a 
“dialogue” with Russia.  
Figure	  5.3	  Open-­‐air	  exhibition:	  “200	  Years	  of	  Occupation”,	  Tbilisi	  August	  7,	  2009.	  Citizens	  gathered	  around	  the	  exhibits	  at	  times	  engaged	  in	  heated	  debates	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  relations.	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Such was the premise for the rush to produce a history textbook on Russian-Georgian 
relations. While for Vaja and Dodo the fading of this urgency (before the shift in power) was 
inevitably tied to the influence of “pro-Russian groups” or “the fear” of exposing the truth, in 
fact, forces hindering their textbook might have had more to do with the competing project that 
originated in the Free University of Tbilisi (hereafter FreeU). In 2010 the founder, president, and 
owner of the university, Kakha Bendukidze, initiated writing a rival textbook. The group 
working under his personal supervision was comprised of several well-known intellectuals 
(mostly public figures tied to western NGOs), politically and socially active public figures, 
university faculty and only one historian (for more on FreeU and these actors see chapter 1).  
This group had well established links and influential standing in Saakashvili’s administration, 
Figure	  	  5.4.	  Exhibit	  from	  the	  open-­‐air	  exhibition	  “200	  Years	  of	  Occupation”	  with	  the	  Russian	  text	  “USSR	  209”,	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  period	  when	  Georgia	  was	  under	  Soviet	  rule	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first and foremost Bendukidze himself as well as several other members of the group and this 
might have played part in delaying the publication of the HI textbook.  
 
5.3. MEMORY GAME: THE LOCAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBAL 
 
This context serves as a point of departure for situating the struggle over Georgia’s 
geopolitical belonging and the resulting disputes on national identity and national politics within 
a public sphere where Soviet generation intelligentsia and liberal intellectuals animated the past 
in two distinct ways. This form of cultural action is what I call a “memory game”, and it 
represents a form of social poiesis that unfolds as a rhetorical game dialogizing two distinct 
voices and discursive genres on Georgianness.  While my primary focus is on the rival textbook, 
I examine the project in terms of its dialogic engagement with the initial HI textbook, owing to 
the fact that it was conceived as a counter-project from the very outset.  I follow behind the 
scenes deliberations of the group working under the FreeU umbrella. My treatment of this 
memory game as a social poiesis focuses on the function of this cultural engagement as a 
rhetorical strategy.  It is a form of address that employs a culturally meaningful symbolic idiom 
as its mode of expression in an effort to transform the consciousness of its addressee.   As such I 
situate my conceptual approach in philosophical and literary traditions concerned with matters of 
speaking and symbolic action. But for further analysis of the memory game itself, it is important 
to situate the social actors involved in this “game,” in the broader context of socio-political 
dynamics and along the lines of an ideological divide between the “intelligentsia” and 
“intellectuals” as distinct elitist formations.   
The distinction between intelligentsia and intellectuals is ideological, genealogical, and sub-
cultural. In the present context, both categories (intelligentsia and intellectuals) function more as 
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ascriptive terms that have value charged connotations rather than analytically descriptive ones. 
But the difference both emic and etic is significant for understanding the diverse vantage points 
that each represent in the context I describe.   
“Intelligentsia” is a construct of the Soviet era, invented for the proletariat’s upward mobility 
that was supposed to produce a social layer of administrative and specialist groups drawn from 
the lower classes (as opposed to the bourgeois intelligentsia) devoted to Soviet power (Fitzparick 
1979). Nevertheless, membership in this mutated form of class was determined by vague and 
arbitrary criteria and was far from being egalitarian (Narvselius, 2012). Individuals could have 
been included in this social circle not because of the symbolic, cultural or intellectual capital they 
possessed, or administrative status they occupied, but because they came from the family of 
intelligentsia.  
However, as Eleonora Narvselius points out in her study of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, their 
“actual sociocultural position in the state socialist system was in discord with their self-
proclaimed position as a cultural elite” (2012 p. 118). In other words, during the Soviet period 
the intelligentsia enacted a public space of double allegiance: on the one hand it served the 
Soviet state system of hierarchy as its “manipulated instrument of manipulation” (Narvselius, 
2012 p. 118); on the other hand, it charged itself with the role of a patriotic cultural guardian and 
later on, during late Socialism and the emergence of nationalism, became the locus of exclusivist 
nationalist discourse while maintaining its status (see Dudwick 1994). Dodo’s words quoted 
above are revealing in that sense. While she and my other respondents from the same community 
of historians, (see chapter 6) did not ascribe to themselves the category of intelligentsia, they did 
identify more prominent public figures as intelligentsia representatives. In contrast, others, 
especially the intellectuals I worked with, saw them as such. The intelligentsia is an internally 
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stratified social group; divided along the lines of social status and prominence as well as 
ideologies and political stances (e.g. pro-Russian, pro-Saakashvili government, etc) (see Wheatly 
for an insightful analysis of the mutated social class structure in the post-Soviet Georgia, 2005).   
The historians who authored HI textbook marked themselves off from the category of 
intelligentsia because in the given discursive domain this term had become synonymous with a 
pro-Russian orientation. On one occasion, I spoke with Dimitri about the issue, a historian of 
Soviet generation who had collaborated with the state established “Commission for Assessing 
Historical Truth” and had published several of his own manuscripts on Russian-Georgian 
relations. When discussing one of the prominent intelligentsia representatives Dimitri expressed 
his regrets on “Russophilia”59 among them and on their “disdain for Europe.”  
(NB): Why do you think these people should despise Europe? 
 
(Dimitri): Why? Oh that’s a good question, I liked it. I will tell you why. I have given 
much thought to this. Our intelligentsia has been raised on Russian culture and language. 
Language is very important… our generation mostly… well I love Russian culture myself 
Chekhov and Turgenev are my favorite authors but I was saved by the fact that I had 
admired west early on in my life, which began with the music and this music swayed me 
over toward Europe (As Dimitri related later, in 1970s he and his friends would listen to 
Jesus Christ Superstar, The Beatles, and Elvis Presley and he would go to “Leningrad” to 
buy Suzi Quatro’s CDs for 20 rubles which, he explained, amounted to one fifth of the 
average Soviet citizen’s salary at the time.) But for many this cultural and linguistic 
factor resulted in Russophilia. Well say for instance Robiko Sturua (Dimitri decided to 
use an example of Georgia’s one of the most renowned theatre director); let’s take one 
person as an example. He is well known in Russian society, don’t you agree?! His 
theatrical plays are products of the Russian world and he is renowned there while his 
productions are completely unknown in Europe. They were not able to integrate [with 
Europe] and they did not want to, because of a linguistic barrier.  
 
Dimitri’s explanation of Russophilia hangs on the question of how post-colonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Russophilia	  is	  commonly	  used	  by	  Georgians	  as	  a	  derogatory	  term	  that	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  groups	  or	  individuals	  who	  are	  in	  favor	  of	  Russia,	  but	  whose	  penchant	  for	  close	  ties	  with	  the	  Russian	  society	  is	  sustained	  by	  some	  unhealthy,	  particularistic	  and	  “primitive”	  interests.	  	  	  	  
	   141	  
subjectivities are formed and why the sense of nostalgia, especially among elite circles, prevails 
in many ex-Soviet societies. John Steinbeck after traveling to the Soviet Union (including 
Georgia) during the early years of cold war wrote the following on how Georgia occupied a 
special place in the hearts and imaginaries of many Soviets: 
Wherever we had been in Russia, in Moscow, in the Ukraine, is Stalingrad, the magical 
name of Georgia came up constantly. People who had never been there, and who possibly 
never could go there, spoke of Georgia with a kind of longing and a great admiration. 
They spoke of Georgians as supermen, as great drinkers, great dancers, great musicians, 
great workers and lovers. And they spoke of the country in the Caucasus and around the 
Black Sea as a kind of second heaven. Indeed, we began to believe that most Russians 
hope that if they live very good and virtuous lives, they will go not to heaven, but to 
Georgia, when they die (1999, p 144). 
 
Steinbeck’s perception is relevant here because it echoes Georgians’ own sense of their place 
among Soviet peoples. This self-image had become part of their sub-colonial subjectivity that 
granted them sense of superiority within the colonial hierarchy ⁠60. Against that, Euro-integration 
promises no special position on the margins of the European space, inferior both geographically 
and culturally. This is especially painful to intelligentsia whose elitism is deteriorating because 
of the gap between their cultural capital and the newly emerging “symbolic market” that has its 
reference in the European space (Bourdieu, 1984).       
(Dimitri): That is why they are antagonistic to European, Atlantic, American culture 
because they think it rejected them. So, here is the factor of cultural alienation. That is 
why they have been alienated not only to European culture but to the younger generation 
[of Georgians] as well. I might not like everything that the new generation does but they 
are progressive [thinkers] and are looking toward the West. 
 
 Dimitri was initially among the FreeU textbook group. I met him first during one of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Manning,	  Ram	  &	  Shatirishvili	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  “geopolitics”	  of	  19th	  century	  intelligentsia	  was	  expressive	  of	  their	  new-­‐found	  and	  ambivalent	  position	  as	  a	  relatively	  privileged	  colonial	  class	  under	  Russian	  rule.(Ram	  &	  Shatirishvili,	  2004)	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first deliberations at the Bazaleti training center (mentioned in chapter 1). But his method, 
approach, and perspectives on historical processes were in discord with the rest of the group. In 
2012 after a heated debate on one of his chapters (for the book) Dimitri left the FreeU project. In 
spite of his pro-western views, for the new intellectuals Dimitri was a “typical intelligentsia 
historian” because of his “academic habits”, his perspective on the “mission” of historiography, 
and his patterns of thinking about Georgia’s past (see Shlimerman, 1998 on the nationalist 
agenda of Georgian historiography, especially since late 1980s; also Kohl & Tsetskhladze, 1995 
on nationalism in the practice of Georgian archaeology). Bendukidze commented on this during 
our interview: 
This is the trouble with our historians [of that generation], they have a mission...and this 
was invented in the 19th century that “we now have to impose on people the myth of a 
united, strong Georgia [and] with that we will be able to form a united Georgian nation.” 
(Kakha Bendukidze) 
 
 Thus intellectuals (specifically the ones working on the rival textbook) devised the terms 
“intelligentsia” as a diffuse term to signify the source of an individual’s symbolic capital, i.e. 
education and career path (Bourdieu 1984) as well as a “nationalist mentality” or thinking pattern 
different from their own. 
In contrast to the term “intelligentsia,” the notion of intellectual wakes associations with new 
forms of knowledge and cultural capital stemming from Western oriented geopolitical 
alignments. Intellectuals have allegiances and affiliations with a different symbolic market and 
different ideologies of power.  As Narvselius explains, “unlike intelligentsia this term lacks a 
connotation of belonging to a community of ascribed virtues and, in principle, the core criterion 
distinguishing the intellectual is his or her outstanding ability of critical reflection” (2012, p. 
121). But in the definition of intellectuals I would emphasize the role of their affinity with 
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Western intellectual discourse and its patterns of thinking as well as political ideology inherent in 
democratic forms of citizenship. For instance, new intellectuals usually come from the circles of 
western NGOs that have played a crucial role in promoting processes leading to the Rose 
Revolution in 2003 and continued their social activism for the advancement of civic institutions.  
They also played a part in educational reform, and so forth. Janashia (see chapter 3) is a good 
example of this.  
The ideological clash that sometimes plays out between Soviet generation intelligentsia and 
the new intellectuals is reflected in the language of nationalism, allegiances to the homeland, and 
Georgian traditions and cultural values   (as we saw for instance, in chapter 3, between Janashia, 
a representative of the western oriented intellectual, and Tavadze a well established historian of 
the Soviet generation intelligentsia). The Georgian nationalist intelligentsia armed with patriotic 
vocabulary often accuses western intellectuals of a lack of devotion to the homeland, pure 
Georgian traditions and conservative religious values.  The intelligentsia charges them with 
adhering to universal, globalizing ideas which are  therefore threating to claims on the purity of 
Georgian culture (see chapter 3). In response to this, the new intellectuals criticize the 
intelligentsia for its double moral standards, standards that reflect the intelligentsia’s historically 
shaped dual position: “quasi-nationalists” who participated in the Soviet system and 
“collaborated” (as exemplary traitors from the perspective of the memory paradigm) in the 
reproduction of the “occupant’s” regime (Soviet system). When explaining why knowing “right” 
history is important, one of my respondents (from the group of intellectuals writing the history 
textbook on 200 years of occupation) critically commented on the intelligentsia’s role in 
Georgian politics: 
The reality is the same...the methods are different, I mean no one will invade you riding a 
horse, Russia does not even spend money to come up with new methods, it’s doing the 
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same thing and as always finds support from the inside. This never changes either, 
because collaborationism is deeply embedded [...] in this intelligentsia, this circle for 
whom [such an order] is advantageous, sometimes for very primitive reasons, that for 
instance she likes to fly up to Moscow to buy a fur-coat... As long as these people are 
opinion-makers in our society and as long as civic consciousness is such that [people 
aspire] to this circle of artists and singers, nothing will salvage us... collaborationism is 
enabled by the existence of such circle. (Ana) 
 
As evidenced by Ana’s response, these battles are also sites for contesting the right to control 
the dominant cultural forms that dictate social norms to the Georgian public (see Verdery, 1991). 
Thus, these contests are inherently political and embody conflicting desires on social order in the 
actual present and in the absolute future.  Disputes over memory are central to these contests. If 
not always explicit, “historical consciousness” (or the lack of “correct” historical consciousness) 
is always implied as an underlying matrix of cultural “mentality” and the discourse on memory 
frequently turns into an instrumental site for judging present political realities.  This is why I 
believe the context in which two history textbooks were produced is an important site where 
multiple sociopolitical vectors intersect and where discourses that are otherwise dispersed across 
diverse arenas become localized and acquire substance through the parallel and simultaneous 
discussion of past, present, and future as well as Georgian “self” and its sub-altern “other”. 
The memory game that played out in this critical discursive field represents an example of 
what Michael Herzfeld in his study of Cultural Intimacy refers to as a form of intimate social 
poetics where one can see how embedded cultural practices reflect “the local consequences of 
the global”  (1997, p. 37). The concept of cultural intimacy is at the crux of Herzfeld’s approach 
to nationalism. He urges anthropologists to contribute to the study of nationalism by looking 
“behind the façades of national unanimity” (1997, p1), and my study is partly a response to such 
a call. Given that some parallels can be drawn between my claim about Georgia’s internal 
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discursive field based on a bivocal mode of memory and Herzfeld’s interplay between different 
registers of national idiom. I will address some of his points to clarify similarities as well as 
differences in my conceptualizations of the Georgian case.  
Central to the Herzfeld’s concept of cultural intimacy are the spaces of cultural engagement 
where social actors express negative self-stereotypes that are sources of national shame, but at 
the same time play a crucial role in simultaneously subverting and reinforcing self-assuring 
national rhetoric. Cultural intimacy denotes such forms of engagement. It is indeed an apt 
concept for looking into how global processes are manifested in the local, culturally embedded 
forms of action and how the interplay of official and unofficial idioms construes ideologies of 
the nation-state. Yet his approach to “diglossia” – “a situation in which a national language is 
split between two ‘registers or social dialects’” (p. 14) places emphasis on the kind of social 
poetics in which social actors (ordinary people) use, reformulate or recast official idioms (a 
“high” register that is usually a property of elites or state officials) for certain unofficial goals.  
In contrast to this I present a case of the reverse process, whereby the intellectual elite de-
officializes the nation’s symbolism to achieve somewhat official political goals. In this process 
Georgia’s new intellectuals subvert the normalized form of discourse on the past that had been 
institutionalized and proliferated by the old Soviet intelligentsia to reconfigure nationhood. This 
process unfolds within the bounded space of cultural “semiosphere” (Lotman, 1990) where as 
paradoxical as it may seem social actors employ the “past” to lend immediacy to their 
pronouncements in the urgency of the present.   
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5.4. COUNTER-VOICES FROM THE PAST: MYTHIC ABSTRACTION AND “REALISTIC” 
OBSTRUCTION 
 
At some stage, for reasons that are themselves historical, most often spurred 
by controversy, collectivities experience the need to impose a test of credibility 
on certain events and narratives because it matters to them whether these events 
are true or false, whether these stories are fact or fiction. 
 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, 1995  
 
In September of 2010, following article by the head of Free University, Kakha Bendukidze, 
appeared in one of the leading Georgian magazines.  In it he wrote: 
 
From next year, teachers in Georgian schools will have an opportunity to use the 
handbook (secondary textbook) 200 Years of Occupation. 
 
The first time I heard of this yet non-existent book, I got very scared, that it would be 
some primitive agitprop, with its conspiracy theories and exaggeration of Georgianness. 
 
Then I figured, this might be one of the most important books, and not only for the school 
pupils. Why?  If you think that a cruel Russia integrated (annexed) the adamant Georgian 
people, but was unable to enslave  [the Georgian people], and for 200 years all of us 
heroically fought for freedom, and have completely preserved our culture, language, 
faith, integrity [or unity], then you need a fairy tale narrator, and it might be better that 
the book is not written at all.  
 
If you want to learn, how had we trashed61 lost many things, acquired something, more 
ugly than beautiful, still survived, and now we have to make something out of ourselves 
[…] then you need a different kind of book.  
 
What kind of book do I want? I want this book to: 
• Show Georgia and Russia in the context of the world's 200 year history 
• Tell about Georgian collaborationism 
• Show the emergence of Soviet phenomena among us such as the intelligentsia, 
double morals, and a seemingly (imaginary) equal society that is in fact deeply 
stratified...  
• Explain why Stalin and Beria were scoundrels62 and not praiseworthy Georgians. 
• Discuss how we became the country of legal thieves and what the Soviet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  The	   author	   actually	   uses	   here	   street	   jargon,	   the	   verb	   "gavfarchakdit"	   the	   root	   word	   is	   "far’chaki’"	   (i.e.,	  pitiful,	  surrendered,	  submitted	  and	  battered,	  the	  prefix	  “ga”	  denotes	  the	  process	  of	  becoming,	  the	  “v”	  in	  “gav”	  is	  a	  first	  person	  marker)	  and	  the	  verb	  here	  is	  dynamic	  passive.	  62	  The	  word	  he	  uses	  here	  literally	  is	  "no	  man"	  -­‐	  Georgian	  arakaci	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Georgian militia [police] was [he implies here how the militia was involved with 
mafia as legal thieves] 
• Analyze how the Georgian economy was decaying and how corruption in 
Moscow was part of this. 
• Make us think why in the first half of the 20th century Gelati monks and Akaki 
Tsereteli [a prominent Georgian writer and active social figure] wanted Georgians 
to convert to Catholicism. 
• Tell us how the Georgian countryside [provinces] became impoverished.  
• Remind us how Georgian "Tergdaleuli63" liberals emerged. 
• Teach us who Dimitri Qipiani64 was 
• Ask us which traditions are truly Georgian and which ones are Soviet formations 
• Describe why we have our current borders [territorial] 
• Accurately recover [reconstruct] the war with Russia 08.08.08 
• Ask us the following question: What did Russia/Bolshevik party knew [that 
enabled them] to bend our neck? 
• And many other things 
 
Don't know about you but it would not be useless for me to read such a book. 
 
 
Bendukidze’s manifest tackles diverse topics; diverse, because they address problematics of 
disparate cultural, ideological and political domains. For the author himself the list of questions 
includes some untold stories that are waiting to be revealed, and the stories that have been told 
yet need to be tested for their truthfulness.  His project, as hinted above, has no singular purpose, 
but goes beyond simply trying to demonize Russia. It contests most, if not all misconceptions of 
historical processes and their outcomes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Tergdaleulebi,	   literally	   those	   who	   drank	   river	   Terek	   (see	   chapter	   3)	   was	   a	   name	   for	   the	   19th	   century	  Georgian	   liberal	   intellectuals	  who	  were	   educated	   in	   Russia,	   hence	   had	   to	   cross	   river	   Terek	  when	   entering	  Georgia	  from	  the	  Caucasus	  (also	  see	  Manning,	  2004,	  2011;	  Suny	  1993).	  	  	  64 	  Dimitri	   Qipiani	   was	   a	   19th	   century	   writer,	   publicist	   and	   a	   public	   statesmen,	   leader	   of	   the	   liberal	  intellectuals.	   He	   was	   exiled	   and	   assassinated	   in	   1886.	   Kipiani	   is	   a	   significant	   figure	   as	   someone	   who	   had	  served	  under	  the	  imperial	  regime	  but	  whose	  work	  is	  valued	  for	  its	  nationalist	  agenda.	  HI	  textbook	  section	  on	  Kipiani	  is	  titled	  “In	  service	  of	  the	  enemy	  for	  the	  homeland.”	  In	  2007	  Georgian	  Orthodox	  Church	  canonized	  him	  as	  a	  saint.	  This	  is	  another	  example	  of	  how	  Georgian	  church	  appropriates	  and	  incorporates	  secular	  heroes	  into	  its	   sacred	   domain.	   Such	   monumentalization	   and	   sacralization	   of	   the	   figures	   like	   Dimitri	   Kipiani	   (or	   Ilia	  Chavchavadze	   who	   is	   also	   canonized	   as	   a	   Georgian	   saint)	   results	   in	   a	   crystalization	   of	   public	   figures	   that	  become	  canonical	  and	  intact	  and	  their	  image	  can	  only	  enter	  public	  debate	  from	  a	  single,	  univocal	  perspective.	  Such	  images	  cannot	  be	  reflected	  upon	  or	  critically	  discussed,	  but	  can	  only	  be	  venerated	  as	  authorities	  of	  the	  divine	  nature.	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When Bendukidze said “If you think, that cruel Russia integrated [annexed] the adamant 
Georgian people, but was unable to enslave  [Georgian people], and for 200 years all of us 
heroically fought for freedom, and have completely preserved our culture, language, faith, 
integrity [or unity], then you need a fairy tale narrator, and it might be better that the book is not 
written at all,” he subverts the fixed and normalized form of historical representation (see 
discussion on metanarrative chapter 2 and 3) not only specifically of the Russian-Georgian story 
but all historical narratives of invasion, resistance and preservation. Contrary to this, the “truth” 
reveals an ugly picture of  “how had we trashed, lost many things, acquired something, more 
ugly than beautiful.”  That is the image of the unexaggerated Georgianness that Bendukidze 
wants to transpose and explain within that image how Georgians “still survived,” and how they 
can “make something out of [themselves].” His discourse dialogizes the voice of self-idealization 
and the voice of self-condemnation and while he antagonizes and debunks the former, he 
inscribes the “truth” claims in the latter.  
In the eyes of Bendukidze and the group of liberal intellectuals working with him 
misconceptions about the past cultivate the image of “exaggerated Georgianness”, and these 
notions act upon the present by way of shaping Georgian citizen subjects’ reasoning mode with 
respect to political, economic, and cultural matters. As Bendukidze explained during our final 
interview: 
For the development of [civil] institutions it is important that we have certain models in 
our heads. Why do we act in one way or another?! We act rationally ⁠65 based on our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Bendukidze	  subscribed	  to	  an	  extreme	  right	  wing	  ideology	  and	  once	  metaphorically	  described	  the	  degree	  of	  his	   ideological	  belonging:	   “on	  my	  right	  side	   there	   is	  a	  wall.”	  Given	  that,	  whenever	  he	  used	  term	  “rational”	   I	  was	  compelled	  to	  wonder	  whether	  he	  took	  human	  rationalism	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  absolutism.	  So,	  I	  asked	  him	  once:	  do	  you	   think	  human	  beings	  are	   rational?	   In	   response	  he	   said,	   "It	  depends	  on	  what	  we	  define	  as	  rational.	  I'm	  not	  entirely	  certain	  ‘rationality’	  is	  the	  right	  word	  at	  all.	  Every	  act	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  rational	  from	  some	  perspective.	  If	  a	  men	  jumps	  from	  this	  window	  because	  he	  wanted	  to	  exit	  the	  building,	  we	  will	  regard	  it	  as	   an	   irrational	   act,	   but	   from	   his	   point	   of	   view	   it	  may	   have	   been	   perfectly	   rational.	   He	  may	   have	   sat	   and	  thought	  about	  it	  and	  from	  the	  way	  he	  perceived	  the	  world	  it	  may	  have	  made	  perfect	  sense	  to	  him,	  so	  it's	  not	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imaginaries about the world. For example if someone’s understanding of the world is 
such that she thinks Russia devoted itself to helping Georgia and tried as much as it could 
to support Georgia, we will act in accordance to this knowledge. That is why correct 
knowledge enables us not to repeat those mistakes and make new mistakes. That is one of 
the charming parts of knowledge that a human can make novel mistakes66 ⁠(Bendukidze, 
personal communication) 
 
As pre-conceived, the book project on 200 years of occupation in a sense had to accomplish 
the impossible. It had to turn the story of 200 years of occupation into a cultural omni-book, a 
liber magnus that could alter “the core of national consciousness.” The photograph below (see 
Figure 5.5.) is a snapshot of the Facebook page created by FreeU group that provides a small 
description of the mission and purpose of the book. Whether or not it successfully accomplishes 
this mission will be known only once it sees the light of day and enters public discussion. 
Making a judgment on this issue falls beyond the scope of this study.  
The “stock of stories” (MacIntyre, 1984) that Bendukidze alludes to in his article are 
meaningful to him as a member of a “textual community” (Stock 1983) because of how they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  irrational.	  Rationality	  is	  always	  about	  third	  party	  perspective	  and	  it's	  not	  right	  to	  devise	  the	  term."	  To	  that	  I	  noted,	   "You	   are	   a	   lot	  more	  post-­‐modern	   than	  you'd	   like	   to	   admit",	  Bendukidze	   smiled	  but	   asked,	   "Why?"	   I	  tried	  to	  explain:	  “Well,	  because	  of	  what	  you	  are	  saying	  right	  now;	   isn't	   it	  all	  about	  everyone	  having	  his/her	  own	  truth	  and	  that	  truth	  can	  be	  absolutely	  valid	  and	  legitimate	  from	  their	  point	  of	  view?"	  But	  he	  did	  not	  think	  of	  himself	  as	  post-­‐modern:	  "No,	  I'm	  definitely	  not	  post-­‐modern,	  because	  I	  just	  think	  rationality	  may	  not	  be	  the	  right	  term,	  but	  I	  do	  believe	  that	  most	  times	  people	  are	  adequate,	  otherwise	  we	  wouldn't	  be	  sitting	  here.	  	  Well,	  say	   for	   instance	   that	   there	   is	   a	   forest	   with	   animals	   and	   30	   lions	   are	   among	   them,	   do	   you	   think	   lions	   are	  adequate?"	   "If	   there	   are	   lions,	   then	   they	   are"	   I	   replied.	   Satisfied	   with	   my	   answer	   Bendukidze	   continued:	  "Good,	  that's	  right	  if	  they	  survive,	  then	  they	  are	  adequate.	  If	  their	  number	  increases	  to	  70	  that	  means	  they	  are	  adequate	  right?	  Well	  humans	  more	  than	  any	  other	  animals	  have	  had	  the	  greatest	  increase	  in	  population	  over	  their	   existence".	  Me:	   "But	   unlike	   other	   animals	   they	   also	   have	   the	   ability	   to	  manipulate	   their	   environment	  which	  does	  not	  make	  them	  any	  less	  adequate	  of	  course,	  so	  yes,	  I	  understand	  what	  you	  mean."	  The	  reason	  I	  am	  quoting	  this	  discussion	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  bracketed	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  “rational”	  as	  Bendukidze	  used	  it	  in	  the	  statement	  above.	  His	  understanding	  of	  human	  adequacy	  was	  inherent	  and	  somehow	  evident	  in	  his	  approach	  to	   people	   as	   a	   manager	   of	   the	   institution.	   His	   belief	   in	   a	   priori	   adequacy	   of	   human	   beings	   informed	   his	  conviction	   that	   when	   given	   a	   choice	   and	   sufficient	   information	   every	   individual	   will	   make	   the	   best	   of	   his	  opportunity.	   	   My	   impression	   after	   working	  with	   him	   for	   3	   years	   was	   that	   for	   him	   no	   one	  was	   inherently	  stupid	  or	  incapable.	  66	  The	  kind	  of	  “understanding	  of	  the	  world”	  and	  Russian	  Georgian	  relations	  Bendukidze	  mentioned	  is	  the	  very	  opposite	  of	  “the	  fairy-­‐tale”	  he	  criticized	  in	  his	  article.	  If	  in	  the	  first	  case	  Russia	  is	  a	  cruel	  enemy	  that	  Georgians	  continuously	  resisted,	  in	  the	  second	  case	  Russia	  appears	  as	  a	  protector.	  	  There	  is	  the	  paradox	  in	  these	  mismatched	  representations,	  but	  not	  of	  Bendukidze’s	  vision	  but	  of	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  memory’s	  dual	  paradigm	  which	  I	  discuss	  at	  length	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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engage notions of Georgianness and how they can transliterate terms of the present socio-
political setup. Testing their truthfulness was important not for what these stories are in and of 
themselves, but for what they do as models for understanding the world (or what he thinks they 
can do as models).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The remaining section of this chapter draws examples from both history textbooks as well as 
from discussions and deliberations (recorded by me) to unfold the central themes of this memory 
Figure	  5.5.	  	  Snapshot	  of	  the	  Facebook	  page	  set	  up	  by	  FreeU	  group	  on	  the	  textbook	  200	  Years	  of	  
Occupation.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  page	  was	  to	  invite	  people	  to	  contribute	  their	  memoires,	  photographs,	  personal	  experiences,	  or	  views	  on	  this	  historical	  period.	  The	  description	  of	  the	  page	  reads:	  “We,	  a	  group	  of	  authors	  are	  working	  on	  the	  textbook	  –	  
200	  Years	  of	  Occupation.	  This	  is	  a	  book	  about	  the	  events	  that	  made	  us	  lose	  independence	  for	  190	  years,	  which	  changed	  our	  life	  and	  soul	  and	  still	  impacts	  our	  present.	  We	  want	  this	  book	  to	  be	  about	  the	  people	  who	  lived	  in	  Georgia	  throughout	  these	  200	  years	  and	  were	  connected	  to	  the	  events...We	  offer	  you	  to	  take	  part	  in	  creating	  this	  book	  together	  with	  us...”	  	  	  	  
	   151	  
game. In understanding these texts and commentaries by their authors, one constantly has to keep 
in mind the pre-fixed paradigms of historical conception and memory maxims (discussed in 
chapter 3 and 4) because these categories define the terms of the game both implicitly and 
explicitly.  Based on these discussions I draw several theoretical conclusions about memory-
making (or memory using) as a form of symbolic action that employs the past as a metaphor for 
cultural engagement aimed at realigning current social order. 
 The fundamental difference between the textbooks produced by the History Institute 
historians (HI textbook) and the FreeU group (FU textbook) can be formulated in terms of the 
evaluative orientation each takes toward two main subjects: Russia and Georgianness. While 
both texts are similar in their intent to demonize Russia and the outcome of its rule, the 
perspective on Georgianness is a point where the two diverge. It is the stance they take toward 
the image of the Georgian nation that is the node where dialogism of two voices and re-accenting 
plays out.  
In the forward of HI textbook the authors address readers of their book by writing: 
The experience of ancestors will teach you that there are no benevolent occupiers, that 
the most valuable thing for humans is freedom and citizenship of an independent country, 
for which our ancestors shed blood throughout thousands of years.... they were defending 
the homeland, language, and Christianity. This book will teach you based on the example 
of one of our historical invaders... to account for the experience of ancestors or the 
world’s historical events in order to foresee the problems of the future... Enormous 
empires have vanished, great countries have ceased existing, but Georgia has survived. 
That is the result of our ancestors’ self-sacrifice... Beginning in the 15th century, Georgian 
kings were looking for an ally in their struggle against Muslim invaders. With this aim 
they tried to form an alliance with Russia along with other Christian states in Europe. 
After the fall of Byzantine Empire (1453) Russia remained as [Georgia’s] closest 
Orthodox [Christian] country and the desire for its support and partnership occurred 
naturally to Georgian politicians.  … Russia had its own interests and …when the time 
came, Russia did not pay attention to the destiny of a country fighting for its survival. It 
singlehandedly, piece-by-piece annexed [Georgia] and erased from the map a country of 
great historical past and culture. Russian politicians and scholars have been reiterating to 
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the present that Russia did not really invade our country but rather incorporated it in 
response to Georgian kings’ persistent requests. In reality none of the Georgian kings 
ever thought of resigning from the throne and rendering full rights to the Russian kings. 
All they wanted was protection and military alliance...  
  
 Evident from these introductory passages is the emphasis on Georgia’s victimization at 
the hands of Russia, and the accent is on the resistance and self-sacrifice of Georgians. Apart 
from that it makes a point of the benevolence of Georgian rulers’ intent in seeking alliance with 
the Orthodox power in their struggle to defend Christianity against Muslim invaders.  This 
forward in its own right dialogizes multiple voices present in the contemporary discursive 
domain, but responds to them by framing the argument on the basis of Georgian metanarrative 
(see chapter 2).  The phrase  “on the example of one of our invaders” is a figurative speech 
element, it is a rhetorical enticement that inevitably prompts any Georgian reader to recall the 
rest of “our invaders” and evaluate the present actor - Russia - not in isolation, but as part of the 
“genera.” The tactic of persuasion that the authors employ here relies on indirect insistence to 
hint how things must be judged, and this speech genre bases its persuasive power on the 
assumption of shared commitment to the “moral impulse” (White, 1981) of the metanarrative. 
 By accentuating the voice of self-idealization, projecting an ideal image of “ancestors 
...[who were] shedding blood... defending the homeland, language, and Christianity”, it devises a 
moral impulse embedded in this memory maxim to make an evaluative statement on what the 
right action or outlook toward Russia is in the present context; an action that realizes the ideal of 
Georgianness.   
 While throughout our interview, Vaja, (one of the authors of the HI textbook) pointed out 
examples of collaborationism, highlighted the “dualistic nature” of Georgians, their inclination to 
“give in” and “give up,” when discussing the content of the textbook, he explained why he 
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thought silencing these vices and accenting the voice of idealism was important in the present 
context: 
 [Georgians believe] that fighting this huge empire is pointless (saying this, he was 
simultaneously referencing the current context as well as the processes of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries) and this is why in our [textbook] rebellions appear more important, 
because if you do not beseech and remind Georgians of this spirit* [in Georgian he used 
the word “vein”] then we are lost. (Vaja) 
 
Vaja believed in what Chavchavadze wrote in his 1888 text that “when a nation remembers 
stories of great deeds, it is revamped, encouraged and inspirited ...[it] fights steadily, embraced 
with an example of its ancestors and their will, and only such a relentless fighter gets to keep a 
playground to itself ” (see chapter 3). Further comments by Vaja and Dodo, (who spontaneously 
joined us during the interview with Vaja) were triggered by the events of 1832 Georgian 
conspiracy against Russian imperialist regime. That attempted rebellion failed as a result of 
betrayal by the brother of one of the conspirators, but it remains a topic of lively discussion as an 
iconic narrative of both Georgians’ patriotic self-sacrifice and betrayal from the intimate circle of 
insiders.  This is a point that emerged in their discussion. 
(Vaja): The main thing here is a spiritual disposition. This is what the textbook was 
needed for. So that the only attitude [of Georgians] is not that of “we are idlers,” “we 
can’t win,” “we are small,” “we are no good for anything”. This must not be propagated, 
because such tendencies exist in all societies. Unless there is constant readiness [to resist] 
nothing will be salvaged. This tendency is the biggest failure, because we are a small 
country anyway, with a lot of problems, [internally] fragmented and if on top of that you 
constantly instill this [self-condemnatory sentiment] it becomes the greatest advantage for 
the occupier and a form of insurance that [the occupied] will abandon any idea of 
resistance... 
 
(Dodo):  ...and stay in slavery for tens and hundreds years more. It endangers independent 
statehood, this kind of thinking. 
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(Vaja): So, that rebellion [of 1832] might have been destined, but it did not let the spirit 
languish and a Georgian was always ready, with every opportunity, to awaken this 
dormant spirit. This is the point, or else how can you defeat Russia?!  
 
(Dodo, later in the discusion): I was at a conference in Gori,67 and they criticized me [for 
my views]...of course if in war Russia uses a nuclear weapon, no one will defeat it, 
neither we nor Americans nor anyone on the planet, but why should one fear this 
[resistance] if you were fighting Persians, all this history of wars that we have, all these 
victories, David the Builder, from here from there...it’s not that I am proposing that what 
happened in the past could happen now, but why should we not preserve in consciousness 
that with normal weapons, normal battle, in a normal war you can defeat someone or be 
defeated but not have this obsessive [fear]..?!  
   
Dodo’s words are especially revealing because her puzzlement over the “fear” of resisting 
Russia stems from her conviction that every Georgian is committed to the truth of the Georgian 
metanarrative and the memory maxims that are built in it. She is perplexed by the paradox of the 
conflict between historical paradigm that attests to Georgians’ constant resistance and defiance 
of powerful enemies, on the one hand, and their present unwillingness to enact this paradigm of 
“true self”, on the other. This predicament led Vaja and Dodo to devise a well-known memory 
paradigm as the “formula” (as Vaja coined it) for their book to inspire the Georgian nation. The 
HI textbook is populated with passages that emphasize the role of resistance against the Russian 
empire, and it frames these various uprisings as part of the nation’s common liberating 
movement. To illustrate this point I will quote two passages below from separate chapters of the 
book: 
(1): In spite of the defeat, the Georgian people once again showed its invader that it 
would never be subdued through national oppression; that Georgia would never run out 
of self-sacrificing patriots. The rebellion also revealed that the Russian occupier was in 
no way different from ... Turk-Seljuk tribes or Ottoman-Qizilbashs...  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Gori	  is	  a	  city	  in	  the	  eastern	  Georgia,	  approximately	  80	  kilometers	  away	  from	  Tbilisi,	  bordering	  disputed	  territory	  of	  South	  Ossetia.	  The	  city	  is	  known	  as	  a	  hometown	  of	  Joseph	  Stalin.	  Russian	  troops	  occupied	  Gori	  during	  2008	  August	  war.	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(2): The 1841 rebellion in Guria [a region in western Georgia] that took lives of many 
people was a part of the Georgians’ national-liberation movement, one more example of 
devoted struggle against Russian tyranny.  
 
If Vaja and Dodo believed that in order to defy the current predicament they found Georgia 
in, a historical account must posit a model that reaches out toward an absolute ideal, the group 
working at the FreeU was convinced of the very opposite. The FU textbook begins its narration 
of Russian-Georgian relations by presenting a jarring image of Georgians that sets up a 
displacing, deforming accent from the very outset. The opening chapter recasts the very first 
encounters between Russians and Georgians over the course of centuries in a very different way 
than Vaja and Dodo envision. Several episodes are covered, but in fact not discussed, analyzed 
or dwelt upon.  Instead, they are merely recalled in a general discussion on the topic: “The 
origins of Russian Georgian Relations”. The very first image recalled is an episode verified in 
the texts of the Armenian historian Stephen of Taron. In this connection the author of the FU 
textbook’s introductory chapter writes:   
Although the crucial turning point in several centuries of Russian Georgian relations was 
the 1801 annexation of the Kartl-Kakheti Kingdoms and incorporation of the country into 
the Russian Empire, the first verified encounter [of this sort that can be found] preceded 
[this] by eight centuries. The story [in the Armenian historian’s text] is depicted in the 
following manner: Approximately in the years of 1001-1002 the Georgians had 
peacefully concluded negotiations with their neighbors Byzantians. This relieved the 
tension and animosity between them. But in the meanwhile [while these negotiations 
were going on], Georgian soldiers robbed some hay from a Russian soldier from the 
brigade hired by the Byzantine army (at least that is what Armenian historian is telling 
us), which resulted in clashes between Russians and Georgians that shed blood. The 
outcome of this was the misfortune that broke over the entire southern-Georgian district, 
Tao: after the cruel Russian raid the country was destroyed, people were massacred and 
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not one Georgian nobleman survived68  (comment in the parenthesis in the original).  
 
What is the sense to be made of this episode? Why did the authors decide to project such 
an image? Georgians are portrayed not merely as inconsiderate and irresponsible, but are 
presented as bullies and wrongdoers who initiate a course of reckless actions with devastating 
effects for the country.  If interpreted in relation to the previous textbook and existing normative 
representations of the past, this episode obstructs the accepted and culturally legitimate image of 
Georgianness. But its purpose is not to destroy all possibilities of national self-assurance, which 
would be the case if this were a monologic, self-sufficient text, but to engage in an 
“antagonizing” critical dialogue with the voice of self-idealization in order to reveal the flaws of 
the Georgian character.  
Re-accenting as a deformative practice not merely diverts the center by reshuffling the 
content, but produces a different utterance by re-texturing the fabric of the text, creating new 
nodes for the unfolding of historical events. In order to produce an utterance that responds to the 
initial one, but shifts its meaning, it introduces a symbolically “polluting” episode like the one 
above (Douglas 1966) that transforms the tone. Contrary to the HI textbook that posits a model 
of distant idealism as an example to aspire to, the rival textbook puts forth a “lesson of 
mistakes”. This form of representation creates a sense of historicity that instead of being 
mythically abstracting is morally obstructing. As Ana, a member of the group who has worked at 
the Free University for years and who was instrumental in coordinating the writing process of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  The	  original	  text	  by	  Stephen	  of	  Taron	  is	  fully	  quoted	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  introductory	  chapter.	  The	  actions	  of	  Georgians	   seem	   even	   more	   reckless	   and	   outrageous	   in	   the	   original	   source.	   Here	   is	   the	   translation	   of	   the	  passage	   from	  the	   text:	   “Some	  warrior	   from	  the	  Russian	   infantry	  was	  carrying	  hay	   to	  his	  horse.	  One	   Iverian	  [Georgian]	  walked	  up	  to	  him	  and	  took	  the	  hay	  away	  from	  him.	  Then	  another	  Russian	  rushed	  to	  help	  him	  [the	  Russian	  warrior].	  The	  Iverian	  called	  his	  own	  people,	  who	  rushed	  in	  and	  killed	  the	  first	  Russian.	  Then	  all	  the	  Russians	  who	  were	  there	  prepared	  for	  battle;	   there	  were	  six	  thousand	  of	  them,	   infantry	  armed	  with	  spears	  and	  shields…	  The	  lords	  and	  vassals	  of	  the	  Tao	  [Georgian	  territory]	  came	  out	  together	  against	  them	  and	  were	  defeated.”	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textbook, pointed out:  
This is an attempt to show that history is not something hanging up in the air and the 
country is separate from it, but that history is those things happening in this country, 
those stories, things that were happening to people... We are not judging anyone or asking 
anyone to be a hero, but saying that there were a hundred thousand martyrs...well maybe 
there were but there was more of this [by “this” she refers to betrayal, collaboration, 
practices that reinforced “occupier’s regime”] and in reality there was more of this, 
because it was with support of such people [collaborators] that everything was being 
destroyed, which will possibly happen now too, in the near future. (Ana) 
 
What Ana was getting at by pointing out that history should not be abstracted from “things 
happening” on the ground was that mythic conception of the past and ensuing belief in 
Georgianness produce a major gap between real actions and their moral evaluations. To put it 
simply, because the conception of the self is abstracted from reality, it cannot sustain moral 
registers that enable judgment here and now.  During one of the deliberations on the textbook, 
Bendukidze formulated a similar point in rather explicit terms, grounding historical conception 
in specific practices of citizenship: 
I have formulated for myself two points. One concerns the purpose of general education 
and another the purpose of this book. The outcome of general education should be that 
after an individual graduates from school and is asked to serve as a juror, he can reason 
adequately with respect to a given case. The purpose of this book should be that when 
one is asked to serve as a juror on the case of espionage he can also reason adequately 
[italics indicate the point where Bendukidze accentuated his sentence]. (Kakha) 
 
Both Ana’s and Bendukidze’s words attest to the centrality of this historical account for 
the present context. It problematizes not Russian politics in and of itself, but the treatment and 
entailments within the Georgian polity. During our interview Beka, one of the FU group 
members who ran the center promoting religious tolerance69, pointed out that in his view the 
textbook on the history of 200 years had to give “realistic evaluation” of that period “which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69Tolerance	  Center	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Public	  Defender	  	  www.tolerantoba.ge	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means that we Georgians were not only occupied but we, Georgian society, have aided in every 
way this tragedy to be institutionalized which was reflected in the occupation, in the abolishment 
of autocephaly, in Russification and so forth”.   
While it was never brought up during working deliberations, such an outlook on 
“realistic” history existed as a tacit consensus among all members of the FU group. The 
“realism” for them entailed emphasis on the mistakes and flaws of the Georgians. The distinction 
between a mythologized and “realistic” past was stressed more acutely during interviews when I 
explicitly posed questions about the purpose and mission of this textbook and asked how it set 
itself apart from other accounts of history.  
Zaal’s commentaries on the topic were exceptionally insightful. As a writer and a scholar 
of literature who had taught at Georgian middle school for years and lectured at the university, 
his sense of history and temporality was informed with diverse experiences.  My interview with 
Zaal lasted for more than three hours.  In his lengthy and rich answers he swiftly moved between 
discussions of literature, poetry, history, and contemporaneity, and although there were many 
interesting points made I will quote here parts of his monologues that are relevant to the issue of 
“realistic” and “mythic” history.  
Zaal himself coined it in terms of “dead” or “frozen history” (gaqvavebuli literally means 
turned into rock. At times he used gaqvavebuli narativi which I translate as lithic narrative) and 
problematized Georgians inadequate temporal orientation in terms of “frozen” temporality: 
Our main problem is that for us... as a nation, as a living organism, time does not exist. 
We are psychologically static in time. And this is reflected in everything, absolutely 
everything, beginning from our morality, our urban culture and our daily customs. (Zaal) 
 
While pointing this muteness of temporality and discussing Georgians’ monolithic 
	   159	  
narratives of selfhood, Zaal continued by explaining how such backward oriented narratives of 
the self create a conflict with reality: 
The reason I think we don’t love history... well the thing is that we comprehend, we 
understand perfectly well that these obsessions of ours, our lithic stories are not real. 
Everyone comprehends this. It is impossible for a person not to understand this; and this 
then creates conflict between yourself and that monolithic narrative. You want to 
conform (correspond) to it, but you don’t, because you are alive and how can you 
conform to the flawless history; so the only way is to lie, not just to lie, but to deceive our 
own selves... so that we’ll do some things inside our homes and elsewhere, but it won’t 
count.  (Zaal) 
 
Zaal’s main point in his problematization of the conflict between real and ideal self was 
that this gap creates a site of liminality for morally unaccountable actions. For example, as a 
demonstration of his point he mentioned disturbingly littered streets of Tbilisi as a manifestation 
of an actual irresponsible and yet unaccountable habit, because in spite of this “reality”, he said, 
littering is not viewed as a Georgian habit.   
 
5.5. MEMORY:  LANGUAGE, MYTH, AND METAPHOR 
 
In spite of the emphasis on “realistic” history, the FU group and the HI historians shared a 
common cultural ground in their approach to memory as an important medium for “fixing” 
Georgian mindsets. They were united in the belief that re-projecting or re-ordering the past can 
create a realm of different order for transcending limitations of existence (Booker 2004). 
Throughout my field research I continuously questioned the logic by which Georgians (including 
myself) are compelled to think of memory as an ultimate and only resource to create or transform 
cultural models of thought—the sole language in which a persuasive and legitimate argument 
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about Georgianness can be articulated. One way to think of this is that such a logic is itself an 
outcome of culturally embedded practice. The past for Georgians (and possibly for other 
collectivities as well) is one of the most powerful metaphors not only on some abstract poetic 
level, but on an existential, life-forming one; a metaphor that Georgians live by and is itself a 
product of complex historicity (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003).   
As Lakoff and Johnson suggested we hardly ever reflect upon the metaphors that “we live 
by” (2003). Their point that metaphors are inherent not only to language, but to action and 
thought as well, informs my own understanding of memory-making practice as in its own right a 
metaphoric and a symbolic action. As a discursive strategy narrating the past creates a metaphor 
for representing or even untangling present reality.  But this form of cultural discourse employs 
the past not merely as any Aesopian parable, but as a symbol that fuses the abstract with the real 
to such extent that it no longer stands for its object of representation but is an indissoluble part of 
that object.  
Cassirer’s theory of symbolic forms can be used to account for this phenomenon. His 
philosophy is concerned with how humans in the process of creating the objective world produce 
“self-contained communities of meaning” (Coskun 2007, p.153). Cassirer thought that “various 
products of culture” like scientific knowledge, language, myth, art, religion, comprise symbolic 
forms that are “directed toward transforming the passive world of mere impressions, in which the 
spirit seems imprisoned, into a world that is pure expression of the human spirit”⁠ (1968, p. 80). 
In his view, symbolic systems in the process of serving as interpretive tools, become much more 
than practical mechanisms; they come to represent human effort at self-expression or self-
conception.  Through that process humans become what he called “animal symbolicum”—
dwellers of a symbolic universe.  For him, man has “…so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, 
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in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything 
except by the interposition of this artificial medium” (1962, p. 25).⁠  Cassirer’s essay Language 
and Myth provides one of the clearest accounts of his view on myth as a special mode of human 
thought which not only transforms reality by representing it in a certain light but is impregnated 
with self-expressive emotions:  
The mythical form of conception is not something superadded to certain elements 
of empirical existence; instead, the primary “experience” itself is steeped in the 
imagery of myth and saturated with its atmosphere. Man lives with objects only in 
so far as he lives with these forms; he reveals reality to himself, and himself to 
reality, in that he lets himself and the environment enter in this plastic medium, in 
which the two do not merely make contact, but fuse with each other (1953 p 10, 
italics in the original). 
 
The idea of symbolic objectification suggests that we cannot perceive our own selves 
unless we project through something else. The need for symbolic objectification in Cassirer’s 
view is born out of the human urge for the expression of deep emotions.  Hence, Cassirer states 
that what we must seek to learn is not the substance of a myth but rather its function in man’s 
social and cultural life (1974). This suggests that symbolic forms should be understood in terms 
of their communicative function within various settings of cultural engagement. Thus we should 
seek to look for symbolic actions and situate them in the contexts of collectivities’ critical need 
to resolve certain entanglements (whether political, cultural or existential) through symbolic 
mediation.  
From this perspective, I argue that symbolic action presupposes two kinds of 
engagement: one in which symbolic forms serve as a medium of objectification and the other in 
which existing symbolic forms themselves become objects of mediation. In other words, if in 
Cassirer’s words, reality is only given to us through the “plastic media”, we can only know how 
to tackle, act back upon reality through these very forms.   
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A crucial point in all this is that symbolic action (as any other form of human activity 
concerned with expression and mediation) grows out of a communicative setting. The need for 
“objectification” is never monologic and fixed, but inherent with dialogism and fluidity. 
Symbolic forms are properties of a speaking subject whose speech is conceived as being 
addressed to her imagined (or real) listener seeking to deliver a message.  
Although Cassirer did not incorporate this focus on communication in his philosophy, in 
my view Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of utterance complements and completes the analysis of 
symbolic action.  The views of these two thinkers stem from the neo-Kantian attempt to bridge 
the gap between “spirit” and “matter” (Holquist, 1999). Bakhtin’s thought on dialogism, as well 
as Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms can be taken as approaches to the epistemology of 
knowledge. It is a meditation on how we know and how we conceive of the self.  Bakhtin’s idea 
that being a self is an event, a drama enacted by more than one actor, implies that the 
construction of self is an ever transforming process, one that is never complete, and always 
includes a multiplicity of “voices” originating from the external world, from all our experiences 
and encounters with the others.   
 “Whatever else it is, self/other is a relation of simultaneity” (Holquist, 1999, p. 99), and 
this relation is always mediated by symbols, signs, cultural tools, and so forth, but most 
importantly by language. Bakhtin’s main emphasis is on the latter. But far from being simply a 
means toward achieving something his understanding goes beyond its expressive function and 
sees language as a key to consciousness, where there is “an intimate connection between the 
project of language and the project of selfhood” (Holquist, 1999, p.102).  
 My understanding of the two discursive genres on Georgianness is informed by such 
approach to symbolic action. The notion of multivoicedness (Bakhtin 1981) and relation of 
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simultaneity (Holquist 1999) is at the crux of “memory game” in question. This memory game 
entails a kind of construction of the Georgian self that is mediated by pre-given symbolic forms 
and is shaped by addressivity to the other. It emanates the idea that the construction of the self is 
an incomplete, heteroglossic and ever-transforming process of expression and contestation that 
takes place in the milieu of multiple speaking subjects.  The Georgian “self” is expressed through 
symbolic forms such as memory narratives, (memory is a collective’s language of “self”-
articulation), but these forms embody two polarized yet simultaneous voices that articulate the 
nature of the Georgian self. One can take a stance, reflect upon things, produce meaning, and so 
froth, by employing either one of two voices (e.g., as Bendukidze did in employing the self-
condemning voice), but it speaks not as a self-contained, isolated or self-sufficient voice of truth, 
but only in a simultaneous relation to the other one.   
 The writing of these two textbooks represents precisely this form of symbolic action. 
Both projects employed the past as a distinct form of speech genre with an aim to say something, 
to deliver a reality-transforming message (performative utterance), targeting particular listeners.  
Memory-making here is a way of doing “things with words” with both “constative” and 
“performative” purpose in mind (Austin 1962).   
The recourse to memory in both cases carried a similar mission: to dismantle “the myth” of 
Russia’s brotherhood and to re-orient Georgian citizens in their political interpretations. But 
while the intelligentsia historians took on this mission with established modes of “historical” 
discourse aimed at reinvigorating a voice of “idealism” in dominant memory paradigm, the new 
intellectuals sought to accomplish the same task by devising the voice of “self-condemnation” 
and re-accenting the very memory paradigm that was in place. 
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CHAPTER 6: CATCH-83: KING EREKLE’S DOUBLE BIND AND THE 
RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN DILEMMA 
 
 
 
 
 
6.6. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mary Douglas in her influential work Purity and Danger wrote that objects that cannot be 
neatly fit into any of the binary categories of a culture are deemed polluting and dangerous. Such 
objects generate the sense of ambivalence that upsets the order of the social world and thus 
become tabooed (Douglas, 1966). But what happens when a group’s conception of order allows 
for the co-existence of dichotomous qualities? When we-ness is construed in terms of a 
relationship of simultaneity between the “pure” and the “dangerous,” between ideal and flawed? 
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When tendencies such as unity and rupture or devotion and betrayal, are conceived as equally 
inherent and natural to the notions of “selfhood”? What I have argued so far demonstrates that 
the defining symbolics of Georgian identity embody two contradictory formulas of Georgianness 
and thus give birth to two counteracting, but mutually constitutive voices. Two discursive genres 
on the nationhood evolve out of the Georgian memory’s bivocality with two distinct but 
dialogically interdependent voices.  
In the previous chapter I have tried to show how the dialogism between the two voices plays 
out in the memory game on Georgia’s past with all its social, political and cultural significance, 
and how it taps into the current socio-political conditions. In this concluding chapter I want to 
expand the argument on bivocality and explore the simultaneity of “pure” and “dangerous” in a 
specific memory image. This chapter will bring to the forefront an individual who is possibly the 
most paradigmatic figure for the memory of Russian-Georgian relations; namely, Erekle II, an 
18th century King of the Kartl-Kakheti Kingdom (the Eastern Georgian Kingdom). Erekle was 
the first Georgian ruler to sign a treaty with the Russian empire, creating a foundation for the 
consequent annexation of all Georgian kingdoms. His contested image acquires primacy in the 
context of Georgia’s current geopolitical complexities. And its interpretations and discussions 
always take on a double temporal orientation, as they critically interweave past and present and 
embody the simultaneity of contradictory elements of Georgianness. In the context of this study, 
his figure is significant as a site of contestation, but also as a monumental image – a single 
embodiment of the all-meaningful, critical, and contradictory categories of Georgianness 
stemming from the memory paradigm. Erekle II and his decision create a node in historical 
memory where voices of both self-idealization and self-condemnation collide. These two voices 
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contemplate Erekle II in two distinct ways and while they unfold into contested visions of 
Russian-Georgian relations, they conceive of two alternative pasts and presents.   
 
 
 
6.2. HISTORICAL PREAMBLE: ’83 GEORGIEVSK TRAKTAT 
 
 
In 1783 the Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti signed a treaty (Traktat) with Russia at Georgievsk in 
the North Caucasus. The treaty contained thirteen articles, four additional “secret” articles and an 
oath of Erekle’s allegiance to Russia.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	  5.1.	  Map	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Kingdoms	  and	  Principalities	  in	  the	  18th	  century.	  The	  approximate	  location	  of	  Georgievsk	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  yellow	  circle	  (underneath	  Russian	  Empire).	  The	  red	  line	  denotes	  current	  political	  borders	  of	  Georgia	  that	  include	  disputed	  territories	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia.	  	  	  (source:	  www.burusi.ge)	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Treaty provisions maintained the following: Russia was to preserve the integrity of Erekle’s 
territories; all Georgian monarchs were to be approved by Russia; Georgian monarchs were 
forbidden to establish relationships with foreign rulers without Russia’s approval; Erekle (and his 
heirs) was obligated to support Russia’s military campaigns, and the Catholicos-Patriarch was to 
be subordinated to the Russian Synod. In addition, one of the “secret articles” stated that Russia 
would serve as the arbiter in disputes between Georgian monarchs (See Rayfield 2012). 
 
6.3. A BIVOCAL KING AND THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA 
 
 
“King Erekle had a bitter war with Dagestanis and defeated them. After the 
victory the King was returning home with his army…Erekle entered a 
country road…Suddenly someone threw a fistful of plums at him. Astounded 
King stopped. So did his army. They looked around and saw a twelve year 
old Ingilo70 girl sitting on a huge plum tree…The King’s accompanies 
rushed toward the fence and yelled at the little girl: “You fool, what have 
you done? How dare you throw plums at the King?” “What? King Erekle 
you say?,” exclaimed the astonished girl from above. “What are you saying? 
Had it been our celebrated King Erekle, would he put a Persian hat on his 
head? No that is a lie, I threw plums at a Persian, our vicious enemy and not 
King Erekle who every Georgian loves as his God…” 
 
Iakob Gogebashvili, Folk legends on King Erekle 
 
“Once when Georgians suffered in war, King Erekle asked the Russian 
general Totleben for help, only with the purpose of uniting the country and 
successfully conducting the matters of his homeland. But Totleben betrayed 
him and ran away in fear”  
 
“People lovingly referred to Georgian King, Erekle II as “little Kakhi” 
Stories of King Erekle 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Ingilo	  is	  a	  19th	  century	  term	  describing	  someone	  from	  Saingilo,	  the	  district	  that	  was	  initially	  part	  of	  the	  Caucasian	  Albania,	  incorporated	  in	  Georgia	  in	  8th	  century.	  After	  Russian	  annexation	  of	  the	  Kartl-­‐Kakheti	  kingdom,	  Saingilo	  became	  part	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire.	  It	  is	  currently	  a	  territory	  of	  Azerbaijan.	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Many of the key issues constituting the memory discourse on the Russian-Georgian 
relationship unfold in terms of the competing perspectives on King Erekle II’s decision to sign 
the Georgievsk Treaty with Russia in 1783.  A result of this treaty was that Georgia became a 
colony of the Russian Empire. In many conversations I have been part of, the disagreement on 
the “Russian issue” somehow leads to mentioning of Erekle’s decision as a fateful act of a man 
upon which the destiny of an entire nation has hinged. “Erekle’s decision” has been an issue of 
contention and contestation not only today but in the 19th and early 20th century intellectual 
terrain, and this is reflected in poetry and prose (e.g. N. 
Baratashvili’s poem Fate of Georgia 1839)  
The debate on Erekle’s decision to sign the treaty 
with Russians is one of “what if” contemplation: What if Erekle had not allied with Russia? It 
takes a stance based on an alternative present and alternative future which could have been, but 
did not come to be as a result of one man’s decision.  It presents a conundrum of an alternative 
reality, and because of that, this historical momentum and Erekle’s figure is invested with 
insurmountable ambivalence and undefiable gravity at the same time. In all instances, Erekle’s 
decision is judged from the perspective of the present context based on what Georgians already 
know about Russia and about what has happened since 1783.  
But Erekle represents a paradigmatic figure not only because of the historical momentum that 
he was an indissoluble part of, but because his own image incorporates the dual paradigm of 
Georgianness and invokes the ambivalence of Georgians in judging both their respected King 
and the outcome of his decision. To employ Douglas’s conceptual framework of binary 
opposition, Erekle II’s iconic figure can be read in both a “pure” and a “dangerous” way. He is 
both a venerated King, defender of Christianity, skillful and brave warrior as well as an 
Figure	  5.2.	  Erekle	  II	  in	  Persian	  headdress	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uncertain, naive, misguided, failed politician who carries the burden of the nation’s “tragic” fate.  
Nevertheless, rather than being silenced or tabooed Erekle is an indissoluble part and an 
anchor of the political debates on Russian-Georgian relations. Interpretations of this memory 
image, the ways in which individuals judge this decisive moment in time and the King who 
belongs to that moment (or to whom this moment belongs), once again demonstrate the 
dialogism of the two voices in Georgian memory. In that sense, Erekle represents a sort of 
prototypical case among all memory images in that it fuses two contradictory tendencies in a 
single body.     
Erekle’s decision is justified, especially when Russian-Georgian religious kinship is 
employed as an interpretive schema vis-à-vis the existing “threat” in 18th century.  At the time 
Georgia was at risk of remaining under pressure from two Muslim empires, the Ottoman and 
Persian. In a column titled “Erekle II – The Tragedy Of An Enlightened King” that was 
published in 2013 in a popular online magazine Georgia Today, the authors pose “Erekle’s 
Dilemma” in the following manner: 
The country was too weak to remain independent, and Erekle was forced to sup with the 
devil. Faced with the choice of making a pact with greedy Russians in the North, who 
were Orthodox Christians, or with the less imperialistic but more aggressive Persians in 
the South, who were Muslims, he opted for the Russians. How would you have decided?     
 
At the same time, many Georgians evaluate Erekle’s move as a political failure, a 
misjudgment of Russia’s political agenda based on naiveté and the weakness of Erekle’s 
character. For instance in the same article the authors write:  
Erekle arguably underestimated what it meant to invite the Russian Bear to his kingdom, 
and probably he did not expect his decision to have consequences that would reach into 
the 21st century. Nonetheless, he well understood that Russia was a dangerous ally, and 
he tried hard to instead get the French on board. 
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The dualism becomes even more acute with the fact that in 1789 Erekle rejected the 
possibility for the unification of the western and eastern Georgian kingdoms. As Donald Rayfield 
writes (2012) the prospect of unity was undermined by royal feuds between Erekle’s heirs: 
“Erekle’s heir Giorgi eloquently evoked the dangers of disunity. But Erekle’s second wife 
Darejan disliked her stepson Giorgi she wanted her daughter’s son, Solomon II, to rule Imeretia 
(the western kingdom of Georgia) in his own right. Erekle tended to yield to Darejan and her 
clique: Imeretia and Kartl-Kakhetia remained separate…” (2012, p. 254). This fact is silenced by 
those who prefer to frame Erekle’s actions in rather positive terms, but underlined by those who 
ascribe many of the king’s decisions to his narrow, particularistic concerns to keep the throne 
within his royal clan.  
In all instances, these evaluations look backward in time from the perspective of 
consequent processes as Russian-Georgian relations unfolded in the way they did, and as such, 
they carry the mystic scent of retrospective mind-reading, entertaining the versions on “what 
Erekle thought” or “what Erekle knew.” In the end, Erekle in his own image embodies the 
bivocality of Georgianness—a heroic King who gave in and made a decision that is justifiable, 
but inexcusable because of the competing voices of Georgianness. This was one of the debatable 
issues for the FreeU group in writing 200 years of Georgia’s Occupation and the point where 
their voice counteracted the voice of “intelligentsia” historians. 
 
6.4. EREKLE’S WINDOW TO EUROPE AND HIS STEP TOWARD RUSSIA 
 
 
Dimitri (mentioned in chapter 5) was a historian in his 60s who thought that it was of 
paramount importance to realize Erekle’s figure correctly. During our interview, it became clear 
to me that Dimitri approached this issue not merely out of scholarly (or even political) curiosity. 
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It rather seemed that he was battling his own sense of ambivalence and sought to resolve 
Erekle’s dilemma with a different interpretive frame, first and foremost for his own moral 
certainty. In the introduction to his book Georgia and Russia: Lessons on the 500 Year Relations 
(unpublished draft given to me by author) Dimitri wrote:  
One of the most demonstrative examples of subordinating the interpretation of historical 
processes to political interests is the battered figure of Erekle II. Today, so-called pro-
Russian circles use him as their historical symbol and project him as a devoted warrior 
for the advancement of Russian rule in the Caucasus. At the same time they try to fit the 
18th century context into present reality and in this way justify their pro-Russian foreign 
orientation. Such a stance gives rise on the one hand to the contemplation of Erekle II as 
a pro-Russian politician, and on the other hand, yields the contradictory, radical 
assessment according to which “little Kakhi” is represented as a destroyer of the 
Georgian state, as a foolish and naive politician. It is exactly such mutually exclusive 
logics that couch discussion on the centuries long history of Russian-Georgian relations.     
 
Having read this introduction that juxtaposed two opposing perspectives with a hint that 
neither one did justice to the matter, I asked Dimitri: 
(NB): What kind of figure is Erekle II for you?  
 
(Dimitri): Well, this is an unresolved issue not only for historiography but for our society 
too, and neither my nor any historian’s opinion will solve this issue because our society is 
divided in two. One party absolutely adores him, and another one [despises] him. Now 
where is the solution? Well, here’s my solution and I am looking at this a little 
differently, although I do not possess much evidence to support it.  Nevertheless I think 
that Erekle thought not so much of preserving his state or anything else.  Instead, his 
main aim was to lead the Georgian people and the country out of  [and here he spelled 
each word, stressing meticulously the point he was making] the Ottoman-Kizilbash 
environment. He wanted to move them away from any sort of Asian developmental path. 
This was most important for him, his imperative idea. Georgia’s Europeaniziation was his 
major strategy.  This perspective sets Erekle apart from the rulers who preceded him. 
They viewed Russia as an ally, as a protector. Erekle’s line was different because his aim 
was to drive the Georgian people out of this environment. Even if it cost him the loss of 
statehood. What are we to do?! (Dimitri sighed) We were in a tragic circumstance. Erekle 
could have remained under Persian protection. Agha-Mohammed-Khan was even 
begging him to do so, but to this [Erekle] was not responding. 
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(NB): Yes I know of that letter Agha Mohammed Khan sent him…71 
 
(Dimitri): Yes, [Agha-Mohammed-Khan said to Erekle] if only you remain [under my 
protection] I would subdue the entire Caucasus to your rule.  But now, I am asking 
you…we should approach this problem more existentially… well, because states are 
much like humans. A nation is a living organism and is like individuals, because after all 
it’s a collection of individuals and the state is a guardian institution. So, here I am asking 
you as an individual and we can discuss this together: Is a human’s sole purpose his/her 
physical existence? Well there are people for whom it is the only purpose, but aren’t there 
people who along with physical existence deem spiritual, intellectual…development to be 
important?! Is that not so?! So I think, Erekle viewed his state from this perspective. He 
wanted the Georgian people to distance themselves from Asian development and 
progress toward a European path of development.  This was a path of intellectual, 
economic and cultural development…  
 
There are two culturally meaningful elements that allow Dimitri to make his interpretive 
schema work (for justifying Erekle’s decision) in a way that makes sense not solely to him, but 
in terms of a culturally acceptable logic. The first one concerns the idea of the statehood being 
secondary to the purpose of the nation. Here Dimitri relies on what is given in Georgian historic 
ideation (see chapters 2 and 4) and is justifiable in terms of Georgia’s memory maxims. As we 
have seen in the analysis of textbooks, preserving Georgian spirituality is a mission of a much 
higher order than sustaining a political entity. Such an interpretation of nationhood stems from 
the conception of Georgia’s past as a repeated cycle of invasions and occupations. From this 
perspective, Georgians preserved their nationhood under the rule of various invaders because of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  In	  1795	  Erekle	  received	  the	  following	  notice	  by	  Agha	  Mohammed	  Khan:	  “Your	  Highness	  knows	  that	  for	  the	  past	  100	  generations	  you	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  Iran;	  now	  we	  deign	  to	  say	  with	  amazement	  that	  you	  have	  attached	  yourselves	  to	  the	  Russians,	  who	  have	  no	  other	  business	  than	  trade	  with	  Iran…	  You	  are	  a	  90-­‐year-­‐old	  man	  and	  how	  are	  you	  making	  such	  a	  mistake:	  you	  have	  let	  these	  impious	  in,	  attached	  yourself	  to	  them	  and	  even	   given	   them	   rights!	   Even	   though	   your	   faith	   is	   different	   from	   ours	   you	   always	   had	   a	   connection	   with	  Iran…It	  is	  now	  our	  will	  that	  you,	  an	  intelligent	  man,	  abandon	  such	  business	  and	  cease	  relations	  with	  Russia.	  If	  you	  do	  not	  obey	  this	  order,	  we	  will	  shortly	  carry	  out	  a	  military	  campaign	   in	  Georgia,	  we	  will	  shed	  blood	  of	  Georgians	  and	  Russians	  together	  and	  will	  let	  it	  pour	  like	  river	  Kura.	  We	  deemed	  it	  necessary	  to	  notify	  you…so	  that	  you	  take	  our	  order	   into	  account	  and	  realize	  your	  situation”	  (partially	  quoted	  in	  Rayfield,	  omitted	  parts	  translated	  by	  author)	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cultural and spiritual steadiness. This memory maxim underpins Dimitri’s reasoning mode.   
The second element Dimitri employs in his framework concerns the current political 
ambition of Georgia with regard to being part of Europe. But here again Dimitri follows the line 
of reasoning that is already part of the public discourse and the statist rhetoric of Saakashvili’s 
government that Georgia’s European orientation is a perennial aspiration and not a contemporary 
invention.  
Dimitri’s interpretive frame that echoes the present political discussion is founded on the 
modern understandings of the nation and essentialist views on nationhood and closely resembles 
the reasoning mode we saw in the Georgian students’ discussion of tradition and modernity (see 
chapter 4). As one student wrote in his essay for “independent reasoning”: 
Culture is directly related to the existence of a nation and its definition as an independent 
entity…To me, generally, a nation does not mean a group of people who have territories and 
sovereign state.  A nation may not be independent, but it still exists as long as it preserves its 
culture and traditions (Tengo, 18 years old) 
 
Dimitri’s interpretation suggests a similar understanding of preserving nationhood and 
assumes that Erekle saw Russia as a window to European civilization and a secure gatekeeper of 
Georgian Christianity. Incidentally, Donald Rayfield in his discussion on Erekle makes the 
similar point that “Russia was Georgia’s door to Europe”, but he also points out:  
Traktat …was the deadliest document any Georgian king signed. Many Georgians saw 
the Traktat as a greater infringement of sovereignty than even the shah’s suzerainty. 
Prohibiting independent foreign policy, …the implied Church union threatened Georgian 
autocephaly. King Erekle knew the danger: he suffered recriminations for collaborating 
with Russia in the 1770s... He knew how Catherine had divided Poland. But he…thought 
the Traktat was their sole option: Russia was relentlessly conquering the Caucasus, the 
Black Sea and the Caspian. [Erekle] had to side with the victors  (2012, p. 251 italics in 
the original).  
 
But why would Erekle think of Russia as a door to Europe? Dimitri’s comments on this question 
led him to a different genre of socially and politically significant issues that again, points to the 
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situatedness of this memory discourse and reflects the dialogic nature of Dimitri’s 
interpretations; suggesting that his frames are meaningful in how they respond to others’ voices 
in the Georgian public sphere:   
At the time, although I am utterly against Russian politics, I think that Russia of the time, 
despite its barbaric nature, compared to Qizilbash and Ottoman countries was kind of a 
European state. A brilliant Russian aristocracy was raised on French and European 
literature and this was the Napoleonic period…French was in fashion…and our 
aristocracy imitated Russian aristocracy. At least Russia was a window to Europe. That is 
why I do not criticize this big decision of Erekle’s…but I completely dissociate myself 
from these Russophiles….these Russophiles use Erekle’s personality as their flag. Poor 
Erekle! These black nationalists… This dark black, irrational nationalism. I feel so bad 
that Erekle is a symbol of this Russophilic political camp.  (Dimitri) 
 
By Russophile nationalists who use Erekle as their “flag” Dimitri was referring to the 
“Society of Erekle II”, an organization that has been promoting the idea of “regularizing” 
relations with Russia and abandoning plans for Georgia’s Euro-integration. This is the society 
that enlisted a couple hundred individuals (no official record exists) and was in charge of 
organizing protests aimed at shutting down the Museum of Occupation in 2012 (see previous 
chapter). They have been especially vocal in blaming Saakashvili for the deterioration of 
Russian-Georgian relations (see chapter 5), and while accusing liberal-intellectuals of being 
“traitors sold for American dollars” they claimed that the Orthodox kinship with Russia was of 
paramount importance for preserving Georgian nationhood.   
So, although one might be puzzled by the fact that Dimitri describes pro-Russian groups as 
“dark nationalists”, in fact these groups in their rhetoric employed a juxtaposition of Russian 
versus Western culture associated with the discourse on “pure Georgian traditions”. These 
overtly pro-Russian groups emphasized the threat that European culture may pose to Georgian 
spirituality, especially to Orthodox Christianity as a pillar of Georgianness.  
However, this in a sense paradoxical symbiosis of Russophilia and nationalism was not (and 
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is not) confined to the extremist groups like “Society of Erekle II”, but with varying degrees has 
found resonance in a number of social circles, especially among individuals who unquestionably 
adhered to the rhetoric of the Georgian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Ilia II. As pointed out 
earlier (see chapter 1) the rhetoric of the Georgian Patriarch had played a crucial role in 
advancing public sensibilities in this respect. The implicit aversion toward Georgia’s 
Europeanization was articulated in terms of nationalist claims that at the same time fused 
national identity with Georgian Orthodoxy (this is also evident from some of the students’ essays 
in chapter 4). The individuals Dimitri had in mind have appropriated this religiously framed 
argument along with somewhat chauvinistic attitudes in their pro-Russian claims. Although, I 
was aware what Dimitri had in mind when he mentioned “irrational nationalism” of the pro-
Russian “camp”, I asked him anyway: 
(NB): Don’t you think that Russophilia and nationalism are mutually exclusive? How is 
that possible? 
 
(Dimitri): Yes, but that’s how they understand, for example Dima… what’s his last name, 
an actor from Sokhumi72 
 
(NB): Jaiani 
 
(Dimitri): Yes, Jaiani. Considered separately as a person, he is a man who loves his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Sokhumi	  is	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  Abkhazia,	  a	  disputed	  territory	  on	  the	  eastern	  coast	  of	  the	  Black	  Sea	  (see	  chapter	  1).	  All	  ethnic	  Georgians	  fled	  Abkhazia	  during	  the	  conflict	  in	  1990s.	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country, his homeland, and he is an excellent ‘tamada’73 [toastmaster of the ritualistic 
Georgian feast]. There’s nothing better than sitting with him at the table, he will tell you 
poems and you will think there is no greater patriot than him. But he is a distinguished 
Russophile. He despises Europe, he despises the West, hates America. Well, what can 
one do?! This was caused by our geopolitics - that one part of our society sees salvation 
there and another one sees it in Europe.  
 
After few more comments on the intelligentsia’s ideological outlook and their political attitudes, 
Dimitri concluded his monologue with the following: 
Here, again we are facing Erekle’s dilemma: his dilemma was Asia or Russia and he 
chose Russia. But don’t forget! He did try to contact Europe and did not receive anything 
in return. We should never forget this! And here we have a new choice: Russia or the 
West? (Dimitri) 
 
Dimitri’s response suggests, that apart from the religious rhetoric, Russophilia has its basis in 
different socio-cultural domains attached to the Russian space, especially as it concerns the 
intelligentsia circles. But it also shows how society’s present anxieties find articulations 
mediated through images from the past; how memory and in this case memory of Erekle 
becomes a site of contestation for legitimizing political claims.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Incidentally,	  intellectuals	  who	  critically	  reflected	  on	  idealized	  versions	  of	  Georgian	  history	  associated	  these	  “mythic”	  notions	  on	  “Georgianness”	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  Georgian	  feast	  and	  performative	  toasts.	  As	  one	  of	  them	  commented:	   “when	   I	   think	  of	   all	   these	   idealized	  notions	  of	  Georgianness,	   all	   that	   comes	   to	  my	  mind	   is	   the	  Georgian	   toast.”	   Toast-­‐making	   is	   a	   semi-­‐stylized	   ritual	   performance	   during	  Georgian	   feast	   (Georgian	   supra	  literally	  means	   tablecloth)	  that	   for	  Georgians	  occupies	  central	  place	  among	   their	  unique	  and	  distinguishing	  cultural	   forms.	   (Some	   of	   the	   students	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   4	   mentioned	   this	   custom	   to	   claim	   that	   such	  traditions	  should	  not	  be	  abandoned	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  modernity	  because	  they	  represent	  unique	  qualities	  of	  the	  nation).	  There	  is	  a	  certain	  order	  of	  toasts	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  followed,	  with	  slight	  variations	  depending	  on	  the	  occasion.	  For	  instance,	  there	  is	  always	  a	  toast	  for	  God,	  homeland,	  family,	  siblings,	  and	  so	  forth.	  As	  Beka	  who	  was	   a	   scholar	   of	   theology,	   noted	   (see	   chapter	   5)	   “the	   Georgian	   feast	   is	   a	   tradition	   strengthened	   during	  Russian	   [imperialism]	   and	   this	   relates	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   real	   life	   confiscated	   from	   the	   Georgians	   was	  compensated	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  toasts,	  for	  instance	  he	  [a	  Georgian,	  fought	  [the	  battle]	  or	  had	  his	  own	  church,	  none	  of	  this	  existed	  any	  longer	  in	  his	  real	  space	  and	  the	  only	  arena	  for	  him	  was	  the	  supra.	  That	  is	  why	  toasts	  resemble	  religious	  service	  this	  much.”	  The	  Georgian	  language	  has	  no	  gender	  and	  the	  pronoun	  is	  refers	  to	  both	  female,	   male,	   animate	   and	   inanimate	   objects.	   But	   I	   translate	   here	   specifically	   as	   “he”	   because	   supra	   is	   a	  dominantly	  male	  domain	  in	  Georgian	  culture.	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6.5. WE DIDN’T PASS THROUGH TO EUROPE, DID WE?! 
 
 
“This was, a huge... how to say, timebomb planted in Georgian politics - the ’83 Traktat.”  
This is what Dodo a historian who co-authored the state ordered textbook on Russian-Georgian 
relations pointed out to me. I met her for an interview at the History Institute. We sat at her desk 
in a shared office with four other deserted tables. Our interview started off with the discussion on 
the unpublished history textbook she had co-authored (HI textbook). In a few minutes, as we got 
to the actual historical questions charged with political context, Dodo’s responses flowed almost 
as if she unleashed a stream of consciousness displaying the carnival of historical imaginary, 
interwoven with present political exigencies. Dodo was so in synch with my questions that I 
almost did not have to ask any.  Her monologues embodied chains of texts in which her dynamic 
speech wove together all the issues I was interested in, one flowed into another almost without 
interruption. Much of the way she articulated historical issues vis-à-vis Georgia’s present social 
and geopolitical challenges corresponds to how these issues are interwoven in the public 
discourse. Her way of conveying thoughts reveals how this discourse flows in real life debates 
and the extent to which individual utterances are shaped by the “sideward glance” toward others’ 
words (Bakhtin, 1981). As we touched upon Erekle, Dodo commented on 1783 Georgievsk 
Treaty 
When you are signing this treaty, you are ceasing foreign relations with everyone, [you 
are] not conducting [any relations] without Russia. What kind of politics will Russia 
allow you to have with the Khan of Ganja, the Khan of Yerevan or any other North 
Caucasian Khan…?! It [Russia] will let you conduct politics that benefits itself, is that 
not so?! And up until then, the Khan of Ganja, the Khan of Yerevan were subordinate to 
Erekle, practically they were under Georgian protection…and all of this was 
destroyed…of course that’s what… (here she cut her sentence short with another 
intervening thought)…we talk with Dimitri very often about this and we fall into this 
[self] contradiction, but we justify [Erekle’s decision] by the fact that Georgia wanted 
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Europe and Europe rejected it altogether and it [Georgia] was induced to pass through74 
to the European world via Russia. This was certainly a benevolent [intention], but we did 
not pass through, did we?! In no way did we pass through, because Russia, to this day 
despises Europe. Even today there is a big deal about Europe. Go see! Listen to the 
Russian Duma, politicians, that NATO, that this EU!…maybe they have their negative 
sides, every union does, but our natural path, a Christian one, is European. We had a 
Byzantine orientation, which was a European orientation. Yes, it was on the territory of 
Turkey, but it was a European country based on Christianity and European 
culture…(Dodo) 
 
Dodo’s monologues were lively and dialogic, not only because her speech addressed my 
questions, but because she constructed her utterances in response to the chain of texts, debates, 
and counter-arguments that were out there in the public realm. She responded to disparate 
speakers and at times her speech would have seemed incoherent, inarticulate unless the listener 
was already aware of the voices she was chasing in her answers.   
Dodo’s criticism of Erekle takes a stance based on a present reality, it retrospectively projects 
a historical outcome to judge actions in the past. Her rhetorical question “…but we did not pass 
through [to Europe], did we?!” points to this retrospective projection of the present reality. It 
inscribes Erekle and his decision in an existing network of geopolitical relations in which 
“Russia despises Europe”.  
Both Dodo’s and Dimitri’s mode of reasoning demonstrate how issues of Georgia’s present 
geopolitical entanglement enter into the interpretive realm of historical processes. The opinion 
that “we have no other choice than to deal with Russia,” expressed to me (among others) by a 
taxi driver is intimately intertwined with this memory discourse of “what if” contemplations. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  The	  verb	  she	  uses	   in	  Georgian	  for	  “pass	  through”	  gasvla	  (gavedit	  evropaze)	  denotes	  action	  when	  one	  gets	  through	  some	  barrier	  and	  arrives	   from	  one	  place	   to	  another,	   for	   instance	   in	  a	   competition	  getting	   to	   finals	  would	  be	   finalashi	  gasvla.	  In	  the	  verb	  gasvla,	  prefix	  “ga”	  denotes	  outward	  movement,	  root	  svla	  is	  moving	  or	  walking,	  thus	  gasvla	  in	  daily	  speech	  stands	  for	  exiting,	  going	  out	  e.g.	  saxlidan	  gasvla	  exiting	  home.	  The	  phrase	  “passing	   through	   to	   Europe”	   (evropaze	  gasvla)	   is	   a	   peculiar	   form	   for	   Georgian	   speech,	   in	   terms	   of	   type	   of	  action	  or	  movement	  the	  verb	  gasvla	  implies,	  and	  while	  Dodo	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one	  who	  employs	  such	  a	  linguistic	  form,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  generic	  phrase.	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instance, for the FreeU group an alliance with Russia was not “the only alternative” Erekle was 
facing. This is because for them “Orthodox Christianity” is not the ultimate paradigm through 
which Georgianness is, or must be conceived. Hence, for them this retrospective ”what if” 
contemplation allowed for the alternative “routes” of Georgia’s geopolitical alignment. During 
one of the deliberations Bendukidze entertained the idea of including “a game” in the textbook, 
an exercise for pupils (for whom the textbook was intended) to debate: “What if Georgia chose a 
different orientation, for instance Iranian, which probably would have been the most right one or 
Turkey if you will?” (meeting at Free University, September 3, 2011).    
However, the ambivalence that is implied in this multivalent and historically charged 
political debate sometimes boils down to the following question: Would Russia eventually 
invade Georgia anyhow with or without Erekle’s decision? How one answers this question is not 
a matter of ability to imagine an alternative past, but is an issue of a specific stance that an 
individual takes toward present geopolitical challenge.  This is how Dodo reflected on this 
question: 
 
Yes, Russia could have invaded [us anyway], just as in 1921 … When you begin to fight, 
nobody knows who will win and who won’t. In that sense Germany started WWI being 
convinced it would win, in the second [WWII], too, but…it is often said that small 
nations should not go to war, because they will be destroyed and it’s better for them to be 
submissive. This is completely…completely unacceptable! Even though I am a mother, I 
have children and war is awful, yet if a small country does not fight…in the way we 
always fought against big countries, I want to say, never once did Georgia have an enemy 
of its own size. The Persian Empire was huge, the Ottoman Empire was huge, and…I 
don’t know…here we were fighting Russia, there were rebellions. We were always 
bitterly defeated, but in any case, humans fought and this heroic spirit and this 
consciousness that a nation must fight for its integrity and for its statehood, this must not 
be lost, otherwise a nation will become obedient, and nothing, nothing…(Dodo) 
 
In answering this question, what matters for Dodo is not the outcome of Georgians’ 
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resistance against a big enemy, but the act itself as a testament and guarantor of nation’s 
existence. This is why in the state sponsored textbook that she co-authored the emphasis is on 
Georgians’ ability to fight great battles; they appear as brave warriors who have helped Russians 
win some of the most important military campaigns, and they would never resign themselves to 
accepting defeat. 
The way Dodo related to Erekle’s decision (among other things) during our interview stood 
in stark contrast with the embellished portrayal given in her textbook. While in conversation, 
Dodo admitted the “self-contradiction” that she and other historians encountered in evaluating 
these historical events, the textbook representation of Erekle embodies the voice of self-
idealization and transposes events and actions into a veiled and much less conflicted narrative:    
At the end of 18th century, the interests of three states were facing one another in the 
eastern part of the Caucasus: Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire. The 
Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti did not have much choice: there was no alternative to Russia, 
being closest to the European civilization. King Erekle tried to gain support from Europe 
in 1781. With the help of Italian missionaries he sent letters to the Emperor of Austria, 
Joseph II, Doge of Venice, and to the kings of France, Naples, Sardinia, and to the 
Pope…In 1782, in parallel, he asked Catherine II for assistance…Russia’s new political 
and diplomatic agenda included eradicating Persian-Ottoman influence in Georgian and 
the Caucasus and establishing Russian dominion... With the fear that European monarchs 
would get involved in the matters of Caucasus, Catherine II ordered [her representatives] 
…to sign a treaty with the kingdoms of Kartl-Kakheti and Imereti…According to 
Georgievsk Traktat the Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti accepted the Russian Emperor’s 
supremacy…As for the internal affairs Kartl-Kakheti, they were to be maintained in an 
independent way. Russia in turn was taking responsibility for [Georgia’s] everlasting 
protection…the Emperor pledged to make every effort to return to Georgia every single 
territory seized by its enemies… 
 
The section on Georgievsk Treaty is concluded with the following paragraph that is 
highlighted in bold font: 
…The insistence by Russian historians that Georgian Kings willingly handed the country 
to Russia is inconsistent with historical reality. None of the Georgian kings gave up his 
kingdom…Limited sovereignty does not amount to the abolition of the statehood, and 
	   181	  
against the background of serious political processes, according to existing norms of 
jurisprudence, signing such agreement was a normal phenomenon. Russia exploited the 
Traktat and by force, and piece-by-piece, seized Georgia, abolished its longstanding 
monarchy… which until then had not been done by any other invader.  
 
 This portrayal accomplishes several things.  On the one hand, it not only maps Russia 
onto the list of Georgia’s enemies, but exacerbates its negative nature by emphasizing that none 
of the other invaders had abolished a Georgian monarchy up until then. This is why it was 
important for Dodo (as she pointed out earlier, see chapter 5) to approach Russian-Georgian 
relations from the standpoint of Georgian statehood and judge events based on such a 
perspective. She devised it as a lens that implicitly rendered Russia as a greater villain than for 
instance, Persia or the Ottoman Empire.  
 On the other hand, in representing the historical processes leading up to 1873 Traktat, she 
and Vaja devise a perspective that frames Erekle’s actions as the only logical alternative. 
Specifically, the following elements justify the king and unburden him from the responsibility 
for committing a fateful mistake: a) “The Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti did not have much choice.  
There was no alterative to Russia, being closest to the European civilization.” This statement not 
only presents things from certain perspective e.g. “Russia being closest to European 
civilization,” but imposes an evaluative judgment “there was no alternative to Russia” for 
justifying the choice made by the King of Kartl-Kakheti; b) the comment that “King Erekle tried 
to gain support from Europe in 1781” emphasizes the point that Erekle made every effort before 
turning to his last and only resort: Russia; and c) the argument that “according to the existing 
norms of jurisprudence, signing such an agreement was a normal phenomenon” stresses that 
Russia breached the agreement that under “normal” circumstances would not impinge on 
Georgian statehood.  
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6.6. THE CONDEMNED KING 
 
Contrary to justificatory frameworks devised by an older generation of historians, the 
FreeU group’s perspective on king Erekle relied on the voice of self-condemnation. It grounded 
the discussion of historical processes and political actions in the “realistic”, down to earth 
portrayal of a Georgian monarch guided by particularistic or pragmatic interests. This team 
sought to re-accent “idealized”, “exaggerated” or “embellished” narratives by de-
monumentalizing historical figures like Erekle. In their discussions and text, political actions 
were not framed in terms of Georgia’s perennial mission or spiritual ideals; instead, historical 
figures were stripped of such monumentality. A dialogic interchange from one of the 
deliberations exemplifies their approach: 
(Beka): We should write this, that Erekle did not unite Georgia, have we written this 
anywhere? 
(Merab): Yes you have raised a good issue, I agree. 
(Beka): There is a text by Amirejibi75 on why Georgia should have united 
(Ana): Oh right, I have read it… 
(Beka): In any case, that’s that! We should write that he did not unite Georgia and he 
changed the rule of throne inheritance, this played a huge role in the abolition of the 
monarchy [by Russians]; it was an absolutely senseless rule. 
(Ana): So we are writing that he did not unite Georgia because of his grandson (Ana is 
making notes while everyone is expressing ideas on what kind of material should go in 
the chapter) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Shalva	  Amirejibi	  (1887-­‐1943)	  was	  a	  Georgian	  poet,	  political	  actor.	  He	  was	  the	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  National	  Committee	  that	  declared	  Georgian	  independence	  in	  1918	  before	  Red	  Army	  invaded	  Georgia	  in	  1921.	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(Beka): Yes let’s write that, by all means. 
(Irakli): We should also write about Darejan76. 
(Beka) Right, she said [Darejan] that “I want to be just like Catherine” [Russia’s 
Emperor]; and she even organized a small revolt against Giorgi XIII, I mean XII… 
 
 Their insistence on portraying Erekle’s and his wife’s clan interests detaches Erekle from 
the idealized narrative. The king no longer appears as a monumental figure who made a decision 
after thinking through his country’s spiritual ideals or perennial geopolitical aspirations.  Instead, 
he is portrayed as an individual caught up in typical royal intrigue and disoriented by a set of 
complex circumstances. The FU Textbook has no highlighted paragraphs with justificatory 
statements, no assertions on Erekle’s European aspirations.  Instead, it emphasizes the negative 
outcome of the Georgievsk Treaty:  
Signing the Georgievsk Traktat irked both Ottomans as well as Persians. In 1785 with the 
encouragement of the Ottoman Empire, a Dagestani army (of 20,000 warriors, but 
according to some other sources 11,000) invaded Kartl-Kakheti. Erekle was unprepared 
for this campaign. Russia on the other hand did not provide assistance…The Georgievsk 
Traktate aggravated Kartl-Kakheti’s political situation. At the beginning of ‘90s Erekle 
II’s relationship with Iran became tenuous…In 1795 the Shah of Iran invaded Kartl-
Kakheti with the army of 25,000 warriors.    
 
Against the HI historians’ efforts not to disgrace Georgia’s legendary King, the FU 
group’s perspective strips Erekle of his monumentality and benevolence (even naiveté) and 
inscribes him into a domain of the profane. But abasing Erekle is not the raison d’être of this 
text.  Instead, the intended purpose of their deformative practice is to deconstruct the discursive 
frame on the inevitability of a Russian-Georgian alliance. Re-casting Erekle’s figure rewrites the 
context of his decision and disenchants the reader from the coherent narrative (like the one in HI 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Erekle’s	  second	  wife.	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textbook) that stretches to the ideal but reinforces the idea that “Georgia had no other choice.”  
 
6.7. CONCLUSION 
 
 The case of memory discourse on Erekle is telling in several respects. On the one hand, 
what is remembered and what is forgotten about Erekle is very much shaped by the current 
political setup and discursive demands in Georgia that are underpinned by socio-political 
conditions. In this respect it shows how remembering and forgetting of the historical past adapt 
to the present needs of the group; how memory images are appropriated depending on one’s 
ideological or political standpoint; and how memory becomes a metaphor, a symbolic resource 
for making and contesting political claims.  
Nevertheless, the memory dispute on Erekle instantiates the bivocality of Georgian 
memory. Contesting representations of this historical figure invoke both the voice of self-
condemnation and the voice of self-idealization. The polemic on the “1783 dilemma” is 
sustained by the dialogicality between these two voices. At the same time, this case demonstrates 
the primary claim of this study, namely, that a memory game, whatever the given socio-political 
conditions are, remains grounded in the pre-shaped discursive traditions and is bounded by the 
culturally pre-fixed paradigms of historical thinking.     
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